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Abstract 
 
This dissertation studies the causes and consequences of policy responsiveness towards 
ethnic minorities in democracies worldwide. I argue that the literature overlooks still existing 
limits of political equality in democracies, because the assessment of the quality of represen-
tation largely relies on the degree of policy responsiveness towards the median voter. The 
primacy of the median voter in policy making is not only normatively problematic, but also 
empirically relevant as it may put the sustainability of democracy at risk. A lack of respon-
siveness towards certain segments in society may lead to dissatisfaction among excluded 
groups, the questioning of a democracy’s legitimacy, and intergroup tensions (e.g. conflict). 
For these reasons, a good democracy should aim at an equal consideration, formulation and 
inclusion of the preferences of all its citizens.  
In sum, this dissertation shows that policy responsiveness differs significantly between 
minority and majority groups and that governments are often less responsive to members of 
minority than majority groups. The fact that governments are less responsive towards minori-
ties in many democracies is normatively problematic because one of the main pillars of de-
mocracy seems to be only partially fulfilled. But it also has important empirical consequenc-
es: a lack of policy responsiveness negatively affects political support, and increases the like-





Diese Dissertation untersucht die Ursachen und Folgen von Policy Responsiveness ge-
genüber ethnischen Minderheiten in Demokratien weltweit. Es wird argumentiert, dass die 
bisherige Literatur bestehende Grenzen von politischer Gleichheit in Demokratien übersieht, 
weil die Beurteilung von Policy Responsiveness den Medianwähler zum Referenzpunkt 
nimmt. Dies ist nicht nur aus normativer Sicht problematisch, sondern hat auch empirische 
Konsequenzen, weil fehlende Responsivität gegenüber Minderheiten die demokratische Stabi-
lität gefährdet. Mangelnde Responsivität kann zu Unzufriedenheit von ausgeschlossenen 
Gruppen, zur Hinterfragung der demokratischen Legitimität, oder sogar zu inter-ethnischen 
Spannungen führen. Deshalb sollte eine gute Demokratie die Präferenzen all ihrer Bürger be-
rücksichtigen und einbeziehen. 
Zusammengefasst zeigt diese Dissertation, dass sich Policy Responsiveness tatsächlich 
zwischen Minderheiten und Mehrheiten unterscheidet. Regierungen sind eher gegenüber der 
ethnischen Mehrheit responsiv. Die Tatsache, dass Regierungen in vielen Demokratien die 
Präferenzen von Minderheiten weniger berücksichtigen als diejenigen von Mehrheiten ist in 
normativer Hinsicht problematisch, da eine der wichtigsten Säulen der Demokratie nur teil-
weise erfüllt wir. Sie hat jedoch auch empirische Konsequenzen: mangelnde Responsivität 
gegenüber Minderheiten schwächt die politische Unterstützung und erhöht die Gefahr von 
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Chapter 4:  Inclusion and Responsiveness. Disentangling political representa-
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“A key characteristic of a democracy is the 
continued responsiveness of the government to 
the preferences of its citizens, considered as 





According to Robert Dahl political equality, and in particular inclusion and representation 
are among the central aspects of democracy (Dahl 1998, 75). While earlier studies on 
democratization and democracy focused heavily on the (formal) aspect of inclusion (e.g. Dahl 
1971; Vanhanen 2000), many seem to believe that inclusion no longer matters, especially 
when it is defined as universal suffrage (for citizens). Since this criteria is fulfilled in all 
current democracies, and even in some non-democracies, the dimension of inclusion is 
sometimes even dismissed as irrelevant for the evaluation of a democratic system (Beckman 
2012). Because the level of inclusion no longer varies among democracies, the literature on 
democracy and democratization has increasingly shifted from inclusion to another aspect of 
democracy – (the quality of) representation (Caramani and Strijbis 2012, 2; Powell 2000; 
Roberts 2010). At the heart of representation lies the aspect of responsiveness, which Pitkin 
(1967, 142–143) judges as its most important dimension. May (1978, 1) even sees policy 
responsiveness as the defining criteria of democracy. Consequently, the aspect of 
responsiveness has gained increasing attention over the last few decades, with most studies 
concluding that today’s democracies perform reasonably well in this regard (e.g. Golder & 
Stramski, 2010; Huber & Powell, 1994; Kang & Powell, 2010; Powell, 2004; Roberts, 2010).  
As inclusion appears to be universal, and policy responsiveness sufficiently high, we 




the defining (c.f. May, 1978, p. 1)) aspects of democracy. But is political equality indeed 
perfectly guaranteed in all democracies? My dissertation begs to differ. 
I argue that the literature overlooks still existing limits of political equality in 
democracies. Inclusion and representation are severely restricted in most (if not all) 
democracies in at least two respects. On the one hand, they tend to exclude individuals 
without voting rights such as non-naturalized immigrants or prisoners (Paxton et al. 2003). 
Since parties adjust their policy position towards the median voter in order to maximise votes 
(Downs 1957), they have less reason to be responsive to individuals without voting rights. 
Consequently, the phenomenon of exclusion from the electorate is likely to affect the level of 
responsiveness of governments (Gilens 2011). On the other hand, the definition of inclusion 
as universal suffrage is very restrictive. Inclusion does not only refer to the formal inclusion 
into the electorate, but also to the incorporation of citizens in the decision-making process and 
their opportunity to influence policy outcomes – i.e. to citizens’ inclusion into decision-
making (Young 2000, 5–6). When inclusion is understood in this way, in most democracies 
even individuals with citizen status are excluded, namely minority groups within the 
(national) population. Although, some countries have introduced special rules for the 
representation of minorities, responsiveness towards them remains low (see Chapter 2). In 
particular when policy preferences vary systematically across social or political groups, the 
primacy of the median voter (Downs 1957) might mean that the preferences of certain groups 
in the population are ignored and their equal rights and treatment neglected (Diamond and 
Morlino 2004, 29; Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 156). In this sense I argue that most 
democracies do not fulfil one of the main quality criteria when it comes to minorities, namely 
the continued responsiveness of political authorities to the preferences of its citizens, treated 
as political equals (Dahl 1971, 1). 
The political exclusion and underrepresentation of minorities is not only normatively 




groups, the questioning of a democracy’s legitimacy, and intergroup tensions (Dalton 2004; 
Norris 2011; Roberts 2010). In this regard, the question of how a regime treats its minorities 
and to what extent it responds to their preferences may influence the trajectory of the entire 
political system. Anecdotal case evidence supports these concerns. Disagreements over 
cultural, economic and language policies has led to protests and violence between minority 
and majority groups (for instance) in the Ukraine, Tîrgu Mureș (Romania), Bulgaria, or 
Bolivia. More specifically, in the Ukraine MPs clashed violently over disagreements 
regarding the language rights of the Russian minority (BBC News Europe 2012; Roudik 
2012); in Tîrgu Mureș (Romania) protests by the Hungarian minority against the language 
policy of the government turned violent when minority protestors clashed with nationalist 
Romanians (Minorities at Risk Project 2009); in Bolivia indigenous groups engaged 
repeatedly in protests against government reforms concerning indigenous land and access to 
subsoil resources (see also chapter 4); and in Bulgaria the economic and cultural 
discrimination of the Turkish minority under communism brought the country to the fringe of 
ethnic conflict in the early 1990s. It was probably only avoided due to a more accommodative 
policy stance (Koinova 2009). These examples underline the importance of ensuring 
responsiveness not only towards the majority, but also towards structural and political 
minorities (e.g. ethnic minorities). A good democracy should, thus, aim at an equal 
consideration, formulation and inclusion of the preferences of all its citizens (Bühlmann et al. 
2011). Motivated by this tension between responsiveness towards the median citizen and 
minority groups in the population, this dissertation aims at better understanding 
responsiveness towards minorities. In particular, I focus on the causes and consequences of (a 
lack of) responsiveness towards minorities in democratic states. 
While the problem of low responsiveness towards minorities potentially applies to a 
wider range of minority groups in a country, empirically I study responsiveness towards 




other minority groups in society – e.g. class, immigrants – divisions between a country’s 
majority population and its national minorities present a persistent, identity-based cleavage (in 
contrast to class). In addition, most members of national minorities have full citizenship rights 
(in contrast to immigrants). Ethnic minorities are defined as autochthonous or ethno-national 
identity groups, based on perceived common origin, shared language, culture or religion 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18). 
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. The next section briefly 
discusses existing studies that deal with policy responsiveness in general and policy 
responsiveness towards minorities in particular. Section 2 examines the quality of minority 
representation from a comparative perspective and shows that representation and 
responsiveness towards minorities is insufficiently guaranteed in most democracies. Section 3 
discusses the contributions of this dissertation and outlines my own arguments. Section 4 
presents the case selection, while section 5 gives an overview of the three papers that build 
the core of the dissertation. 
 
State of the Art 
Responsiveness is approached in different ways in the literature. In my dissertation it is 
understood as policy responsiveness and defined as the responsiveness of political institutions 
(namely government and legislature) to the preferences and opinions of their citizens and the 
introduction of policies and issues that are in line with citizens’ preferences. As many studies 
on policy responsiveness towards minorities are based on Pitkin (1967, 209), I use the term 
substantive representation and (policy) responsiveness interchangeably. In line with the 
definition of policy responsiveness used here, Pitkin (1967, 209) defines substantive 
representation as “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them.”  
Current research on policy responsiveness towards the general population is often based 




legislature. These studies depart from the premise that congruence between what citizens want 
and what governments and legislatures do is one of the central features of democracy and 
should be sufficiently high (e.g. Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & Powell, 1994; Powell & 
Vanberg, 2000; Powell, 2000; Wlezien & Soroka, 2007). Comparing ideological or policy 
positions of voters and legislatures (or governments), policy responsiveness appears 
satisfactory (e.g. Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2007; Kang & Powell, 2010; Mattila & Raunio, 
2006). Mainstream parties seem to change their policy positions in response to the preferences 
of the median voter (Ezrow et al. 2010), legislatures’ and governments’ position appear to be 
mostly in line with the preferences of the median voter (Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & 
Powell, 1994; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; Powell, 2000), and responsiveness seems even to 
improve over time (Powell, 2009). However, all these studies judge the quality of 
representation exclusively through the representation of the median voter. That preferences of 
minorities might not be equally represented is not seen as a flaw of democracy, because “the 
position of the median voter is the only policy that would be preferred to all others by a 
majority of voters” (Powell, 2000, p. 163). 
By contrast, research on policy responsiveness towards minority groups explicitly 
challenges this view of representation and argues that minority groups must be protected 
against a “tyranny of the majority”. Influenced by Hannah Pitkin’s (1967) theory on 
representation, an overwhelming majority of studies focus either on the relationship between 
descriptive representation – i.e. representation of minorities by MPs of their group – and 
policy responsiveness, or simply on the level of policy responsiveness towards specific 
minority groups. In this tradition, policy responsiveness towards minorities has mainly been 
studied with respect to three groups: socio-economic minorities, women, and ethnic 
minorities (or immigrants).  
Studies on socio-economic minorities repeatedly showed that governments are less 




2008; Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012; Gilens, 2011, 2012). However, most of these studies 
did not place much emphasis on the reasons for low levels of policy responsiveness towards 
socio-economically less well-off citizens. The main exception is a recent study by Bernauer, 
Giger and Rosset (2015) who show that the bias against less affluent citizens is smaller in 
more proportional electoral systems.  
Studies on policy responsiveness towards women, by contrast, have extensively studied 
the causes of policy responsiveness, in particular the link between descriptive and substantive 
representation (e.g. Kittilson, 2008; Phillips, 1994; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; 
Wängnerud, 2009). They tend to agree that the presence of female MPs is a central 
prerequisite for policy responsiveness towards women.  
Research on ethnic minorities’ substantive representation is most developed in the United 
States. Since the 1970s, a vast body of literature has built up that focuses on the effect of 
ethnic minority representation (mostly of Afro-Americans and Hispanics) in parliament on 
policy responsiveness towards these groups (e.g. Gamble, 2007; Hero & Tolbert, 1995; Minta 
& Sinclair-Chapman, 2013; Minta, 2009; Owens, 2005). Only few scholars have dealt with 
policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities in other countries (e.g. Bird 2011b; Hodžić 
and Mraović 2015; Pande 2003; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011). To the best of my 
knowledge, the only comparative evaluation of ethnic minorities’ substantive representation 
was conducted by Andrew Reynolds who briefly addresses the relationship between 
descriptive and substantive representation across countries (Reynolds 2011, 99–100). 
I build on this literature in order to study how well democracies fulfil one of their central 
pillars when it comes to ethnic minorities, and what its causes and consequences are. In my 
dissertation I widen the scope of previous studies, both theoretically, by addressing the causes 
and consequences of policy responsiveness towards minorities, and geographically, by 
covering more than 40 democracies worldwide. This enables us to understand if the pattern 




generalizable to democracies worldwide. In order to better understand this, the next section 
gives an empirical overview of the quality of minority representation in today’s democracies. 
Thereafter, I introduce the argument of this dissertation and outline its main contributions. 
 
The Quality of Minority Representation 
As discussed above, representation is a central aspect of democracy. While most citizens 
enjoy the right to vote in today’s democracies and have, therefore, the formal possibility to be 
represented in the political system, the actual representation of minorities and responsiveness 
towards their demands is often criticised. In this section, I present a descriptive overview of 
the novel data on descriptive and substantive representation used in this dissertation by 
discussing how well ethnic minorities are represented in today’s democracies, and how 
responsive governments are towards their demands. In this context I also address the 
argument that responsiveness towards minorities only matters as long as minorities and 
majorities have different policy preferences. 
While disputed in the literature, many members of minority groups seem to think that 
only members of their own ethnic group can represent them properly. Hence, they see a direct 
link between representation in parliament and the representation of their interests (Phillips 
1998; Ruedin 2009; Young 2000). Even in the absence of a proven effect of descriptive 
representation on substantive representation, most democracies seek some degree of minority 
representation “in the name of justice and legitimacy” (Ruedin 2009, 335). Nevertheless, 
minorities remain underrepresented in most democracies (see figure 1). Based on the data 
used in this dissertation, figure 1 presents the average level of descriptive representation 
across a country’s democratic period. While there is quite a lot of variance across time and 
between countries, which will be investigated further in chapters 2 and 3, it is evident even at 
this stage that many minority groups are severely underrepresented or entirely excluded from 




proportional to their size or overrepresentation (values≥1 in figure 1). Despite the fact that all 
these countries are democratic they seem to violate one of the main requirements of liberal 
democracy when it comes to minorities – namely the equality of representation. It is striking 
how many groups have been completely excluded from parliament throughout the entire 
democratic period of their country. While complete exclusion is predominantly the fate of 
very small minorities, there are a number of large groups with astonishingly low levels of 
representation (e.g. Russians in Estonia and Lithuania, indigenous groups in Bolivia and 
Peru). Representation in Boliva, for instance, only increased in recent years when Evo 
Morales managed to fully mobilize the indigenous population and won the presidential 
elections of 2005. 
What does the exclusion of minorities from parliament imply for other aspects of 
representation? While some expect a direct link between descriptive representation of groups 
in parliament and the responsiveness to their preferences (e.g. Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 
2009; Mansbridge 1999; Preuhs 2007; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005), others question the 
benefit of descriptive representation (e.g. Cameron, Epstein, and Halloran 1996; Lublin 1999; 
Pitkin 1967), and point out that governments may enact minority friendly policies in the 
absence of descriptive representation in order to improve democratic legitimacy and ensure 
the accommodation of ethnic groups (e.g. Preuhs 2007, 279; Zuber 2015, 5). Hence, policy 
responsiveness towards minorities might be achieved even in the absence of descriptive 
representation. Given that research on policy responsiveness towards the general population 
evaluates the quality of representation as rather good (e.g. Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & 
Powell, 1994; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; Powell, 2000) the question arises whether they are 





Figure 1: The descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in democratic parliaments 
Notes: Figure 1 depicts the average level of descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups across the 
democratic period of a particular country. Values of 1 refer to proportional representation – i.e. a group’s 
share in parliament corresponds to its share in the population. 
  

























MEX: Other Indigenous People
GEO: Abkhazians
























































From a normative point of view, responsiveness towards minorities is crucial for a 
democracy in order to fulfil the democratic requirement to represent citizens as political 
equals (Bühlmann et al. 2011, 522; Dahl 1971, 1). Empirically, however, a lack of 
responsiveness towards minorities only matters if minorities have distinct preferences that 
differ from the majority (Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 166). If preferences among the minority 
and majority population are equal it is (empirically) irrelevant if governments are more likely 
to respond to the demands of one group or the other, since the link between policy preferences 
and policy outcome would be the same across all groups (Gilens 2012, 78). Research on 
policy responsiveness towards special groups, therefore, relies on the implicit or explicit 
assumption that distinct minority interests exist, and that preferences on these differ between 
minorities and majorities (e.g. Zuber, 2015, p. 4). The link between group identity and 
political preferences has been discussed most extensively in social psychology. According to 
this literature, group membership influences not only how we view ourselves and others, but 
also the values and attitudes we hold (Conover 1984; Hogg 2003; Huber and Powell 1994; 
Lieberman and McClendon 2012). Apart from social psychological processes associated with 
group membership, the actual life experiences of members of a social group contribute to the 
formation of preferences that are similar across members of the same group. For instance, 
many ethnic groups share not only a distinct culture, but also a distinct economic position that 
differentiates them (on average) from other groups. Such group based cultural and economic 
differences might well affect group needs and preferences with regard to cultural, economic 
and social-welfare policies (Baldwin and Huber 2010).  
When policy preferences indeed differ between the minority and majority population, 
studying the responsiveness towards the median voter is insufficient to judge the quality of 
representation. Therefore, figures 2-4 compare the preferences of minorities and majorities 
over different issues for selective (mostly European) countries, for which survey data was 




e.g. cultural and minority rights – and issues that have more indirect implications – i.e. 
economic issues. In each figure the coefficients represent the (predicted) difference between 
minority and majority groups, sorted by the difference between the lower bound of the 95% 
confidence interval and the zero line (see also Lieberman and McClendon 2012).1 
 
Figure 2: Difference between the majority and minority groups regarding the perceived 
importance of cultural autonomy for minority groups, 95% CIs 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2003 
on National Identity (II) (ISSP Research Group 2012). Specifically, the following 
question was used in order to analyse differences between minorities and majorities: 
“Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and 
traditions” (Q8b). Coefficients represent predicted difference between minorities and 
majorities, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 clearly reveal preference differences between members of minority and 
majority groups when it comes to cultural issues. Figure 2 presents preferences for cultural 
autonomy in eight democracies.2 In line with what one would expect, minority groups are 
more supportive of cultural rights than the respective majority group in their country.3 We 
find the largest differences in countries with strong ethno-national cleavages in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the smallest differences in Western countries with comparatively less 
                                                          
1 Where the bars do not cross the zero line these differences are statistically significant on the 95% level. 
2 Specifically, individuals were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that minorities should be 
given government assistance to preserve their cultural autonomy (ISSP Research Group, 2012). 




salient ethnic divisions. The fact that the differences are not significant in Spain is surprising, 
given the increased salience of autonomy demands in recent years. A closer look at the 
preferences of Spain’s ethnic groups reveals that the non-finding is partly due to differences 
across groups. While Basques are more supportive of cultural autonomy than the Spanish 
majority, all other groups are not significantly distinguishable from the majority population. 
Along the same lines, figure 3 displays differences regarding the evaluation of the 
importance of minority rights (European Social Survey 2013). Supporting the pattern 
described above, members of ethnic minority groups differ significantly from the respective 
majority group in about half of the cases. Kosovo is the only case, where the minority is 
significantly less supportive of minority rights than the respective majority population. On the 
one hand, the fact that the Serb minority in Kosovo is less in favour of minority rights than 
the Albanian majority might be related to the Serbs’ strong orientation towards Serbia. If 
Serbs perceive themselves as citizens of Serbia rather than of Kosovo, they might not be 
concerned with the guarantee of minority rights. On the other hand, Serbs might not perceive 
themselves as a national minority, because the term “nationalities” was used for non-
constituent people in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (e.g. Albanians, Roma, 
Greeks etc.) rather than for the Slavic constituent people of the six republics. In line with the 
pattern in Figure 2, preferences differ more strongly in Central and Eastern Europe than in 
Western European countries, where minority rights are less salient. Intuitively this makes 
sense, as rights for national minorities receive broad support in most Western European 
countries.4 
                                                          
4 It is more surprising that the preferences for minority rights do not differ significantly between majorities and 
minorities in the Ukraine and Israel. The case of the Russians in the Ukraine might be similar to the Serbs in 
Kosovo. Russians might not perceive themselves as a true minority, because they used to control the government 
before the Ukraine became independent from the USSR. Furthermore, the survey was conducted in 2013 – i.e. 
before the ousting of Yanukovych – when the Russian minority was politically more powerful. While for The 
case of Israel, the difference between the Jewish and Islamic population almost reaches significance, the 
relatively small effect might be explained by the ESS’ sampling strategy. They have exclusively interviewed 
Arab (Islamic) people who hold Israeli citizenship and, therefore excluded Palestinians in East Jerusalem (or the 
occupied territories). The exclusion of an important part of the Islamic population from the survey might 




Figure 3: Perceived importance of minority rights among minorities, 95% CIs 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the sixth round of the European Social 
Survey (ESS6) (European Social Survey 2013). Specifically, responses to 
the following question were analysed: “How important do you think it is 
for democracy in general that the rights of minority groups are 
protected?” Coefficients represent predicted difference between 
minorities and majorities, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
In sum, as expected by Kymlicka (1995) and others (e.g. Evans & Need, 2002; Rovny, 
2014) preferences on cultural issues seem to differ considerably between members of the 
majority and the minority population. When governments follow the median voter5 on these 
issues, minority preferences are likely to be neglected. However, members of ethnic minority 
groups are obviously not only concerned with cultural policies. On the contrary, for many, 
economic questions might be much more important. Therefore, I also looked at differences in 
policy preferences on more general policy issues. Based on data from the second and third 
round of the comparative study of electoral systems (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
2007, 2013) I evaluated differences between minority and majority groups regarding their 
perception of a country’s most important policy problem. I was particularly interested in 
whether members of minorities and majorities prioritize economic questions differently. If we 
                                                          
5 Following the median voter theorem (Downs 1957) we can expect governments to be responsive to the 




also find preference variations in purely economic areas, this lends further support to the 
claim that policy responsiveness towards minorities matters empirically.6  
 
Figure 4: Probability of prioritizing unemployment relative to (majority) group, 95% CIs 
 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the second and third round of the 
comparative survey of electoral systems (CSES) (Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems 2007, 2013). Specifically responses to the 
following question were analysed: “What has been the most important 
issue to you personally in this election?” 
 
Figure 4 presents the differences between a country’s minority groups and the majority 
population in the predicted probability of mentioning unemployment as the most important 
policy problem. With 15 out of 53 (28%) differences being significantly distinguishable from 
the majority group, the gap between majorities’ and minorities’ priorities is quite substantial. 
Given that unemployment is generally a very salient political topic, the size of this gap is 
surprising. It implies that governments might face difficulties when attempting to be equally 
responsive to minorities and majorities when it comes to economic issues. Comparable 
                                                          
6
 As I am more interested in whether preferences differ between majority and minority groups than in the 





differences also exist with regard to other non-cultural policy issues in democracies (see 
figure A1 & A2 in the Appendix). 
Considering the differences between preferences of minorities and majorities, policy 
responsiveness towards minority groups is not only normatively desirable, but also 
empirically relevant, as polities that are primarily responsive towards the median voter are 
likely to neglect the preferences of minority groups. How do democratic governments deal 
with this challenge? Are they ready to defend the interests of minorities against intrusion by 
the majority population (Van Cott 2005) and risk contradicting the preferences of the median 
voter? Or do they accord electoral concerns greater importance, and respond only to the 
preferences of the pivotal (median) voter (Downs 1957)? 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate policy responsiveness in the two policy areas discussed above – 
cultural and economic rights – by analysing the level of minority language rights and the 
existence of policies against economic discrimination. Given the substantial preference 
differences in cultural and economic areas these two policies are likely to be important for 
most members of minority groups. According to figures 5 and 6 there are only few countries 
which fully guarantee minority language rights and where economic discrimination against 
minorities is completely absent. In about half of the countries, minority language rights are 
relatively well guaranteed and governments implement policies to improve the economic 
position of minorities. This leaves roughly half of all analysed minority groups, which do not 
benefit from minority language rights and are severely economically discriminated against. 
Since minorities often have higher preferences for minority rights than majorities, this implies 
that policy responsiveness towards minorities suffers in these countries. How policy 
responsiveness towards minorities may be increased, and what consequences a failure to 
respond to minorities’ preferences has, is the topic of the three chapters that comprise this 
dissertation. Based on this discussion, I now outline the main theoretical and empirical 




Figure 5: The level of language rights for minorities in democratic states 
Notes: Figure 5 shows the average level of minority language rights (scale of 0-6) over a country’s 
democratic period. Higher values refer to higher levels of language rights. 
 
  


















































































Figure 6: The level of economic discrimination of minorities in democratic states 
Notes: Figure 6 shows the average level of economic discrimination (scale of 0-4) over a country’s 
democratic period. Higher values refer to higher levels of discrimination. 
 




ECU: Highland Indigenous People
LVA: Russians
HND: Garifuna





















































































Main contributions of the dissertation 
This dissertation combines the literature on the quality of democracy – in particular on 
policy responsiveness and representation - with studies on ethnic conflict and power-sharing. 
More specifically, it contributes to the literature on political representation in general and 
policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities in particular in two ways. First, I challenge 
the still dominant view in the literature that policy responsiveness towards the median voter 
(or citizen) is sufficient or even normatively superior (Powell 2000, 164; Roberts 2010, 40). 
While there is indeed no other policy position that is supported by more voters (Powell 2000, 
163), I argue that strict responsiveness to the preferences of the median voter is nevertheless 
problematic – in particular in heterogeneous societies. When preferences differ significantly 
between minority and majority groups, responsiveness towards the median voter might easily 
result in a “tyranny of the majority” (Toqueville 1987). By focusing explicitly on policy 
responsiveness towards minorities, I test to what extent democracies fulfil their liberal 
requirement to “guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part” (Madison, 
Hamilton, and Jay 1987). Second, I develop a new theoretical framework to explain diverging 
levels of policy responsiveness towards minorities. One part of the literature discusses the 
problem of low policy responsiveness towards minorities as a critique of the median voter 
perspective, and compares responsiveness towards minorities and majorities (e.g. Giger, 
Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012; Gilens, 2011). However, this literature does usually not consider 
the causes or consequences of low levels of policy responsiveness among minorities (but see 
Bernauer et al., 2015). Other studies depart from the assumption that minorities are 
underrepresented without actually testing it, and focus on explanations for the (allegedly) low 
policy responsiveness towards minorities. These studies (e.g. Bird 2011a; Mansbridge 1999; 
Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Wängnerud 2009) tend to associate low policy 
responsiveness towards minorities with their low political representation in parliament – that 




work most of these studies rely, questioned whether the representation of groups through MPs 
of their own group really increases policy responsiveness. Minority MPs might be too small in 
number to influence policy outputs even if all MPs of minority groups are fully committed to 
representing their own groups (probably a very unrealistic assumption). Consequently, I argue 
in my dissertation that mere descriptive representation of minorities in parliament is 
insufficient to guarantee government responsiveness towards their demands. Minority MPs 
need to be in a special position of power, and possess additional leverage to ensure that their 
demands are heard and translated into minority-friendly policy outcomes.  
Contributing to the literature on democratic support, ethnic conflict and power-sharing, I 
analyse the consequences of low policy responsiveness towards minorities. While the 
potential consequences of low levels of policy responsiveness are vividly discussed in the 
literature and many are aware of the fact that responsiveness towards minorities is not fully 
guaranteed, very few, if any, studies have explicitly analysed the consequences of low policy 
responsiveness on the behaviour and attitudes of minorities. I argue that a lack of policy 
responsiveness reduces the legitimacy of a political system and the political support among 
the minority population, and is likely to lead to protest and conflict. While especially the latter 
has become a central claim in the literature on ethnic conflict (Birnir 2007; Cederman, 
Wimmer, and Min 2010; Theuerkauf 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), it has so far 
not directly been tested, as most studies approximate policy responsiveness with descriptive 
representation in the government. Combining insights from the conflict and representation 
literature, I argue that these are two different mechanisms which need to be disentangled in 
order to fully understand the role of representation for conflict. 
Apart from developing a new theoretical framework to explain why responsiveness 
towards minorities is important, how it may be achieved, and what consequences it has, I 
contribute empirically to the literature on policy responsiveness by presenting a novel 




perspective. Policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities has so far mainly been studied in 
qualitative studies with few cases (e.g. Bird, 2011a; Hodžić & Mraović, 2015; Pande, 2003), 
or in quantitative single case studies in the United States (e.g. Owens, 2005; Preuhs, 2006, 
2007; Reingold & Smith, 2012). Studying policy responsiveness towards minority groups 
comparatively across different countries is notoriously difficult, as neither the approaches 
from qualitative nor quantitative case studies are easily applicable. (Qualitative) Case studies 
focus mostly on roll call votes, speeches of parliamentarians or MPs’ expressed commitment 
to represent their ethnic group (e.g. Bird, 2011b; Hodžić & Mraović, 2015). Quantitative 
studies from the United States, by contrast, measure policy responsiveness by looking at 
issues that are important to minorities in the United States (e.g. social welfare benefits). Both 
approaches pose unresolved challenges to an application to comparative large-N studies. 
Analysing roll-call votes or parliamentary speeches across multiple countries is impractical 
and suffers from problems of data availability; issues that are important to minorities in the 
United States are certainly not a sufficient proxy for substantive representation in other 
countries. In this dissertation, I therefore present an approach that allows policy 
responsiveness towards ethnic minorities to be studied across a wider range of groups and 
countries by applying a strategy that proved successful in studies on policy responsiveness 
towards women (e.g. Caiazza, 2004; Cowell-Meyers & Langbein, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer & 
Mishler, 2005): I consider policies that are likely to be important for most members of 
minority groups across many countries, and concentrate on policy areas where minorities tend 
to have different preferences than the majority – i.e. on areas where responsiveness towards 
minorities matters. I relied on academic research and international treaties to identify two 
policy areas which directly affect members of ethnic minority groups: language rights and 
economic discrimination. 
In sum, through studying policy responsiveness towards minorities from a comparative 




minority and majority groups and that governments are often less responsive to members of 
minority groups. Normatively, this is problematic as, when it comes to ethnic minorities, one 
of the main pillars of democracy seems to be only partially fulfilled. This has important 
consequences, as minorities who receive lower levels of policy responsiveness are less 
supportive of their political system (see chapter 2), and more likely to engage in conflict (see 
chapter 4). While descriptive representation is important to increase policy responsiveness, in 
particular if minorities benefit from additional leverage (see chapter 3), it is insufficient to 
guarantee the legitimacy of a democratic system on its own, i.e. in the absence of policy 
responsiveness. The inclusion of token representatives in parliament is not sufficient to ensure 
the support for democracy (see chapter 2). What matters are governments that consider the 
preferences of minority groups, and respond adequately to their demands. In light of 
increasing discussions about quotas for women and minorities, this has important 
implications. In order to fulfil the liberal requirement of representing as many citizens as 
possible, democratic governments need to consider minorities’ as well as majorities’ 
preferences, rather than just granting certain groups some additional seats in parliament. This 
requires political systems with incentives for politicians to act against the will of the majority 
if it is necessary to protect the fundamental interests of the minority. While this is unlikely in 
purely majoritarian systems, it might be achieved through political systems which encourage 
compromises among different factions of society – be it through political institutions that 
require coalition governments or electoral rules that make politicians dependent on the 
preferences of majorities and minorities alike (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1969; Reilly 
2001). 
While this dissertation focuses on the representation of ethnic minorities, these findings 
are likely to be valid for other minority groups in society as well. The challenge of low policy 
responsiveness applies not only to ethnic minorities, but also to poorer socio-economic groups 




economic inequality in democracies and the underrepresentation of lower classes in 
parliament (Schäfer 2015, chap. 8) should raise concerns. Similar to underrepresented ethnic 
groups, they might become dissatisfied with democracy and/or engage in protest against the 
state. Conversely, when democracies succeed in including and representing these groups, 
support for the political system they live in might prosper. To what extent the findings of this 
dissertation are indeed transferable to other social minority groups might be a promising 
avenue for future research. 
 
Case selection 
This thesis builds on the assumption that political representation, institutional 
characteristics and political processes influence the level of policy responsiveness towards 
minority demands. It aims at understanding how well democracies fulfil one of their central 
pillars when it comes to ethnic minorities and what its consequences are.  While it would 
certainly be enlightening to compare responsiveness towards minorities in democracies and 
autocracies, causes and consequences of policy responsiveness are inherently different in 
democratic and non-democratic regimes. For instance, one argument for the level of policy 
responsiveness put forward in the literature refers to descriptive representation in parliament 
(see chapter 3).  In non-democratic regimes, parliaments are often less important and MPs 
have less influence over the legislative process. Studying the effect of representational 
processes in democracies and autocracies simultaneously might, therefore, not be very useful. 
Similarly, the consequences of lacking policy responsiveness might be different. For instance, 
analysing the support for democracy in non-democratic countries (see chapter 2) is quite 
counterintuitive. 
Consequently, this dissertation is based on a worldwide sample of ethnically 
heterogeneous democracies. Ethnicity is understood as a socially constructed identity, based 




Wimmer, and Min 2010; Fearon 2003; Horowitz 1985). Countries that reach a minimum level 
of democracy according to Freedom House (≤4) and Polity IV (≥6) and exceed a population 
of 500’000 were included in the initial selection.7 In order to ensure the comparability of 
cases 17 Asian and African countries were then excluded from further analyses. In particular, 
the countries were excluded for the following reasons:  
1) It is more difficult to reliably identify relevant ethnic groups in African and Asian 
countries. In contrast to other world regions, identity-based cleavages tend to cut 
across each other more often (i.e. India, Kenya, Zambia) which makes the 
identification of ethnic groups empirically much more problematic. The basis for 
ethnic identification may even change completely in a short period of time, as 
illustrated by regime transitions in Kenya and Zambia, where democratization led 
to a shift from local (clan-based) identity to regional (language- or religion-based) 
identity (Posner 2007).  
2) Studying policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities requires that minority 
and majority groups are clearly distinguishable and identifiable. In most 
democracies political and demographic majorities are identical, i.e. majorities are 
usually better represented than minorities and constitute the political elite. 
However, this is not necessarily true in former colonies, where some minority 
groups are historically advantaged and control the most important political 
positions. The history of ethnic dictatorship and colonialism makes the division 
into majority and minority groups particularly problematic in Asia and Africa. In 
depth case knowledge of each country would be necessary to pick the appropriate 
(political) minority group for the analysis. While the political majority might 
                                                          
7 In cases where the two ratings differed, the country was only included if it was rated at most one scale-point 
below the democracy threshold (on the measure where it was not rated as democratic). If countries were 
democratic for different periods with authoritarian interruptions, only the most recent democratic period was 




reside with the minority in Latin America as well, the privileged minority group is 
at least consistent across countries – i.e. the descendants of the Spanish settlers.  
3) In many African countries ethnic parties are banned and representation based on 
ethnicity is prohibited. Information on the representation of ethnic groups is, 
therefore, scarce. This makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to study the effect 
of descriptive representation in these countries (e.g. Bogaards, Basedau, & 
Hartmann, 2010; and further contributions in Democratization 17(4)). 
Overall, these criteria allow for the consideration of over 90 ethnic minority groups from 
more than 40 countries.8 In order to study policy responsiveness towards minorities 
empirically across time and space, I compiled the original dataset “Ethnic minorities in 
democracies” that covers all pluri-ethnic democracies in Europe, North and South America, 
and Oceania since 1945. Datasets on ethnic groups notoriously suffer from selection bias, as 
researchers need to determine which of over 5000 ethnic groups to include into the analyses 
(Hug 2013; Kymlicka 1995). In order to reduce the problem of selection bias, the two most 
commonly used datasets on ethnic groups were combined in order to select ethnic groups. 
Groups were selected on the basis of the EPR dataset on ethnic power relations (Cederman, 
Wimmer, and Min 2010) and the Minority at Risk Project (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).9 
The dataset includes novel measures on minority language rights and descriptive 
representation in parliament and government since 1945 and combines them with recoded and 
extended measures of MAR and EPR.10 
 
  
                                                          
8 However, the number of countries that are included in the different chapters differs slightly due to data 
availability (see the respective appendices of each chapter for a list of countries and ethnic groups that are 
included). 
9 EPR-ETH defines a group as politically relevant if "at least one political organization claims to represent it in 
national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination" (Hunziker 2013). A group is 
defined as relevant (or politically significant) by MAR if "the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, 
systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; and [if] the group is the basis for political 
mobilization and collective action in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests" (Minorities at Risk 
Project 2009). 





This dissertation consists of three papers each highlighting different aspects of the causes 
and consequences of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities (see figure 7). The first 
article (chapter 2) is concerned with a normative critique of the primacy of the median voter 
in studies on policy responsiveness. It challenges the view that responsiveness towards the 
median voter is sufficient or even normatively superior, and highlights the empirical 
consequences of a lack of responsiveness for the quality of democracy. The second article 
(chapter 3) focuses explicitly on the causes of policy responsiveness by analysing the 
conditions under which descriptive representation contributes to policy responsiveness. The 
third and final article (chapter 4) of this dissertation is concerned with the question of whether 
policy responsiveness indeed has an accommodating effect on inter-ethnic relations by 
reducing the risk of violent and non-violent ethnic protest. 
In the following paragraphs the main argument and the most important findings of each 
paper are briefly summarized. 
 






Chapter 2: Responsiveness – to whom? Why the primacy of the median voter alienates 
minorities 
Chapter 2 (1st Paper) constitutes the normative basis of this dissertation and discusses 
why policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities matters. Many see responsiveness 
towards the median voter as sufficient or even normatively superior, because no other policy 
position will receive more support (Powell 2000, 164; Roberts 2010, 40). However, in 
heterogeneous societies pure responsiveness to the median voter bears the risk of creating a 
“tyranny of the majority” (Toqueville 1987), as policy positions which divert from the 
median’s position are not considered in policy making. I argue that a lack of policy 
responsiveness towards minorities is not only normatively problematic, but endangers the 
stability of democratic systems, because policy outputs which meet the demands of a society 
are one of the most important guarantors for the public support of a political system (Easton 
1957). Accordingly, if citizens feel unrepresented by the political authorities, they are likely 
to lose trust in the political institutions and to withdraw their support from the political system 
(Ishiyama 2001; Ruiz-Rufino 2013).  
 
Chapter 3: Presence, representation and impact: how minority MPs affect policy out-
comes 
After having established the importance of policy responsiveness towards minorities in 
chapter 2, chapter 3 (2nd Paper) focuses on the potential causes of policy responsiveness. 
Why are policy outcomes in some democracies consistent with minority preferences while in 
others minority rights are severely contested? Some scholars of representation argue that there 
is a direct link between representation in parliament and the representation of interests – i.e. 
between descriptive and substantive representation. They claim that descriptive 




more likely to share their group’s political perspectives and to act in favour of minority voters 
than MPs of other social groups (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 2000).  
While this argument seems appealing at first, I argue in the third chapter that the actual 
effect of minority representation in parliament on policy outcomes is not self-evident. Even if 
a minority group is proportionally represented in parliament, its number of MPs is usually 
rather small. Minority MPs can, therefore, easily be outvoted and politically marginalised 
(Bieber 2008, 114). Conversely, governments may enact minority-friendly policies even in 
the absence of descriptive representation in order to enhance democratic legitimacy and 
stability  (Preuhs 2007, 279). 
Hence, while many expect a link between the descriptive representation of minorities and 
policy responsiveness, the mechanism of how minority MPs affect policy outcomes has so far 
remained largely unclear. In this paper I focus on the conditions under which descriptive 
representation has an effect on policy outcomes. I argue that it is not primarily the level of 
descriptive representation that matters, but its combination with three moderating factors that 
increase the leverage of minority MPs: government inclusion (Preuhs 2006, 2007), a powerful 
legislature (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007), and the size of the included minority group 
(Ghanem 2012). 
 
Chapter 4: Inclusion and responsiveness: Disentangling political representation and its 
effect on ethnic protests in electoral democracies 
The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation (3rd Paper) analyses the consequences of 
a lack of policy responsiveness on democratic stability and inter-ethnic peace. According to 
grievance-based explanations of conflict, ethnic unrest is more likely when minority groups 
are insufficiently included into the political process. When certain groups do not feel 
represented, they are more likely to feel excluded and to develop feelings of anger and 




political representation has two potential benefits: symbolic inclusion and policy 
responsiveness. While most studies on the link between representation and ethnic conflict 
acknowledge the importance of policy responsiveness, they restrict their analysis to the effect 
of descriptive representation (in the government). In the fourth chapter of my dissertation, I 
disentangle the effect of symbolic inclusion from policy responsiveness and argue that actual 
policy consequences are more important than descriptive representation for the avoidance of 
ethnic confrontations. The quantitative analysis of the argument is combined with a 
qualitative case study of Bolivia to better illustrate the causal mechanism at hand. 
 
Synthesis of the chapters 
In sum, this dissertation combines and extends the literature on representation, conflict, 
and power-sharing in order to study the causes and consequences of policy responsiveness 
towards minorities in democracies. The overarching theoretical framework of this thesis 
heavily relies on Pitkin’s (1967) seminal contribution, which emphasises the multi-
dimensionality of representation. Whereas her contribution remains entirely theoretical, many 
have taken up her argument and studied some dimensions of representation empirically. In 
line with Pitkin (1967) and May’s (1978) conviction that policy responsiveness is the crucial 
aspect of democracy, most scholars have particularly focused on this aspect of representation. 
The general literature on policy responsiveness tends to overlook, however, that minorities are 
not necessarily well represented by the median voter, in particular if their preferences differ 
from those of the majority population. The goal of the present thesis was to address this gap in 
the literature by focusing explicitly on policy responsiveness towards minorities.  
In contrast to the literature on policy responsiveness, the literature on conflict and power-
sharing has long recognized the importance of representing minorities and considering their 
preferences in politics. Most prominently, Lijphart (1969) argues in favour of power-sharing 




The underlying assumption of such propositions is that political inclusion – i.e. descriptive 
representation – automatically translates into political influence (see also Birnir 2007; 
Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). With this dissertation, I challenge this simplification and 
argue that the effects of descriptive and substantive representation need to be distinguished. It 
is not evident that descriptive representation directly relates to increased levels of policy 
responsiveness (chapter 3), or that different types of representation affect the stability and 
legitimacy of a political system in the same way (chapter 2 and 4). Therefore, by 
distinguishing between different aspects of representation, and studying the role of policy 
responsiveness beyond the median voter, this thesis adds to the literature on representation, 
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Preference differences between minorities and majorities across various issues 
 
In order to test if minority and majority groups only prioritize unemployment differently 
or if once can observe a more general trend of policy priority differences, I further analysed if 
minorities and majorities differ with regard to the evaluation of a country’s three most 
important problems. Figure A1 below presents the results of country-wise multinomial 
logistic regressions with ethnic group dummies. It plots the difference between a country’s 
majority group and the respective minority groups in the predicted probability of selecting one 
of a country’s three most popular issues. In total figure A1 shows 181 predicted differences in 
31 countries. 47 of these differences (26%) are statistically significant. In other words, the 
probably that members of minority groups have different policy priorities than members of 
the majority group is about one fourth. This is comparable to the differences found with 
regard to unemployment. It is difficult to judge whether this is a lot or not. I would argue that 
the fact that preferences of minorities and majorities differ even on general issues in one 
fourth of the cases is a strong indication that policy responsiveness towards minorities 
matters. If governments are only responsive to the majority population responsiveness 
towards minorities is likely to suffer. From the data at hand, it seems evident that minorities 
sometimes have quite distinct policy priorities that are not well represented by responding 
solely to the median voter. These differences remain robust to the inclusion of control 







Figure A1: Probability of prioritizing one of the top three issues relative to the majority 
group, 95% confidence intervals 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the second and third round of the comparative survey of electoral systems (CSES) 
(Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007, 2013). Specifically responses to the following question were 






Figure A2: Probability of prioritizing one of the top three issues relative to the majority 
group, 95% confidence intervals, incl. control variables 
 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the second and third round of the comparative survey of electoral systems (CSES) 
(Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2007, 2013). Specifically responses to the following question were 
analysed: “What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election?” It was controlled for 

















Policy responsiveness – i.e. responsiveness of governments to the preferences of its citizens – 
is a crucial characteristic of every democracy. Many see responsiveness towards the median 
voter as sufficient for democracy, because no policy position will receive more support. In this 
paper, I argue that the primacy of the median voter is normatively and empirically problematic. 
From a normative point of view a good democracy does not (only) need to maximise the influ-
ence of the majority, but must also protect minorities against oppression by the majority popu-
lation. Beyond normative arguments, ignoring the preferences of social minorities has real em-
pirical consequences as it endangers the legitimacy and stability of a democracy through de-
creasing the political support of minority groups. Based on ESS6 data, the empirical analysis 
confirms the risks of a lack of policy responsiveness. It indicates that minorities are generally 
less supportive of the political system than majorities, but that their support increases if policy 
responsiveness towards them rises. 
 







Policy responsiveness is one of the central pillars of democracy (Dahl 1971, 2) and directly 
related to the democratic ideal of the ‘rule by the people’. If people truly rule, public policies 
should follow their preferences closely (Roberts 2010, 39). In this sense, good democracies 
require politicians who heed the policy preferences of the people and respond to them when 
deciding on issues. 
The question of policy responsiveness is particularly complex in heterogeneous societies, 
where policy preferences might differ strongly between different groups in society. Neverthe-
less, most research analyses policy responsiveness from a majoritarian perspective of democ-
racy, and focuses heavily on the median voter (e.g. Cohen, Jeffrey, 1997; Hobolt & 
Klemmensen, 2007; Kang & Powell, 2010; Roberts, 2010). This paper challenges this primacy 
of the median voter. While responsiveness towards the median voter ensures that a majority 
supports public policies, it also carries the risk of creating a “tyranny of the majority” 
(Toqueville 1987), as preferences which divert from the median’s position are not considered 
in policy making. Responsiveness towards the preferences of the median voter might, therefore, 
mean that important concerns are ignored or that minorities’ equal rights and treatment are 
neglected (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 29). While this problem is empirically most relevant in 
heterogeneous societies with strong group identities, normatively, it also applies to homogenous 
societies, as the preferences of some citizens are always more influential than those of others. 
The focus on the preferences of the median voter, thus, violates a key normative principle of 
democracy that demands that governments are responsive to as many people as possible and 
treat them as political equals (Dahl 1971, 1). The consideration of the preferences of minority 
groups should, therefore, be a key element of all democracies, even and particularly if they 
contradict the position of the median voter (Kymlicka 1995; Van Cott 2005). This type of de-
mocracy requires systems with incentives for politicians to act against the will of the majority 
if it is necessary to protect fundamental interests of the minority. This might be achieved 
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through political systems which encourage compromises among different factions of society – 
be it through political institutions that require coalition governments or electoral rules that make 
politicians dependent on the preferences of majorities and minorities alike (e.g. Horowitz 1985; 
Lijphart 1969; Reilly 2001). In a similar vein, some political theorists demand that decision-
making power is distributed proportionally to people’s stakes in a particular decision 
(Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010, 137). This would ensure that majorities cannot overrule mi-
norities on issues that are of particular importance to minorities (but not to majorities). 
However, as argued in this paper, the primacy of the median is not only problematic from 
a normative point of view, but also empirically relevant as it may put the sustainability of de-
mocracy at risk. Citizens who feel that the government is unresponsive towards their prefer-
ences tend to lose confidence in the political system and to express less support for political 
institutions (Roberts 2010, 8). A loss of confidence may lead to political alienation and apathy 
as citizens fear that their voice is not heard and their vote has no effect (Ishiyama 2001; Ruiz-
Rufino 2013). Decreasing involvement in politics as a consequence of political apathy is highly 
problematic and delegitimizes the political process, which is based on the participation of its 
citizens. If voters lose attachment to political parties, electoral volatility and the development 
of new (anti-system) parties may increase (Dalton 2004, 11), or anti-elite protests, participation 
in riots, and even political violence may be encouraged (Dalton 2004; Muller, Jukam, and 
Seligson 1982; Roberts 2010). 
Following these arguments, the present paper investigates policy responsiveness towards 
minorities and its effect on their support for the political system they live in - henceforth referred 
to as “political support of minorities” or “minorities’ political support”. The problem of gov-
ernments being responsive to majorities, and not minorities, potentially applies to a wide variety 
of groups, such as ethnic, religious or socio-economic groups. In the present paper minorities 
are operationalised as ethno-national minority groups, because ethnicity is a relatively persis-
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tent identity that only changes slowly over time (Fearon 2003; Horowitz 1985). Politically mo-
bilized ethnic identity groups are understood as a subset of all possible identity groups which 
might be affected by low government responsiveness. For this purpose, ethnic groups are de-
fined as national or autochthonous groups who self-identify with their group based on a shared 
language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; 
Horowitz 1985, 17–18).  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, I review previous research on policy 
responsiveness and establish the argument that a focus on the median voter is normatively prob-
lematic. In the light of this, I examine the empirical consequences of a lack of policy respon-
siveness in today’s heterogeneous societies by focusing on the question of political support. 
The third and fourth sections discuss the data and the results, which indicate that minorities are 
indeed more supportive of the political system if the system is responsive to their preferences. 
The final section discusses the implications of these results for democracy in heterogeneous 
societies. 
 
Policy responsiveness towards minorities 
Why policy responsiveness towards the median voter alienates minorities 
Policy responsiveness is a central aspect of liberal democracy (e.g. Dahl, 1971; Pitkin, 
1967). Democratic rule implies not only a certain procedural process – i.e. elections – but also 
that the preferences of the people influence the policies that are implemented (Powell 2000, 
160). While the importance of responsiveness towards citizens’ preferences is uncontested it 
remains an open question towards whom policy makers ought to be responsive.  
For those who favour a majoritarian model of democracy, responsiveness towards a majority 
of the people is sufficient. For others, governments should be responsive to “as many people as 
possible”; they favour a proportional model of democracy (Lijphart 1984, 4; Powell 2000, 21). 
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Independent of the majoritarian or proportional perspective of democracy, however, when judg-
ing a system’s responsiveness, responsiveness towards the median voter or median citizen is 
usually taken as the reference point (e.g. Kang & Powell, 2010; Powell & Vanberg, 2000; 
Powell, 2000; Roberts, 2010). Many even see responsiveness towards the median citizen as 
normatively superior, because there is no other policy position available on which more people 
would agree (Powell 2000, 164; Roberts 2010, 40). 
However, the primacy of the median citizen overlooks the fact that most democracies are 
heterogeneous in some way or another, which has severe implications. Most democracies are 
characterised by the presence of socio-economic subgroups and/or identity-based ethnic or ra-
cial groups (even if they are not, or only to a small degree, voters have heterogeneous interests 
in all societies). Indeed, previous research indicates that the level of responsiveness differs be-
tween different groups in society, and that governments are more responsive to affluent citizens 
(Bartels 2008; Gilens 2011, 2012; Rigby and Wright 2011; Rosset, Giger, and Bernauer 2013)1 
and ethnic majority groups (Abrajano and Poole 2011). Particularly in this context, majority 
rule easily transforms into a “tyranny of the majority” (Lijphart 2004; Toqueville 1987, chap. 
15). Majority rule as it is practised today bears the risk of producing situations where a majority 
that has little stakes in an issue overrules a minority with great interest in a decision. When 
people have different stakes in collective matters the interests of the minority will not be suffi-
ciently considered by majority rule, even if all voters enjoy equal procedural influence (namely, 
equal voting rights) (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). Thus, democracy requires more than the 
maximisation of the influence of the majority (the procedural aspect of democracy). It also 
needs to fulfil the liberal requirement of democracy which demands the equal protection of the 
rights of all citizens in society independent of their resources and other forms of power 
(in)equalities – including of those who belong to the minority (Diamond and Morlino 2004; 
                                                          
1 While there is also contradictory evidence which suggests that responsiveness towards different socio-economic 
groups is substantially similar (e.g. Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Ura & Ellis, 2008), generally when there are differ-
ences the preferences of less affluent citizens are worse represented (Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2015). 
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Rigby and Wright 2011, 189). In this regard, a (democratic) republic needs to guard “one part 
of the society against the injustice of the other part” (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1987), and to 
be responsive to as many citizens as possible and not only to the median voter (Dahl 1971, 2). 
While a lack of responsiveness towards parts of the population is always normatively ques-
tionable, empirically, the primacy of the median voter is only problematic if policy preferences 
vary systematically across groups (Gilens 2011, 250; Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 166). When 
preferences do not differ between groups the political preferences of minorities are represented 
even if the government only responds to the median citizen (Giger, Rosset, and Bernauer 2012, 
52; Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 161). However, there is good reason to expect differences be-
tween minority and majority preferences. Group membership influences not only how we view 
ourselves and others, but also the values and attitudes we hold (Hogg 2003). This implies that 
policy preferences might vary with group membership. The link between group identity and 
political preferences has been discussed most extensively in the literature on social psychology 
and social identity. This literature argues that individuals who take their group identity into 
account when making decisions are likely to develop policy preferences distinct from those of 
the median voter (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Conover 1984; Habyarimana et al. 2009; 
Lieberman and McClendon 2012). When policy preferences vary between different social 
groups – i.e. between minority and majority groups – governments which are responsive to the 
median citizen are not necessarily responsive to minority groups in society. If democracies in 
heterogeneous societies are to avoid the so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Toqueville 1987, 
chap. 15) and to fulfil their liberal requirement of protecting minority and majority rights alike 
(Diamond and Morlino 2004; Kymlicka 1995), they need to be responsive not only to the ma-
jority, but also to the minority population.  By solely focusing on responsiveness towards the 





Empirical consequences of median responsiveness 
A lack of responsiveness towards minority preferences is not only normatively problem-
atic, but is also likely to create empirical challenges as political systems in which the policy 
preferences of (parts of) the population are ignored are likely to suffer from a loss of confidence 
on the part of their population (Roberts 2010, 8). According to Easton (1957, pp. 395–397) one 
of the main mechanisms that generates support for the political system is through policy outputs 
that meet the demands of society – i.e. through output legitimacy. All citizens have certain 
expectations towards the government and the political institutions. When these expectations are 
met, this translates into political support for the government, and the entire political system 
(Hetherington 1998; Liu and Baird 2012; Norris 1999a; Ruiz-Rufino 2013). Certainly, the po-
litical authorities cannot and do not need to meet every demand of their citizens and most gov-
ernments can rely on a reservoir of trust (or ‘diffuse support’ in Easton’s terminology) that 
protects them against immediate reactions to the introduction of unpopular policies. If a gov-
ernment is persistently unable to meet the demands of its citizens – or parts of its citizens –  
however, this reservoir of trust may erode, leading to demands for a regime change or even a 
dissolution of the political community (Easton 1957, 397). More specifically, in countries 
where parts of the society perceive the political system as illegitimate and the government as 
unresponsive, the stability of democracy is endangered (Hänni 2014). A lack of political support 
among parts of the population might foster cleavages within society, alienation from the polit-
ical system, and fuel conflict if minority groups feel that their preferences cannot be satisfied 
within the existing polity (Cho 2010; Dalton 2004; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Norris 
1999c). By contrast, we can expect that higher levels of responsiveness towards minorities re-
duce the risk of alienation and dissatisfaction among these groups, and in turn, increase their 




Hypothesis 1 (H1): The better policy responsiveness towards minorities is, the higher their 
level of political support will be. 
 
However, some argue that the legitimacy of a system depends not on the system’s output, 
but also on its perceived input. In heterogeneous societies a key conflict evolves around the 
question of whether every group has the opportunity to elect its own representatives into par-
liament (Cho 2010, 1652) – i.e. around whether a group is descriptively represented. Descrip-
tive representation is a special category of representation and refers to representation through 
members of one’s own social group (Norris and Franklin 1997; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 
2005, 409). Especially in heterogeneous societies, descriptive representation may serve as a 
basis for evaluating the legitimacy of a polity (Mansbridge 1999, 628). It is argued that mem-
bers of marginalised groups are more likely to identify with the legislature and the political 
institutions if they see representatives “like themselves” in the parliament (Mansbridge 1999; 
Phillips 1995; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, 414). Descriptive representation by group 
members may influence attitudes towards the polity by giving members of minority groups the 
feeling of being included and having participated in the decision-making process (Madrid 2008, 
172; Mansbridge 1999, 651; Sanchez and Morin 2011, 486–487). This in turn is expected to 
influence individuals’ subjective perception of democratic legitimacy – i.e. political support 
(Welge 2015). Hence, the legitimacy of the political system might not (only) depend on what it 
does, but also on how it looks (Scherer and Curry 2010, 91). In light of these arguments the 
following hypothesis is postulated.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Higher levels of descriptive representation of minorities are positively 





Case Selection and measurement 
This paper studies the effect of policy responsiveness on the support of minorities for the 
political system. The theoretical arguments apply to different types of politically salient groups. 
In the empirical part of this paper, I test the hypotheses for politically relevant2 ethno-national 
minority groups as a subset of salient minority groups in the society. The aim is to empirically 
test the influence of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation on political support. 
Ethnic minorities are a feasible operationalization of societal minorities, because ethnicity is a 
relatively persistent identity that only changes slowly over time (Fearon 2003; Horowitz 1985) 
and group membership of politically relevant groups is politically salient. 
In the empirical analysis this paper establishes whether the normative problem of the pri-
macy of the median voter has empirical consequences. In particular, it analyses how policy 
responsiveness towards ethnic minorities is related to their political support. In order to study 
the effect of policy responsiveness among the minority group, I first discuss how ethnic minor-
ity groups are identified. Then, policy responsiveness is operationalised in areas that are im-
portant for these minority groups. The empirical analysis mostly focuses on ethnic minorities, 
but also includes the majority for some parts of the analysis. 
 
Selection and measurement of ethnic groups 
The empirical analysis combines group- and individual-level data. For the individual level 
data, I rely on the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS6) (European Social Survey 
2013).3 To analyse the effect of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation on politi-
cal support, members of ethnic minority groups need to be identified from survey data. The 
selection of ethnic groups is based on the EPR-ETH dataset on ethnic power relations 
                                                          
2 EPR-ETH’s definition of politically relevant is applied. In this sense groups are defined as politically relevant if 
at least one political organisation claims to represent a group in national politics, or if the group is subjected to 
state-led discrimination (Bormann et al. 2015) 
3 While many public opinion surveys allow for an assessment of political support, only the ESS6 includes questions 
that enable us to measure the policy responsiveness towards minorities with individual level data. 
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(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Ethnic groups are defined as autochthonous or ethno-
national communities based on perceived common origin, shared language, culture or religion 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18). The ESS6 
covers 14 countries for which EPR counts ethnic groups. I only include groups into the analysis 
which are covered by the EPR dataset (and therefore by EPR’s definition “politically relevant”). 
In Europe – and in particular in the countries covered by the ESS6 - these ethnic groups can 
mostly be identified through their language. I relied on a subjective definition of ethnicity given 
by the survey respondents by coding answers to the questions on an individual's language spo-
ken at home or an individual's religion (for Israel). This approach also allowed me to take the 
fluid character of ethnicity into account (Fearon 2003, 197). 
In order to test the validity of the coding, the share of an ethnic group in the population as 
measured with ESS6 data is correlated with the aggregate measure of ethnic group size – based 
on EPR-ETH (Cederman et al., 2010). The correlation between the two measures of ethnic 
group size is very high and lends confidence in the measure of ethnicity used here (correlation 
of 0.98, see figure A1 in the supplementary material). A list of included minority groups is 
included in table A1 in the supplementary material.4 
 
Dependent variables5 
The present paper focuses on ethnic minorities' political support as a function of policy 
responsiveness. Political support is usually disaggregated into support for the political commu-
nity, support for the political regime6 and support for the political authorities (Dalton 2004; 
Easton 1965; Norris 1999c). The operationalization of the concept is based on previous research 
which has identified widely available indicators to measure the different objects of political 
                                                          
4 The ESS6 includes 14 multi-ethnic countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Israel, 
Kosovo, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and Ukraine. These 14 countries contain individuals 
from 25 minority groups for which all information is available. 
5 Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in table A2 in the supplementary material. 
6 Support for the political regime is sometimes broken down into support for regime principles, support for regime 
performance, and support for regime institutions (e.g. Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999c). 
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support (c.f. Norris, 2011, p. 44). In this paper, I rely on support for regime performance as an 
indicator that lies between the extreme points on a continuum from diffuse to specific support 
(Dalton 2004; Norris 1999b). Judgments of regime performance are based on evaluations of 
how the political system functions in practice. Although criticized for measuring multiple di-
mensions of political support and for being differently understood across individuals and na-
tions (Linde and Ekman 2003; Oskarsson 2010, 428), the survey item most appropriate for 
measuring subjective evaluations of regime performance remains the question regarding an in-
dividual's satisfaction with the way democracy works in his/her country (scale 0-10) (Dalton 
2004, 24; Norris 2011, 44). The respective survey question reads as follows. 
And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? 
While not ideal, the item is less problematic for measuring regime performance than regime 
principles (Linde & Ekman, 2003). In particular, the indicator still varies across individuals and 
countries as it does not ask about the general support for democracy (a value quite unanimously 
supported in Europe and beyond), but specifically about support for the way democracy works 
in a particular country. 
 
Independent variables 
The main independent variable is policy responsiveness on the individual and group level. 
All group-level variables are based on a novel dataset “Ethnic minorities in democracies” which 
includes measures of policy responsiveness and descriptive representation.7 In the present paper 
policy responsiveness refers to responsiveness towards the preferences of ethnic minorities and 
the representation of minority issues. Using an appropriate measurement for responsiveness 
towards ethnic minorities is challenging as most previous studies solely rely on responsiveness 
towards the median voter. Generally, one can distinguish two approaches. On the one hand, we 
may assess policy responsiveness by examining the existence of policies which are usually 
                                                          
7 More information on the dataset is available from the dataset appendix at the end of the dissertation. 
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considered ‘minority issues’. This approach has been applied in research on policy responsive-
ness towards women or (racial) minority groups in the United States (e.g. Caiazza, 2004; 
Cowell-Meyers & Langbein, 2009; Preuhs & Hero, 2009; Preuhs, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer & 
Mishler, 2005). On the other hand, one can assess policy responsiveness on an individual level 
by comparing individuals’ expectations with individuals’ evaluation of government perfor-
mance on particular issues. Individual level data allows the potential heterogeneity of policy 
preferences among minorities to be taken into account. In this paper, both approaches are used, 
thereby providing a more complete picture of the relationship between policy responsiveness 
and political support.  
First, the assessment of policy responsiveness on an individual level is operationalised as 
the difference between individuals’ expectations and their evaluation of government perfor-
mance. This view of policy responsiveness relates citizens’ expectations with (perceived) pol-
icy outcomes. The sixth wave of the European Social Survey provides (for the first time) indi-
cators which allow policy responsiveness to be analysed in a comparative perspective with in-
dividual level data. In order to measure the congruence between expectations and perceptions 
of policy outcomes, I use the questions on government responsiveness (E37 and E38), and mi-
nority rights (E7 and E23), respectively (see table 1). All variables are scaled from 0-10 and are 
used to build two indices of policy responsiveness – general responsiveness and minority rights 
responsiveness. For both indices, policy responsiveness is measured as the inverted difference 
between citizens’ expectations and the perceived performance of policy makers; values that 
exceed maximal congruence are constrained at ten – i.e. policy responsiveness is not considered 
to be higher if an individual benefits more than (s)he expects. Accordingly, the index of policy 
responsiveness ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 indicating full policy responsiveness. Formally, 
policy responsiveness is defined as follows:  
 
Policy responsiveness = min [10, 10 – (importance – perceived performance)] 
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Table 1: Operationalisation of policy responsiveness 
 
Second, policy responsiveness is examined based on what are usually considered ‘minority 
issues’. For this purpose, two policies which are of particular importance for many minority 
groups are taken into account: cultural rights and the extent of economic discrimination (c.f. 
Hänni 2015). Cultural rights are measured as language rights. Language is often seen as an 
important group characteristic which bonds group members together (Liu 2011, 125), and is the 
most important marker for many ethnic groups  (Micheal E. Brown and Ganguly 2003, 3).8 The 
second issue area taken into account is economic discrimination. Economic discrimination is 
one of the most obvious obstacles which ethnic minority groups face in many countries, and 
accordingly an issue of substantive importance for most members of an ethnic community.  
To assess the level of minority language rights, an additive index is developed which ranges 
from 0 to 6 and consists of three variables where each element can be guaranteed (2), partly 
guaranteed (1), or not guaranteed (0). The three variables are 1) the possibility of using the 
minority language when interacting with authorities and the courts; 2) the possibility of educa-
tion of the minority language (as a subject); 3) the possibility of education in the minority lan-
guage (as the language of instruction for all subjects). Data is collected on the group level by 
                                                          
8 Even if not all members of minorities support minority group rights to the same extent, ethnic minorities are 
significantly more in favour of minority rights than members of the majority population (Evans and Need 2002; 
Rovny 2014). 
General Responsiveness […] please tell me how often you think the government in 
[country] today changes its planned policies in response to 
what most people think? 
 How important do you think it is for democracy in general 
that the government changes policies in response to what 
most people think? 
Minority Rights Responsiveness […] please tell me to what extent you think each of these 
statements applies in [country]. The rights of minority 
groups in [country] are protected. 
 How important do you think it is for democracy in general 
that the rights of minority groups are protected? 
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coding laws provided by Leclerc's database on language policies around the world (Leclerc 
2015). This information is complemented with data from Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Liu (2011). 
Economic discrimination is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 with MAR data, where (0) refers 
to no discrimination and (4) refers to the presence of exclusionary and repressive policies which 
severely restrict the economic opportunities of an ethnic group (Minorities at Risk Project 
2009). The use of MAR data is associated with problems of selection bias (Hug 2013). The 
problem is minor for the present study as only three groups are missing from the MAR sample. 
Missing groups (French and German speakers in Belgium, Serbs in Kosovo)  were recoded with 
secondary sources, based on qualitative country reports by the Council of Europe (2014) and 
the Minority Rights Group International (2014). The consideration of actual policies in addition 
to individual perceptions of policy responsiveness also allows me to account for the potential 
problem that perceptions of democracy and responsiveness might empirically be closely re-
lated: when minorities are dissatisfied with democratic rule in general they might rate all aspects 
of democracy (e.g. performance) more critically, regardless of the actual level of policy respon-
siveness. In other words, minorities might judge governments to be unresponsive, because they 
dislike democratic rule, without considering the actual policy performance of the government. 
By including objective factors in addition to subjective evaluations it can be tested if the results 
hold beyond subjective evaluations of policy responsiveness. 
 The second independent variable of interest is descriptive representation of ethnic minor-
ities. Descriptive representation is defined as representation of an individual by a co-ethnic in 
parliament, and is thus measured on the group-level. Data for descriptive representation of eth-
nic minorities is based on the annual Human Rights Reports of the United States Department 
of State (U.S. Departement of State) and parliamentary websites.9 Descriptive representation is 
calculated as the ratio between a group's share of representatives in parliament and its share in 
                                                          
9 Data was completed with information from Ruedin (2012), OSCE, newspapers, Protsyk & Osoian (2010), Protsyk 
& Sachariew (2012), and other country specific resources (Chaisty 2013; Crowther and Matonyte 2007; Garaz 
2012; McLeay 1980). 
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the population. Mathematically speaking, the measurement is based on the concept of the ad-
vantage ratio of Taagepera and Laakso (1980). Perfect proportionality between the size of an 
ethnic group and its representation in parliament occurs when 𝐴 =  x 𝑦 = 1⁄ , where x corre-
sponds to the share of an ethnic group in parliament and y to its share in the population (Taa-
gepera/Grofman 2003: 662).10 
 
Controls 
Apart from policy responsiveness and descriptive representation there are additional fac-
tors that might influence ethnic minorities’ political support. In the present analysis, I control 
for 4 types of factors: political, socio-cultural, performance-based, and demographic factors. 
Political support greatly depends on an individual’s feeling of belonging to the political 
winners (Anderson et al. 2005). This is measured as government vote and coded as (1) if an 
individual states to have voted for one of the parties in government, and (0) otherwise. Further, 
I control for political interest, which is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values re-
ferring to more political interest. Moreover, socio-cultural and performance-based factors are 
important determinants of political support. I therefore control for an individual's level of edu-
cation, generalized trust and religiosity, as well as for household income. Likewise, demo-
graphic factors such as gender and age have been shown to determine political support, and are 
therefore included into the analysis. More information about the coding and the questions used 
for the control variables is provided in table A3 in the supplementary material. All control var-
iables were recoded by assigning the lowest category the value of (0) to ease the interpretation 
of the regression results.  
  
                                                          




The main goal of the empirical analysis is to study the effect of a potential lack of policy 
responsiveness towards minorities on their support for the political system. For this purpose, 
minorities’ satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country is analysed. In order to 
establish the influence of policy responsiveness, its effect needs to be distinguished from other 
explanations for minorities’ level of political support. There are at least four reasons why mi-
norities might exhibit low levels of political support (i.e. dissatisfaction with the way democ-
racy works). 1) Low political support of minorities might be due to a generally unresponsive 
political system – i.e. there is no difference between policy responsiveness towards minorities 
and majorities. 2) The low political support of minorities may be a sign of overall low political 
support in a country – i.e. everybody in a political system is equally dissatisfied with the way it 
works. 3) Minorities might be dissatisfied with the political system because they are not, or not 
sufficiently, descriptively represented in the parliament. 4) Minorities exhibit low levels of po-
litical support, because the government is less responsive towards them than towards the ma-
jority population. The last point is the main argument of the present paper and constitutes the 
heart of the empirical analysis. In order to test the fourth proposition, however, the three alter-
native explanations for the (low) political support of ethnic minorities need to be ruled out. In 
order to do this, I proceed as follows. 
First, I show that minorities find government policies less responsive than majorities. This 
is tested by analysing the policy preferences of minority and majority groups and their evalua-
tion of policy performance descriptively (figure 1). I further present evidence that the prefer-
ences of majorities are more likely to influence policy outcomes than the preferences of minor-
ity groups (figure 2).  
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Second, I show that the low political support is not an artefact of a generally politically 
dissatisfied population (table 3). I test this with hierarchical models by regressing political sup-
port on minority group membership. The results suggest that minorities are indeed less support-
ive of the political system than the majority population. 
 
Table 2: Summary of analytical model 
Causes of low political support 
among the minority population 
Analytical steps Empirical indications 
1) Political systems are particu-
larly unresponsive towards 
minorities 
Compare policy preferences 
and policy responsiveness 
among the minority and ma-
jority population. 
Difference regarding policy 
preferences of and policy re-
sponsiveness towards mi-
norities and majorities 
2) Minorities are particularly dis-
satisfied with the political sys-
tem 
Compare political support 
among the minority and ma-
jority population 
Difference regarding the po-
litical support of minorities 
and majorities 
3) Low support is due to the lack 
of descriptive representation 
(H2) 
Analyse effect of ethnic mi-
norities’ descriptive repre-
sentation on their level of 
political support 
Consistent and significant 
effect of descriptive repre-
sentation 
4) Low support is explained by 
lack of policy responsiveness 
(H1) 
Analyse effect of policy re-
sponsiveness towards ethnic 
minorities on their political 
support 
Consistent and significant 
effect of policy responsive-
ness towards minorities 
 
To test the third and fourth explanation I focus exclusively on the minority population and 
compare the effect of descriptive and substantive representation in the same models (table 4). 
Hence, in this – main – part of the analysis I investigate with hierarchical linear regressions 
whether what the system does (policy responsiveness) or what it looks like (descriptive repre-
sentation) is more important. While this part of the analysis is solely performed on the minority 
population, the majority population is included for robustness checks.11 In order to control for 
                                                          
11 Theoretically, I am interested in the effect of lacking policy responsiveness towards minority groups. There is 
no theoretical reason, why the effect of policy responsiveness (difference between expectations and perceived 
performance) should differ between majority and minority groups. The point of interest is whether the generally 
low level of support among minority groups is associated with lower levels of policy responsiveness and could, 
consequently, be increased by higher levels of policy responsiveness. 
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varying levels of democratic experience and quality, as well as other country specific factors 
that may potentially influence an individual’s/group’s level of political support, all models in-
clude country-fixed effects. Table 2 above summarizes the four explanations for ethnic minor-
ities’ (low) level of political support, the analytical steps necessary to test them, and the respec-
tive empirical indications in support of the explanations. 
 
Analysing the policy responsiveness towards minorities and majorities 
First, to investigate how (a lack of) policy responsiveness relates to the political support of 
minorities, it is analysed whether policy preferences and policy responsiveness actually differ 
between members of minority and majority groups or if a political system is equally (un)re-
sponsive to the entire population (first explanation for low political support). For this test I only 
present results for the variables measuring expectations and evaluations of minority rights, be-
cause differences between members of minority and majority groups are expected to be most 
pronounced in the area of minority rights. Figure 1 depicts the policy preferences, the perceived 
government performance, and the level of policy responsiveness for members of minority and 
majority groups separately. The clearly separable ‘notches’ around the median can be under-
stood as strong evidence that the median for members from majority and minority groups dif-
fers. The support for minority rights is higher among the minority than the majority population, 
indicating that members of minority groups, on average, value minority rights more than mem-
bers of the majority population (left). By contrast, in comparison to the majority population, 
members of the minority groups are less satisfied with the level of minority rights in their coun-
try (middle). Median responsiveness (i.e. congruence between expectations and perceived per-
formance) is correspondingly lower for members of the minority population than for members 
of the majority population (right). 
Second, in order to test to what extent the preferences for minority rights influence the 
(perceived) government performance regarding this issue, I regress government performance 
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on policy preferences (see figure 2). For this analysis a multilevel analysis with random inter-
cepts and country fixed effects is conducted. Again, the ESS6 indicators for the evaluation and 
perception of minority rights are used (see table 1).12 The perceived guarantee of minority rights 
protection is explained by an interaction between the minority status and expectations concern-
ing minority rights. In other words, the empirics analyse how well individual policy preferences 
for minority rights predict the (perceived) government performance among members of minor-
ity and majority groups. The findings reveal a clear difference between minorities and majori-
ties. While increased preferences for minority rights are associated with an increased (per-
ceived) guarantee of minority rights among the majority population, there seems to be no effect 
among the minority population. This implies that governments are (perceived to be) more re-
sponsive towards the preferences of the majority population (or that members of the majority 
population evaluate the guarantee of minority rights less critically than members of the minority 
population). If policy responsiveness is as important for democracy as many claim (Dahl 1971; 
Pitkin 1967; Roberts 2010), a lack of responsiveness towards the minority population is likely 
to hurt the support among members of minority groups. Whether minorities are indeed less 
supportive of the political system than majorities is analysed in the following section. 
                                                          
12 The questions used for preferences and perceived guarantee are identical with those used for the construction of 
the variable “Minority rights responsiveness” – i.e. E7 and E23. 
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Figure 1: policy responsiveness towards minorities and majorities compared 
 
Notes: The figure presents the distribution of policy responsiveness, perceived performance and expectations with regard to the protection of minority 
rates among the majority and minority population, pooled over all countries. Non-overlapping notches are strong evidence that the median between the 
majority and majority differs significantly. 
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Figure 2: Effect of Expectation on Performance, protection of minority rights 
 
Notes: Effect of expectations concerning minority rights on perceived per-
formance (of the same issue) among minority and majority groups. Graph 
is based on a multilevel model with individuals clustered in ethnic groups. 
Perceived guarantee of minority rights protection is explained by an inter-
action between minority status and expectations about minority rights. 













Effect of preferences on perceived guarantee of minority rights
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Analysing the political support of minorities and majorities 
In this section the second alternative explanation for the low political support among the 
minority population is tested by analysing if minorities and majorities indeed differ with regard 
to their satisfaction with the political system. Low political support is most problematic if it is 
specific to the minority population – i.e. if it is not mirrored by the support of the majority 
population. 
In table 3 the political support for the regime – satisfaction with democracy – is analysed 
as a function of the minority status and control variables with linear hierarchical models with 
random intercepts. Individuals are clustered in ethnic groups and potential country effects are 
controlled for with country dummies (i.e. country fixed effects). The empty model and model 
1 evaluate if political support differs among individuals and countries (empty model) and be-
tween majorities and minorities (model 1). As expected, individuals who belong to an ethnic 
minority group are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country than their com-
patriots from the majority population. While the control variables are mostly in line with the 
expectations and previous research, they do not erase the effect of the minority status (model 
2). Hence in sum, the second alternative explanation for the low political support of ethnic 
minorities is rejected. The analysis below clearly indicates that members of the minority popu-
lation are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country than members of the 
majority population, and that the low level of political support among the minority population 
cannot be explained by a generally politically dissatisfied population. In the next section I there-
fore restrict the analysis to the political support of minorities to investigate why they are less 





Table 3: Explaining satisfaction with democracy among minorities and majorities 
 Empty Model Model 1 Model 2 
Minority  -0.41** -0.24+ 
  (0.14) (0.14) 
Winner   0.66*** 
   (0.04) 
Gender   -0.02 
   (0.04) 
Age   -0.00* 
   (0.00) 
Education   -0.02+ 
   (0.01) 
Political Interest   0.11*** 
   (0.02) 
Interpersonal Trust   0.19*** 
   (0.01) 
Income   0.07*** 
   (0.01) 
Religiosity   0.05*** 
   (0.01) 
Constant 4.18*** 4.10*** 2.88*** 
 (0.39) (0.32) (0.33) 
Variance (Ethnic groups) 0.39*** 0.10** 0.32*** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
Variance (Residuals) 2.25*** 5.08 2.17*** 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
N (individuals, groups) 14855, 42 14855, 42 14855, 42 
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes 
BIC 66589.51 66522.04 65481.11 
Log Likelihood -33217.91 -33179.37 -32620.48 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The effect of descriptive representation and policy responsiveness on the political sup-
port of minorities 
In this section I analyse the third and fourth explanation for the low political support among 
the minority population (see table 2 above) and turn to the evaluation of the main hypotheses. 
Again, linear hierarchical models with random intercepts, individuals clustered in ethnic 
groups, and country-fixed effects are used (see table 4). To analyse if policy responsiveness 
indeed affects minorities’ satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country (H1) two 
strategies are applied. First, I investigate whether individuals who perceive the government to 
be more responsive exhibit higher levels of support for regime performance (using individual 
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level data). Then, more ‘objective’ factors of policy responsiveness are included, which meas-
ure the level of policy responsiveness on the group level via the level of economic discrimina-
tion and language rights. Furthermore, all models include a measure of descriptive representa-
tion to examine if policy responsiveness is indeed the key to political support, or if it is sufficient 
if a system looks representative – i.e. if descriptive representation is high (H2). 
Turning to hypothesis 1, which states that higher levels of policy responsiveness are asso-
ciated with higher levels of political support, I find strong evidence in favour of the postulated 
relationship. Even after including country fixed effects in order to control for unobserved coun-
try level effects13, policy responsiveness has a positive effect on minorities’ satisfaction with 
democracy. The first two models present the effect of the subjective measures of policy respon-
siveness. Both, responsiveness in terms of minority rights and in terms of general policy re-
sponsiveness seem to be equally important: the higher an individual perceives policy respon-
siveness, the more satisfied (s)he is with the way democracy works in the country.14 The confi-
dence in this result might suffer from fears that evaluations of perceived policy responsiveness 
and evaluations of democracy are empirically too closely related to be clearly separated. There-
fore, I also assess the effect of policy responsiveness with more ‘objective’ factors which are 
not based on individual perceptions. As models 3 and 4 in table 4 underline, the results are 
robust to the inclusion of the group-level measurements of policy responsiveness. Individuals 
who belong to groups that are economically discriminated are less supportive of the political 
regime, whereas individuals who belong to groups that receive higher levels of language rights 
are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. These results match the first 
hypothesis which postulates that policy responsiveness may work as a remedy against the low 
                                                          
13 Potential country level effects that might be important, but cannot be tested due to the low number of countries 
include: the level of democracy, the support for democracy among the majority population, and a recent history of 
ethnic conflict or economic development. These factors are controlled for by country fixed effects. 
14 The effects also hold when policy responsiveness is measured in a simpler way by only looking at the effect of 
performance (variables E37 and E7). Results are included into the appendix in table A4. 
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political support of minorities.15 This finding is also politically relevant as it suggests that the 
low political support of minorities is not unalterable. To the contrary, the findings imply that 
minorities might support the political system to a similar extent as the majority population if 
their preferences were better represented. 
However, is it really policy responsiveness that matters or is political support already en-
sured through political institutions that look representative? Building on assumptions about 
group representation we might assume that descriptive representation is sufficient to guarantee 
the political support of minorities (Gay 2002). Descriptive representation gives members of 
identity-based groups a feeling of inclusion and influence in politics and might, therefore, suf-
fice to guarantee the political support of minorities (H2) (Madrid 2008). The results in table 2 
below clearly reveal that descriptive representation alone is not sufficient to guarantee the po-
litical support of minorities. The effect is only significant in one of the models and weaker than 
the effect of policy responsiveness:16 An increase from no descriptive representation to perfectly 
proportional descriptive representation results in barely one scale point higher levels of satis-
faction with democracy. In comparison, policy responsiveness has a much more substantial 
effect: an increase from the minimum to the maximum increases the level of satisfaction with 
democracy by almost two scale points for the group-level measures, and by more than one scale 
point for the individual level measures of responsiveness. This implies that what governments 
do is more important than what they look like, thereby again underlying the importance that 
governments are responsive to as many citizens as possible and not only to those who are elec-
torally relevant (Dahl 1971). 
 
  
                                                          
15 The results also hold when the individual level variables are included together with group level factors (see table 
A6 in the supplementary material). 




Table 4: The effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic minorities’ satisfaction with democracy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Policy Responsiveness     
General Responsiveness 0.12***    
 (0.01)    
Minority Rights Responsiveness  0.13***   
  (0.01)   
Economic Discrimination   -0.55***  
   (0.16)  
Language Rights    0.41* 
    (0.18) 
Other Variables     
Descriptive Representation 0.28 0.08 0.96* -0.07 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.39) (0.38) 
Winner 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Gender -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age -0.01* -0.00+ -0.00+ -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Political Interest 0.09+ 0.11* 0.09+ 0.09+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Interpersonal Trust 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Religiosity 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Income 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.04* 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 5.68*** 6.13*** 7.75*** 5.24*** 
 (1.17) (1.17) (1.22) (1.34) 
Variance (Ethnic Groups) 1.05e-16 1.12e-15 1.09e-15 4.48e-18 
 (8.86e-16) (9.01e-15) (8.84e-15) (3.97e-17) 
Variance (Residuals) 3.79*** 3.80*** 3.91*** 3.92*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
N (individuals, groups) 2466, 25 2466, 25 2466, 25 2466, 25 
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
BIC 10484.89 10495.90 10562.83 10570.03 
Log Likelihood -5140.91 -5146.41 -5179.88 -5183.48 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Testing the robustness of the results to the inclusion of the majority population 
In order to test the results’ robustness, the changes the effects of policy responsiveness 
undergo when the majority population is included are analysed. I concentrate on attitudes re-
garding the importance and guarantee of minority rights for the robustness checks as there is no 
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theoretical reason why the effect of general responsiveness should vary between minority and 
majority groups.17 The inclusion of the majority population allows me to ascertain if policy 
responsiveness is indeed responsible for the different levels of political support among the mi-
nority and majority population, and if increasing levels of minority rights affect the support of 
minorities and majorities differently. The robustness checks presented below (table 5) lend con-
fidence to the results presented so far.  
As a first check, policy responsiveness is included as an additional predictor into the mod-
els that cover the entire population (table 3). If political support indeed depends mainly on the 
level of policy responsiveness, the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority group 
should disappear once policy responsiveness is included. Indeed, minorities and majorities are 
no longer distinguishable with regard to their satisfaction with democracy when policy respon-
siveness is included into the models (table 5, model 1). This suggests that minorities exhibit 
lower levels of political support, because the government appears less responsive to their de-
mands than to those of the majority. Minorities expect higher levels of minority rights than the 
majority, and perceive the level granted to be lower (see also figure 1). This leads to a discrep-
ancy between policy expectations and the perceived performance, and thus negatively affects 
the political support of minorities. 
 If a lack of policy responsiveness is the driving force behind minorities’ lower level of 
political support (see table 3, model 2), we should expect minorities to react more strongly to 
increased minority rights than members of the majority population. One can test this by inter-
acting a person’s minority status with the perceived guarantee of minority rights. The positive 
and significant interaction effect lends strong support to our hypothesis: (perceived) increasing 
levels of minority protection have a stronger effect on the satisfaction with democracy among 
                                                          
17 While members of ethnic minorities are expected to react stronger to policy responsiveness in the area of mi-
nority rights than the majority population, there is no reason, why members of minorities and majorities should 




members of minority than majority groups. In other words, if the protection of minority rights 
improves, the gap between minority and majority groups regarding their political support de-
creases (table 5, model 2).18 
In sum, the results presented here lend strong support to the assumption that lower levels 
of political support among the minority population are associated with a lack of policy respon-
siveness towards their preferences. Members of minority groups are more satisfied with the 
way democracy works if their expectations are met and if the government takes measures to 
increase its policy responsiveness toward them (e.g. reduces economic discrimination, increases 
the level of language rights). The fact that a (perceived) increase in minority rights is more 
influential among minorities suggests that we are dealing with a minority specific effect. Not 
all individuals react to increased levels of minority rights. It is members of minorities who 
demand higher levels of minority rights, and who are more satisfied with their political system 
if they receive them. While it is worrying that some governments are still less responsive to-
wards minorities than majorities, the findings also suggest that governments which try to square 
the circle and to represent the preferences of minorities and majorities at the same time will be 
rewarded by greater levels of support among the minority population. This finding might have 
important implications for the long-term stability of democracies, particularly in ethnically het-
erogeneous societies. 
  
                                                          
18 Ideally, a similar test would be conducted for the group-level factors (economic discrimination and language 
rights). Since the group-level factors are exclusively measured for minorities this is not easily done. In Table A6 
in the supplementary material I present an approximation, where the political support of the majority population 
is regressed on the average level of minority rights in a country – i.e. the (missing) level of language rights and 
economic discrimination for the majority population is replaced with the average value on these variables for a 
country’s minority groups. The results of this robustness check support the claims made above. Economic discrim-
ination does not affect the political support among the majority population, whereas the level of language rights 
has a barely significant and weak positive effect on the support of the majority population (probably partly due to 
omitted country-level variables). The effect of language rights is clearly weaker than that for the minority popula-
tion. In sum, we may, therefore, conclude that the low level of support among the minority population is related 
to the failure of governments to respond adequately to minority preferences. 
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Table 5: The effect of policy responsiveness on satisfaction with democracy (full sample) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Minority -0.06 -0.23+ 
 (0.10) (0.14) 
Minority Rights Responsiveness 0.13***  
 (0.01)  
General Responsiveness 0.12***  
 (0.01)  
   
Guarantee of minority rights (perception)  0.17*** 
  (0.01) 
Minority * Guarantee of minority rights  0.05* 
  (0.02) 
Government responsiveness (perception)  0.21*** 
  (0.01) 
Winner 0.56*** 0.45*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Gender 0.02 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Age -0.00*** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Political Interest 0.12*** 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Interpersonal Trust 0.17*** 0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Income 0.06*** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Religiosity 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 1.40*** 1.43*** 
 (0.22) (0.20) 
Variance (Ethnic Groups) 0.04* 0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Variance (Residuals) 4.29*** 4.12*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
N (individuals, groups) 14855, 42 11197, 42 
Country Fixed Effects yes yes 
BIC 64426.00 47906.22 
Log Likelihood -32083.32 -23822.58 






Most governments are aware of the necessity to be responsive towards the median voter in 
order to have a chance of re-election (Downs 1957). Consequently, responsiveness towards the 
median voter is generally fairly well achieved (Cohen, Jeffrey, 1997; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 
2007; Kang & Powell, 2010; Roberts, 2010). However, more recently some studies revealed 
important group differences in terms of policy responsiveness between minority and majority 
groups (e.g. Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012; Rosset et al., 2013). Considering the heterogeneity of 
most countries and potential preference differences resulting from this heterogeneity, this paper 
criticizes the primacy of the median voter from a normative and empirical perspective. If re-
sponsiveness is a key characteristic of democracies, responsiveness towards the median voter 
is problematic, especially if important subgroups in the population are not represented by the 
median’s position. Good democracies do not only require electoral participation and majority 
vote, but also the protection of group and individual rights. Some suggest introducing special 
rules that weigh the decision-making power according to the stakes at hand to ensure that a 
majority with little stakes cannot overrule a minority with high stakes (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 
2010). Others advocate political systems which reward compromises between different groups. 
Politicians might be encouraged to decide against the preferences of the majority in certain 
issue areas which are of particular importance for minorities if they are aware that their (re-
)election depends not only on members of the majority, but also on members of the minority – 
e.g. through electoral systems which reward cross-group voting and/or coalition building (c.f. 
Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1969; Reilly 2001).  
Apart from the normative problem of neglecting the preferences of minorities, a lack of 
responsiveness towards minorities also has empirical implications, as individuals who feel that 
their demands are not met might withdraw their support from the political system and engage 
in anti-system behaviour. The empirical analysis examined the policy responsiveness towards 
minorities and its empirical consequences for the political support of minorities. The results 
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indicate that the preferences of minorities indeed differ quite considerably from the preferences 
of the majority in many countries, and that governments seem to be more responsive towards 
the preferences of the majority. This is not only normatively problematic, but has real empirical 
consequences as a lack of responsiveness towards minorities seems to translate into lower levels 
of support among the minority population. Contrasting the effect of descriptive representation 
and policy responsiveness, the findings suggest that policy responsiveness is more important 
for the political support of ethnic minorities than descriptive representation. Members of mi-
norities seem not only to evaluate how representative institutions look, but also what office-
holders do. While the hypotheses where empirically tested for ethnic minority groups, the find-
ings have implications for other subgroups in the population. They might also apply to other 
minority groups which receive lower levels of policy responsiveness than the majority – e.g. to 
socio-economically poorer groups (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Rosset, Giger, and Bernauer 
2013; Soroka and Wlezien 2010, chap. 8). Considering the findings of this paper the lack of 
policy responsiveness towards poorer citizens should raise concerns. In light of growing socio-
economic inequalities (Cingano 2014) low policy responsiveness towards less affluent citizens 
might have important (and potentially damaging) implications for democratic legitimacy.  
The generalisability of these findings is, however, limited by the cross-sectional structure 
of the ESS dataset. The ESS6 presents a unique source to study policy responsiveness across a 
variety of issues with individual level data, but is restricted to one time point. Potential changes 
over time can, therefore, not be analysed. In order to fully understand the link between policy 
responsiveness and political support, we would ideally rely on panel data to analyse how the 
effect changes over time, and how within-country variation in policy responsiveness affect the 
political support of minorities. Future research and new data may reveal further insights into 
the link between policy responsiveness and political support by analysing how such within-
country and time effects affect the presented findings. 
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Nevertheless, this paper contributes to the normative and empirical literature on policy re-
sponsiveness and representation. From a theoretical point of view this paper critically reas-
sessed the primacy of the median voter in the literature on policy responsiveness. While respon-
siveness towards the median voter might be sufficient in homogenous societies, it carries the 
risk of a “tyranny of the majority” in heterogeneous societies. The paper argues that the focus 
on the median voter is not only normatively problematic, but also politically risky, as a lack of 
responsiveness lowers the political support among minority members. For heterogeneous soci-
eties this might prove very dangerous, as a lack of political support is likely to endanger the 
legitimacy and stability of a political system. The findings imply that minority groups are not 
simply less supportive of the political system because they are often members of the political 
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Figure A1: Correlation between aggregate and survey measures of ethnicity 
 
Notes: correlation between the size of the minority population based on survey and aggregate 
measures. Data for aggregate measures is taken from the EPR-ETH dataset (Cederman, Wimmer, 
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Table A1: Ethnic minority groups 
Country Ethnic Minority Groups Groupsize (Survey) 
Albania Greek speakers 0.42 
Belgium French speakers 41.77 
Belgium German speakers 1.26 
Bulgaria Turkish speakers 8.97 
Bulgaria Romany speakers 4.17 
Estonia Russian speakers 28.54 
Finland Swedish speakers 5.89 
Hungary Romany speakers 0.25 
Israel Islamic 12.64 
Kosovo Serbian Speakers 26.26 
Lithuania Russian speakers 7.73 
Lithuania Polish speakers 4.55 
Russia Tatar speakers 1.41 
Russia Ossetian speakers 0.48 
Russia Avaric speakers 0.4 
Russia Bashkir speakers 0.4 
Slovakia Hungarian speakers 7.25 
Slovakia Romany speakers 0.65 
Spain Catalan speakers 8.9 
Spain Galician speakers 2.89 
Spain Basque speakers 0.61 
Switzerland French speakers 22.07 
Switzerland Italian speakers 3.82 
Ukraine Russian speakers 44.6 
Ukraine Crimean Tatars 0.28 
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Satisfaction with Democracy 52602 5.16 2.57 0 10 
Minority 27008 0.18 0.38 0 1 
General Responsiveness 54673 7.36 3.17 0 10 
Minority Rights Responsiveness 54673 7.72 2.69 0 10 
Winner 45464 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Gender 54656 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Age 54540 48.31 18.59 15 103 
Education 54309 3.87 1.85 1 7 
Political Interest 54411 1.34 0.92 0 3 
Interpersonal Trust 54453 4.92 2.49 0 10 
Religiosity 54109 4.77 3.08 0 10 
Income 43981 4.06 2.81 0 9 
Language Rights 4748 4.94 1.44 1 6 
Descriptive Representation 4748 0.93 0.51 0 2.04 




Table A3: Operationalization of Variables 
 
  




And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way 





[…] please tell me how often you think the govern-
ment in [country] today changes its planned policies 
in response to what most people think? 
0-10 
 How important do you think it is for democracy in 
general that the government changes policies in re-
sponse to what most people think? 
0-10 
Minority Rights […] please tell me to what extent you think each of 
these statements applies in [country]. The rights of 
minority groups in [country] are protected. 
0-10 
 How important do you think it is for democracy in 




Gender Gender 0=Male 
Age Age of respondent  
Education Generated variable: Highest level of education (based 
on country-specific information) 
0-7 
Satisfaction with economic 
performance of govern-
ment 
On the whole how satisfied are you with the present 
state of the economy in [country]? 
0-10 
Interpersonal Trust […] would you say most people can be trusted or you 
cannot be too careful? 
0-10 
Religiosity Regardless of whether you belong to a particular reli-
gion, how religious would you say you are? 
0-3 
Winner Which party did you vote for in that [the last] elec-
tion? 
Coded as 1 if respondent referred to one of the parties 
in government. 
0-1 
Political Interest How interested would you say you are in politics? 0-3 
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Table A4: The effect of policy responsiveness on satisfaction with democracy (responsiveness 
measured with performance indicators) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Policy Responsiveness   
General Responsiveness 0.23***  
 (0.02)  
Minority Rights Responsiveness  0.24*** 
  (0.02) 
Other Variables   
Descriptive Representation 0.23 0.09 
 (0.37) (0.33) 
Winner 0.35** 0.41*** 
 (0.11) (0.10) 
Gender -0.12 -0.07 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Age -0.01+ -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Education 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Political Interest 0.08 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Interpersonal Trust 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Religiosity 0.05** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Income 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 3.42+ 5.85*** 
 (1.93) (1.13) 
Variance (Ethnic Groups) 4.89e-22 6.45e-16 
 (3.90e-21) (4.78e-13) 
Variance (Residuals) 3.60*** 3.57*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
N (individuals, groups) 2466, 25 2466, 25 
Country Fixed Effects yes Yes 
BIC 8343.47 9533.42 
Log Likelihood -4073.06 -4666.25 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. Substantive representation was measured with the questions E37 and E7: 
Namely, “[…] please tell me how often you think the government in [country] 
today changes its planned policies in response to what most people think?” and  
[…] please tell me to what extent you think each of these statements applies in 




Table A5: The effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic minorities’ satisfaction with democ-
racy, individual level variables included into all models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Policy Responsiveness    
General Responsiveness 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Minority Rights Responsiveness 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Economic Discrimination  -0.44**  
  (0.15)  
Language Rights   0.32+ 
   (0.18) 
Other Variables    
Descriptive Representation 0.11 0.65+ -0.17 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.37) 
Winner 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Gender -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Age -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Political Interest 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Interpersonal Trust 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Religiosity 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 5.36*** 6.26*** 4.28** 
 (1.15) (1.19) (1.31) 
Variance (Ethnic Groups) 5.46e-19*** 1.42e-19*** 7.79e-20 
 (4.91e-18) (1.19e-18) (6.44-19) 
Variance (Residuals) 3.70*** 3.69*** 3.70*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
N (individuals, groups) 2466, 25 2466, 25 2466, 25 
Country Fixed Effects yes Yes yes 
BIC 10435.82 10435.39 10440.53 
Log Likelihood -5112.47 -5108.35 -5110.92 




Table A6: The effect of minority rights on the majority’s  satisfaction with democracy, group-
level factors 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Economic Discrimination -0.06  
 (0.19)  
Language Rights  0.32+ 
  (0.18) 
Winner 0.70*** 0.70*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Gender -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Age -0.00+ -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.03* -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Political Interest 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Interpersonal Trust 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Religiosity 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Income 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 3.26*** 1.70+ 
 (0.39) (0.88) 




Variance (Residuals) 4.84*** 4.84*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
N (individuals, groups) 12386, 14 12386, 14 
BIC 54871.42 54868.72 
Log Likelihood -27379.16 -27377.81 
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Many ethnic minorities demand (adequate) descriptive representation in parliament – i.e. rep-
resentation through representatives of their own ethnic group. They expect improved descrip-
tive representation to affect the responsiveness of governments towards their demands. How-
ever, the mechanism of how minority MPs affect policy outcomes remains unclear, because 
minority MPs can easily be outvoted and marginalised. I argue that descriptive representation 
mainly has an effect if MPs possess additional leverage to influence policy outcomes. The 
argument is tested with hierarchical models and time-series data from 97 groups in 50 multi-
ethnic democracies. While the analysis shows that descriptive representatives are most suc-
cessful in influencing policy outcomes if they are included in the government, the legislature 
is powerful, and a group is comparatively large, it also reveals important differences between 
policy issues. 
 
Keywords: descriptive representation, substantive representation, ethnic minorities, language 




During the last few decades many countries have introduced special measures to ensure 
the representation of ethnic minority groups (c.f. Bird, 2014; Krook & O’Brien, 2010). Apart 
from ideological and normative reasons, the driving force behind these measures is the under-
standing that groups which are excluded from political power and whose preferences are not 
recognized might become a threat to democratic stability and legitimacy. Increasing the level 
of descriptive representation in parliament is popular among minority groups, because it is 
believed to be associated with increased substantive representation (e.g. Mansbridge, 1999; 
Phillips, 1994, 1995; Young, 2000) – i.e. increased responsiveness of governments to the 
preferences of minorities (Pitkin 1967, 209)1. Hence, apart from normative claims for the in-
clusion of all societal groups, which are based on the principle of political equality and the 
right of all groups to be present in parliament (Ruedin 2009, 335), many see a link between 
the representation of groups in parliament and the representation of their interests (e.g. 
Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1994, 1995; Preuhs, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; 
Wängnerud, 2009; Young, 2000).  
However, as already Pitkin underlines, the actual effect of minority representation in par-
liament on policy outcomes is all but clear (Pitkin 1967, 142). Indeed, research from the Unit-
ed States has shown that increased descriptive representation may go together with decreased 
policy responsiveness towards minority interests. While gerrymandering in the United States 
successfully increased Afro-Americans’ descriptive representation, it often decreased overall 
Democratic representation (the party usually more open to Afro-American’s interests), thus 
leading to decreased policy responsiveness towards Afro-Americans in Congress (Cameron, 
Epstein, and Halloran 1996; Lublin 1999). Furthermore, even if a group is proportionally rep-
resented in parliament, it usually constitutes only a small faction. As a result, minority MPs 
can easily be outvoted and politically marginalised (Bieber 2008, 114). We may even think of 
descriptive representatives who consciously decide not to target their group specifically, but 
____________________________________ 
1 Henceforth, the terms substantive representation and policy responsiveness are used interchangeably.  
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instead to represent all minorities in a country or voters from a mainstream party (Zuber 2015, 
5). Conversely, even where descriptive representation is absent, a government might include 
ministers belonging to an ethnic minority group, or enact minority-friendly legislation, in or-
der to enhance democratic legitimacy and stability (Preuhs 2007, 279; Zuber 2015, 5). Conse-
quently, while many expect a link between descriptive and substantive representation, the 
mechanism of how minority MPs affect policy outcomes remains unclear. Building on the 
literature of ethnic minorities' substantive representation, this paper tests under which condi-
tions descriptive representation affects policy responsiveness towards minority issues. I argue 
that it is not principally the level of descriptive representation that matters, but rather its com-
bination with three moderating factors. I expect descriptive representatives to be more suc-
cessful in influencing policy outcomes if they are included in government coalitions (Preuhs 
2006, 2007), if the legislature is powerful (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007), and if their group 
constitutes a significant share of the population (Ghanem 2012). 
The main innovation of this paper is the extension of the study of ethnic minorities’ sub-
stantive representation to a comparative framework which covers all electoral democracies in 
(Western and Eastern) Europe, (North and South) America, Australia and New Zealand, and 
the integration of the three moderating factors into one framework to analyse the conditions 
under which descriptive representation matters. For this purpose, I develop the new dataset 
“Ethnic minorities in democracies” that provides new measures of descriptive representation 
of ethnic minorities over time, and allows substantive representation to be measured over a 
large number of groups. In order to measure the substantive representation of minorities I rely 
on a de-jure and a de-facto measurement of policy outcomes. The de-facto measurement relies 
on an extended and recoded measure of MAR’s (Minorities at Risk Project 2009) data on 
economic discrimination, while the newly developed de-jure measure covers the extent of 
language rights for language minorities. 
In exploring the effect of ethnic minorities' descriptive representation on policy out-
comes, I first present an overview of the literature on the substantive representation of minori-
4 
 
ty groups. Then the theoretical framework is discussed which introduces three conditions - 
government inclusion, legislative power, and group size - which are expected to increase the 
influence of descriptive representatives on policy responsiveness. Next, I turn to the opera-
tionalization and introduce the newly developed dataset on “Ethnic minorities in democra-
cies”. Finally, I empirically test the hypotheses and discuss the findings. 
 
Literature review 
The literature on the substantive representation of specific social groups proposes a direct 
link between descriptive and substantive representation. It argues that descriptive representa-
tives work as spokespeople for their group, advocate group-specific policies, or change public 
policy priorities in areas of importance for members of their own group. The idea is that rep-
resentatives who belong to the same social or ethnic group as their voters are more likely to 
share their group's perspectives and to stand for their interests (Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2011; 
Bloemraad 2013; Owens 2005; Phillips 1995; Young 2000).  
 Previous research on the substantive representation of specific social groups (mostly 
women and ethnic minorities) has applied two strategies. Earlier attempts to conceptualize 
policy responsiveness have focused mainly on gender or racial differences in political atti-
tudes and parliamentary behaviour. Keeping very close to the initial definition of substantive 
representation by Pitkin (1967), these studies have analysed how minority parliamentarians 
vote, how they engage in parliamentary debates, and whether they see themselves as repre-
sentatives of their identity group. Hence, it was examined whether descriptive representatives 
are acting for (Pitkin 1967, chap. 6) their social group in parliament. These studies have ro-
bustly shown that descriptive representatives differ with regard to their political attitudes 
(Childs 2002; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Norris 1996) and their political behaviour (Baker 
and Cook 2005; Bird 2011; Bratton 2005, 2006; Broockman 2013; Dolan 1998; Grose 2005; 
Hogan 2008; Juenke and Preuhs 2012; Lublin 1999; Minta 2009; Preuhs and Hero 2009; 
Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Saalfeld 2011; Swers 1998; Tremblay 1998; Whitby and 
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Krause 2001), and that many minority (and female) representatives feel a responsibility to 
represent their own group (Broockman 2013; Butler and Broockman 2011; Childs 2002).  
However, substantive representation is most meaningful if the presence of minority MPs 
does not only affect political behaviour, attitudes and values in parliament, but also policy 
outcomes. While it is well documented that minority representatives aim to act for their con-
stituencies or hold different values and base their decisions on different cues than majority 
MPs (Preuhs and Hero 2009), it is less clear how their behaviour affects policy outcomes. 
Thus the crucial question to be answered is whether descriptive representation has actual poli-
cy consequences. There are some studies on women's substantive representation which ana-
lyse the effect of descriptive representation on the existence of women-friendly policies and 
policies which are considered particularly important for women. These studies analyse the 
length and extent of maternity and childcare leave (Kittilson 2008; Schwindt-Bayer and 
Mishler 2005), the percentage of children with a child-care space (Bratton and Ray 2002), the 
extent of welfare benefits (Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Reingold and Smith 2012) or 
policies against domestic violence (Caiazza 2004; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009). Re-
garding the substantive representation of ethnic minorities, few studies have explicitly fo-
cused on policy outcomes. The main exceptions are Preuhs (2006, 2007) and Owens (2005), 
who both study the effect of descriptive representation on policies important to minority 
groups. Specifically, they focus on the relationship between Afro-Americans' and Latinos' 
descriptive representation and the extent of welfare benefits in the United States. Reingold 
and Smith (2012) link the research on women and ethnic minorities and show that the share of 
female minority representatives has the strongest influence on US states' welfare policy. Be-
yond the United States, there is almost no comparative research on the policy responsiveness 
towards minority issues, probably also due to the lack of comparative datasets. To the best of 
my knowledge, the only exception is the recent book by Andrew Reynolds (2011), who brief-
ly addresses the question from a comparative perspective and finds no conclusive results 
(Reynolds 2011, 99–100). In the present paper, I build on these contributions and define sub-
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stantive representation as minority-friendly policy outcomes, rather than as the behaviour and 
attitudes of descriptive representatives in parliaments. 
 
How Descriptive Representatives influence Policy Outcomes 
Studying the effect of ethnic minorities’ descriptive representation on policy responsive-
ness towards their demands rests on the assumption that minorities hold policy preferences 
that are substantially different from the majority and other minority groups in society – i.e. 
that group specific interests exist (Hänni 2015b; Lieberman and McClendon 2012). Group 
specific preferences have been most extensively studied by the literature on social psychology 
and identity which argues that group identity does not only determine how we view ourselves 
and others, but also which preferences we hold (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Conover 
1984; Habyarimana et al. 2009; Hogg 2003; Lieberman and McClendon 2012).  
Hence, while the literature is clear about why descriptive representation should influence 
substantive representation, it is less clear about how the mechanism works. To understand if 
and when the presence of minority MPs increases the substantive representation of ethnic mi-
norities, the crucial question is under what conditions minority politicians are able to influ-
ence political outcomes. In democracies, agenda setting and decision-making is the principal 
domain of the legislative majority. Since members of an ethnic minority group normally do 
not hold the legislative majority - at least not in democracies - minority representatives do not 
usually wield decision-making power (Bieber 2008; Protsyk 2010). Therefore, descriptive 
representatives can only affect policy outcomes indirectly. In order to influence the policy 
agenda, minority MPs might follow a number of strategies. In most parliaments MPs have the 
opportunity to give statements on issues which they see as important. Such motions in parlia-
ment are an effective mean of grabbing the attention of other parliamentarians (Tremblay 
1998). Furthermore, minority MPs can lobby for their interests in committee meetings, ask 
questions in parliament and generally raise the awareness among the political majority for 
minority concerns. In the same way as women might be in a better position than men to pro-
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mote women's concerns in parliamentary debates (Tremblay 1998), ethnic minority MPs 
might be in a better position to promote minority issues.  
The particular strategies available to minority MPs depend on how they are elected. Mi-
nority representatives are mostly elected through ethnic minority parties or as MPs from 
mainstream parties.2 For MPs who are elected through ethnic minority parties there is good 
reason to believe that they attempt to contribute to the representation of minority issues. 
These representatives deliberately chose to run for a specific minority group, and can, there-
fore, be expected to identify strongly with this group (c.f. Zuber 2015, 8). For minority MPs 
of non-ethnic or multi-ethnic parties the picture is more complicated. On the one hand, while 
minority MPs in multi-ethnic parties might be in favour of minority interests, they might feel 
responsible for all ethnic (minority) groups rather than explicitly for their own ethnic group 
(Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Zuber 2015, 8). The influence on policy responsiveness towards 
a particular ethnic group might, therefore, be weaker if MPs come from multi-ethnic parties. 
On the other hand, the 'loyalty' of minority MPs in mainstream parties is unclear. Not all mi-
nority MPs who are elected through mainstream parties might see themselves as representa-
tives of their ethnic group, but rather as members of particular political parties - e.g. the So-
cial Democrats or the Conservatives3. Furthermore, many party systems are characterized by 
strong party discipline which makes effective minority representation more difficult in non-
ethnic parties. However, although parties are the main parliamentary actors and party disci-
pline is often strong, the common party position is usually the result of intense internal de-
bates. In pre-parliamentary party meetings, individual MPs have the opportunity to convince 
their fellow party members of their policy views - e.g. on minority issues - and to present 
themselves as policy specialists. This can give individual MPs considerable influence over the 
policy position of their party (Thomassen and Andeweg 2004). Hence, even minority MPs in 
____________________________________ 
2 For a more detailed discussion of how minority MPs are represented in political parties, and how the  way of 
representation influences their political behaviour see Zuber (2015). 
3 However, as outlined above, many minority MPs consider it important to represent their group (Broockman 
2013; Butler and Broockman 2011; Celis and Wauters 2010; Childs 2002; Thomassen and Andeweg 2004). 
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mainstream (non-ethnic) parties can be expected to influence policy outcomes in favour of 
their ethnic group – but possibly to a lower extent than MPs from minority parties.  
In sum, the ability of minority MPs to influence the legislative agenda is determined by 
the relationship between minority MPs and the legislative majority. If minority representa-
tives are elected through mainstream parties, their policy influence depends on intra-party 
coalition building which can be achieved through committee meetings, pre-parliamentary 
meetings or policy specialization. If minority representatives are part of an ethnic minority 
party, gaining legislative support for minority issues depends on inter-party coalition building 
(Protsyk 2010). Hence, regardless of how minority MPs are elected, a positive effect of de-
scriptive representation is expected. However, the effect might be stronger for minority MPs 
who were elected through ethnic minority parties, because the pattern of representation is 
more straightforward. From this discussion follow two hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Descriptive representation of ethnic minorities increases the policy responsiveness 
towards minority preferences. 
H1b: The hypothesised effect is stronger for MPs of an ethnic minority party than for 
MPs of non-ethnic or multi-ethnic parties. 
 
While there is good reason to expect a direct effect of descriptive representation on policy 
outcomes, it might be rather weak, as minority MPs can easily be marginalized in parliament 
(Bieber 2008). I argue that descriptive representation is particularly important if MPs have 
additional leverage to influence policy outcomes, and therefore, discuss three ways that are 
expected to strengthen the effect of descriptive representation. It is claimed that the ability of 
minority MPs to influence the decision-making process is much higher if the minority groups 
are part of strong political coalitions (Browning 1984; Preuhs 2007), if the legislature is pow-
erful (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007), or if they make up a bigger share of the population 
(Ghanem 2012).  
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The most straightforward way to ensure a position of power, which allows for additional 
policy influence, is through presence in government. Minority representatives who are part of 
the executive are in a privileged position for ensuring the incorporation of minority-friendly 
policies into legislation (Preuhs 2006, 2007; Protsyk 2010). It is, therefore, more likely that a 
government is responsive to a minority group's demands if it has members of that group with-
in its fold (Cho 2010, 1656). Accordingly, the influence of descriptive representation should 
be stronger if a minority group is also represented in government. At first glance, one might 
find it unlikely that members of an ethnic minority group or small minority parties should be 
included into the government. However, comparatively small minority parties might be attrac-
tive coalition partners as they can  demand smaller shares of government positions than larger 
mainstream parties (Bieber 2008). Furthermore, including minorities into government might 
also serve a governments purpose to increase its legitimacy among the minority population 
(Gay 2002). 4 From this follows the second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Descriptive representatives have a stronger influence on policy responsiveness if they 
are part of strong coalitions - i.e. if they are included in the government. 
 
Even where government ministers belonging to an ethnic minority group are lacking, the 
probability that descriptive representation matters is higher when opposition parties are im-
portant for policy making (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007). In a political system where the 
executive is strong, minority representation might be less important than in a system where 
opposition parties in the legislature have a more prominent position. For instance, minority 
representation in parliament is likely to be more effective when minority MPs have a chance 
to force the government to bargain. The ability of opposition parties to influence the political 
agenda is highly dependent on the agenda-setting prerogatives of the government during the 
parliamentary passage of bills. Therefore, the influence of minority representation in parlia-
____________________________________ 
4 Indeed, there are a number of countries where minority MPs are regularly represented in government (Bieber 
2008). Examples include the Hungarian minority in Romania and Slovakia, or the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 
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ment is higher when the executive influence over legislative matters is low (Alonso and Ruiz-
Rufino 2007). This argumentation leads to a hypothesis postulating an interactive effect of 
descriptive representation and the strength of the legislature. 
 
H3: Descriptive representatives have more influence on policy responsiveness if they live 
in a country with a powerful legislature. 
 
Finally, given that a small number of minority MPs can easily be outvoted and marginal-
ized (Bieber 2008), it is expected that descriptive representatives are more successful in influ-
encing policy outcome for larger minorities. Not only are the policy demands of larger groups 
more likely to be heard, but they are also more likely to be considered (Ghanem 2012, 367; 
Liu 2011, 131), as large minority groups can credibly threaten the stability of the state if they 
are excluded from the political system (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 96; Hänni 2014). 
Furthermore, with the share of minority MPs remaining the same, those representing larger 
minority groups naturally win more seats, meaning that the influence of MPs of larger minori-
ty groups will be greater. In other words, simple arithmetic implies that it is more difficult to 
exclude a sizeable minority (e.g. 40%) from power, than a minority of negligible size (e.g. 
5%). In sum, larger groups are more likely to exert influence on policy outcomes because they 
can put more pressure on decision-makers, and are more likely to play a pivotal role in the 
decision-making process (Ghanem 2012, 367). From this emerges the fourth hypothesis. 
 
H4:  Descriptive representatives of large minority groups have a greater effect on policy 




Case selection and Measurement 
Case selection 
This project covers pluri-ethnic democracies (Freedom House (2011) ≤ 4 and Polity IV 
(Marshall and Gurr 2011) ≥ 6)5 with at least two ethnic groups and more than 500’000 inhab-
itants since 1945 from Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America and Oceania, 
where ethnic minority groups are politically relevant and exceed one per cent of the popula-
tion. African and Asian democracies (17 countries) are excluded for mainly two reasons: 1) In 
many African countries ethnic parties are banned or representation based on ethnicity is pro-
hibited. This makes it very difficult to gather valid information about their representation in 
parliament and government, and to study the effect of descriptive representation on policy 
responsiveness (in particular hypothesis 2 which relies on representation in ethnic minority 
parties). 2) Ethnic identity is more volatile in Asian and African countries and there are more 
cross-cutting cleavages of identity (e.g. India, Zambia). This makes it more problematic to 
identify the relevant ethnic cleavage for the study of policy responsiveness without deep case 
knowledge. 
On the basis of these criteria I developed the dataset “Ethnic minorities in democracies” 
which includes novel measures on descriptive representation in parliament and government as 
well as on the substantive representation of ethnic minorities. In the present study, ethnic mi-
norities are defined as autochthonous or ethno-nationalist minorities based on perceived 
common origin, shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; 
Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18). Datasets on ethnic minorities often suffer from 
selection bias, because one needs to decide which of the at least 5000 existing ethnic groups 
to include (Birnir et al. 2014; Hug 2013; Kymlicka 1995). In order to reduce problems of se-
lection bias I chose politically relevant (salient) ethnic minority groups on the basis of the 
EPR dataset on ethnic power relations (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and the Minority 
____________________________________ 
5 In cases where the two ratings differed, the country was only included if it is rated at most one scale-point be-
low the democracy threshold (on the measure where it was not rated as democratic). 
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at Risk dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The combination of both datasets reduces 
the selection bias associated with datasets on ethnicity (especially with MAR) (Hug 2013). In 
cases where MAR data is used, missing groups are coded through other sources and a review 
of the group-specific literature (see the respective variables for more details).6 In total 97 eth-
nic groups from 50 countries are included into the analysis (see also table A1 in the supple-
mentary material, Part A). For some (mainly small) groups information on the descriptive 
representation in parliament was not available. These groups were, therefore, excluded from 
the main analysis; for some robustness checks they were considered and coded with their 
share of descriptive representation in ethnic minority parties. 
 
The Dependent Variables: Ethnic Minorities' Substantive Representation 
The argument that the presence of minority representatives in parliament affects the sub-
stantive representation of minorities rests to some extent on the assumption that members of 
the same minority group share a similar identity which distinguishes them from members of 
other groups and influences their policy preferences (Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; 
Phillips 1995). Descriptive evidence supports this assumption. Minorities often seem to have 
distinct policy preferences, both in cultural and non-cultural areas, which differentiates them 
from the majority population in their country. They are more likely to be in favour of minority 
rights and differ with regard to how important they perceive economic issues (Hänni 2015a). 
This is illustrated by figure 1 below which depicts the difference between ethnic minorities 
and majorities on the question, how important government assistance for the guarantee of 
cultural autonomy is perceived (based on data from the ISSP Research Group 2012). In most 
countries individuals who belong to an ethnic minority group seem to be more likely to sup-
port increased government assistance for cultural autonomy than individuals who belong to a 
country’s majority group. 
 
____________________________________ 
6 A more detailed description of the dataset is provided in the data appendix at the end of this dissertation. 
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Figure 1: Difference in preferences for cultural autonomy between mi-
norities and majorities 
 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2003 
on National Identity (II) (ISSP Research Group 2012). Specifically, the following ques-
tion was used in order to analyse differences between minorities and majorities: „Ethnic 
minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and tradi-
tions” (Q8b). Models were calculated by predicting preferences for cultural autonomy by 
an interaction between country and minority status with an OLS regression. 
 
Given these preference-differences we need to define on which issues the substantive rep-
resentation of minorities shall be measured. As discussed previously, substantive representa-
tion is here understood as policy outcomes, rather than as the political behaviour of MPs. Fol-
lowing studies on women's substantive representation, ethnic minorities’ substantive represen-
tation may be defined as issues particularly salient to ethnic minorities, or as issues where 
policy consequences are likely to have a stronger impact on members of an ethnic minority 
group than on members of the majority group (Carroll 1994; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 
2009; Kittilson 2008). This definition already reveals the ultimate problem of measuring eth-
nic minorities' substantive representation: the assumed homogeneity of minority interests. It is 
clear that minority interests might and will differ among members of the same ethnic group 
(see also the error bars in figure 1) and this heterogeneity of ethnic groups is acknowledged. 
Nevertheless, in light of the growing political importance of minority representation, a rea-
sonable and pragmatic approach to studying its effect on policy outcomes is necessary, which 
14 
 
looks at issues that are likely to be important to most members of minority group (even if not 
for everybody).  
Previous attempts to measure substantive representation as policy outcomes have mainly 
focused on studies in the United States. Scholars have mostly measured policy responsiveness 
by considering the extent of social welfare benefits (Owens 2005; Preuhs 2006, 2007). While 
this solution might be convincing for measuring responsiveness to Latino or Afro-American 
interests in the United States, it poses unresolved challenges to an application to cross-country 
comparisons. The present study therefore considers policies which are likely to be important 
for ethnic minorities across Europe, America, and Oceania, and focuses on areas where mi-
norities tend to have different priorities than the majority population - i.e. on areas where re-
sponsiveness to minority interests matters. This approach is in line with studies on policy re-
sponsiveness towards women, which also focus on broad women-friendly policies to measure 
policy responsiveness. I rely on academic research and international treaties to identify two 
policy areas which directly affect members of ethnic minority groups. The first focus is on 
minority language rights as a legislative area which is of particular importance for many eth-
nic minority groups (Deets and Stroschein 2005). Language is often seen as an important 
group characteristic which bonds group members together (Liu 2011, 125), and is the most 
important marker for many ethnic groups  (Brown and Ganguly 2003, 3). Internationally, mi-
nority language rights find wide support among organizations within and beyond Europe (e.g. 
United Nations, 1966, para. 27; Council of Europe, 1992; CSCE, 1990, para. 35). The newly 
developed index of minority language rights consists of three variables and ranges from 0 to 
6, where each element can be guaranteed (2), partly guaranteed (1), or not guaranteed (0). The 
three variables are 1) the possibility of using the minority language when interacting with 
authorities and the courts; 2) the possibility of education of the minority language (as a sub-
ject); 3) the possibility of education in the minority language (as the language of instruction 
for all subjects). Data is collected on the group level and is based on Leclerc's database on 
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language policies around the world (Leclerc 2015).7 For the part of the analysis which in-
cludes this variable, the sample is restricted to language minorities (approximately 80% of the 
minorities in the sample are language minorities).8  
A second focus is economic discrimination. This is included as a measure for de-facto 
policy responsiveness towards minority groups. Certainly, economic discrimination is one of 
the most obvious obstacles which ethnic minority groups face in many countries, and accord-
ingly is an issue of substantive importance for most members of an ethnic community. The 
importance of fighting economic discrimination of minorities is also a primary goal of inter-
national organisations such as the OSCE (OSCE 2012). Economic discrimination is measured 
on a scale from 0 to 4 with MAR data, where (0) refers to no discrimination and (4) refers to 
the presence of exclusionary and repressive policies which severely restrict the economic op-
portunities of an ethnic group (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Groups excluded by MAR 
were recoded with case study information based on reports of the Minority Rights Group In-
ternational, Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Wheatley (2004). 
The focus on two very different policy areas – cultural and economic policies –allows 
studying if the effect of the explanatory variable is consistent across different policy areas. 
One might expect different policy issues to have different causes. Cultural policies are the 
issues most often demanded by members of minorities (Kymlicka 1995), but also relatively 
easy to implement as they are usually treated as single pieces of legislature. By contrast, eco-
nomic policies aimed at the reduction of economic discrimination might be more difficult to 
arrange, because they might include (higher) monetary transfers across groups than the im-
plementation of cultural policies, and their implementation is likely to be more complicated, 
because they might be included into broader economic or budgetary policy packages. Distin-
guishing between two types of policies that are relevant for minorities allows us to analyse if 
they are explained by the same mechanisms. 
____________________________________ 
7 Data was completed with Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Liu (2011). 
8 The results for economic discrimination are robust to the exclusion of non-language minorities. 
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Independent Variables: Descriptive Representation and the Moderating Factors 
The main independent variable is descriptive representation, which is measured by 
counting all the MPs of an ethnic group in parliament. This measure extends previous time-
series measures of descriptive representation considerably as it not only codes MPs from eth-
nic minority parties, but also minority MPs who were elected through non-ethnic or multi-
ethnic parties.9 Data on descriptive representation in parliament is mainly coded with infor-
mation from the annual Human Rights Reports of the United States Department of State (U.S. 
Departement of State) and parliamentary websites, and complemented with country specific 
information10. Descriptive representation is calculated as the ratio between the group's share 
of representatives in parliament and the group's share in the population. Mathematically 
speaking, the measurement is based on the concept of the advantage ratio of Taagepera and 
Laakso (1980). Perfect proportionality between the size of an ethnic group and its representa-
tion in parliament is given when A=xi/yi=1, where xi corresponds to the share of an ethnic 
group in parliament and yi to its share in the population (Taagepera/Grofman 2003: 662). To 
analyse whether the effect of descriptive representation is stronger if it is achieved through 
minority parties (H1b), it is accounted for the share of minority MPs which is elected trough 
ethnic minority parties. For this purpose, a party is considered as ethnic when its representa-
tives are primarily elected by members of the ethnic group and their main political appeal is 
based on ethnicity (Ishiyama 2009). Data on ethnic minority parties and their share in parlia-
ment is based on Bochsler (2010), Ishiyama (2009), Pan & Pfeil (2006), Reed (2002), Van 
Cott (2005), and official election results. 
As outlined above, a conditional effect of descriptive representation in parliament is ex-
pected (H2-H4). Methodologically speaking, an interaction term between descriptive repre-
sentation in parliament and the respective moderating variable is calculated and included in 
____________________________________ 
9 Didier Ruedin (2009, 2013) and Andrew Reynolds (2011) both collected very detailed cross-sectional data for 
minority representation beyond ethnic parties. 
10 Data was completed with information from OSCE country reports, newspapers, Ruedin (2012), Reynolds 
(2011) Protsyk & Osoian (2010), Protsyk & Sachariew (2012), Lublin (1997), Van Cott (2000), Crowther and 
Matonyte (2007), and  McLeay (1980). 
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the models. First, the question of whether government inclusion strengthens the effect of de-
scriptive representation on policy responsiveness is analysed (H2). This is measured with a 
dummy variable, where (0) indicates that no minority representative is included in the execu-
tive, and (1) refers to governments where at least one minister belongs to the respective ethnic 
minority group.11 
Second, it is expected that minority MPs are more likely to influence policy making, 
when the legislature is powerful (H3) (Alonso/Ruiz-Rufino 2007). The policy influence of the 
legislature is measured with an assessment of its relative leverage in the political process 
(Banks and Wilson 2013). The variable ranges from (0) to (3), where (0) refers to a country 
where no legislature exists, (1) refers to an ineffective legislature where the implementation of 
legislation is impossible, (2) characterizes a partially effective legislature, i.e. the executive 
does not completely dominate, but still outweighs the legislature, and (3) refers to an effective 
legislature with substantial legislative authority (Banks and Wilson 2013).  
Third, the probability that the preferences of minority groups are heard, and more crucial-
ly, considered in the policy making process depends on the relative size of the minority group 
(Ghanem 2012, 367; Liu 2011, 131). I therefore expect an interactive effect between group 
size and descriptive representation. Data on group size is taken from MAR and EPR-ETH 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Minorities at Risk Project 2009).12 
 
Control Variables 
Additionally, it is controlled for other factors which might confound the relation between 
descriptive and substantive representation. First, territorial autonomy rules for minority 
groups are considered as an explanation for the level of policy responsiveness. Forms of de-
centralization are an important means of collective representation as they distribute power 
____________________________________ 
11 Sources include electoral databases [(Beck et al. 2001), (Nordsiek 2012), the European Election Database 
(2012), and the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2012)], the country reports from the U.S. Departement of State, 
and Birnir (2007) as well as Birnir and Satana (2013). 
12 If the information regarding the ethnic composition of the population differed between MAR and EPR-ETH, 
the data was validated with information from the CIA World Factbooks. The relative size of a minority group is 
calculated as its share of the entire population. 
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from the centre to the constituent political entities (Erk and Anderson 2009). Territorial au-
tonomy rules are measured with a dummy variable based on EPR-ETH (Bormann et al. 2015), 
and completed with information provided in Pan and Pfeil (2006), laws on autonomy, MAR 
(Minorities at Risk Project 2009), and constitutions13. Second, territorial concentration may 
contribute to substantive representation, as groups which are territorially concentrated might 
develop a stronger group-feeling which might strengthen their political demands. Territorial 
concentration is measured with MAR-data, and completed with information based on 
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) and Wucherpfennig et al. (2012). The variable consists 
of four categories, where (0) refers to widely dispersed groups and (3) to groups which are 
concentrated in one region. Third, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe have im-
proved their minority legislation – at least on paper – since minority recognition and protec-
tion is one of the prerequisites for admission to the European Union (Liu and Baird 2012; 
Rechel 2008; Schwellnus, Balázs, and Mikalayeva 2009). Therefore, a dummy variable for 
Central and Eastern Europe is included. 
Table A2 in the supplementary material shows descriptive statistics for all the variables 
used in the analysis. The level of analysis is an ethnic minority group in a country in a given 
year (country-group-years). The full sample of 97 groups and 50 countries is restricted due to 
missing information regarding the representation in parliament for some small minority 
groups. In total, the sample includes 77 ethnic minority groups from 44 democracies for eco-
nomic discrimination, and 71 groups from 40 democracies for language rights. Due to slightly 
different observation periods for the two dependent variables this allows for the inclusion of 
79 minority groups in 44 democracies. See the supplementary material (Part A) for more de-
tails on included ethnic minority groups and countries. 
 
____________________________________ 
13 The results are substantially identical when updated and extended MAR data is used. 
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Data Analysis and Findings 
This study tests whether increases in ethnic minorities' descriptive representation are as-
sociated with increases in policy responsiveness towards minority issues (substantive repre-
sentation). To answer this question a method which provides within-group estimates over 
time is needed. For this purpose multilevel analysis is applied. Multilevel models with three 
levels (time, group, country) allow analysing if the proposed relationship holds within ethnic 
groups and not just between them (Hox 2010; Shor et al. 2007) - i.e. if increases in descriptive 
representation within one particular group over time improve policy responsiveness towards 
this particular group.14 The models include a random intercept for countries and ethnic groups 
to take different baseline levels of substantive representation across groups and countries into 
account. The fixed effects of the independent variables then refer to the average effect on sub-
stantive representation when the independent variables change within ethnic groups. Formal-
ly, the model takes the following form:   
 
Yijk=β0k+ βXijk + αWjk + γZk + [Τ XijkXijk | Τ XijkWjk | Τ XijkZk] + μ0k + λjk + εijk 
 
Substantive representation in country k and group j at point i is explained by an overall 
mean (β0k), time dependent group-level variables (the X variables and the respective β), time 
independent group and country variables (the W and Z variables and their respective α and γ), 
interactions between time-variant group variables, time-variant or invariant group or country 
variables (the XX, XW, and XZ variables and their respective T), country variation (μ0k), 
group variation (λjk), and time variation (εijk). 
The findings of the hierarchical linear regressions are presented in table 1 below. For 
each dependent variable (economic discrimination and language rights) four models are pre-
sented. Models 1 and 6 include the main independent variable of interest (descriptive repre-
sentation in parliament) and all the control variables, while the subsequent models include one 
____________________________________ 
14 The application of a multilevel model to time-series data is straightforward (Hox 2010). In contrast to the 
usual multilevel models, time is set as the lowest level. The effect of descriptive representation on policy respon-
siveness is analysed with a linear multilevel model (see table 1). 
20 
 
interaction effect at a time to test hypotheses 1b-4 for both dependent variables separately. 
The baseline (empty) models not presented here show that around 30% of the variance is at-
tributed to country-level differences, approximately 50% of the variance is explained by 
group-level differences, and 20% are attributed to the lowest level (country-group-year) - thus 
justifying the choice of a hierarchical model. 
The findings presented in table 1 support the first hypothesis which states that descriptive 
representation is positively related with policy responsiveness for both dependent variables 
(model 1 and 6). More specifically, the higher a group’s level of descriptive representation in 
parliament the lower is the economic discrimination towards that group, and the higher is its 
level of language rights. In terms of substantial effects, however, the influence of descriptive 
representation is rather small. When a group's descriptive representation increases from none 
to perfectly proportional representation, the level of economic discrimination decreases by 
approximately 0.68.15 The effect is somewhat smaller with regard to language rights where an 
increase from none to perfectly proportional representation refers to an increase of approxi-
mately half a scale point. If the effect of descriptive representation is linear, this suggests that 
it mainly matters if a minority group is considerably over-represented - i.e. if it has a repre-
sentation score above 1. This would be in line with the famous argument that a critical mass 
of MPs is needed to have enough leverage to actually influence policy outcomes (e.g. 
Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Bratton, 2005) (see also hypothesis 4 below).  
As suggested above, such leverage is more likely if the MPs are backed by an ethnic mi-
nority party than if they belong to a mainstream party since the link to their ethnic group is 
more direct. Hypothesis 1b, therefore examines if the effect is stronger if most minority MPs 
are part of ethnic minority parties. This assumption is tested with an interaction effect be-
tween descriptive representation and the share of those minority MPs who is elected through 
ethnic minority parties (models 2 and 7). For the interpretation of the interaction effect, I refer 
____________________________________ 
15 The models are robust to an ordered logit specification of hierarchical models (see supplementary material 
Part B, table A8 and figure A3). 
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to figure 2 below (first row), which graphically illustrates how the effect of descriptive repre-
sentation in parliament varies with the share of minority MPs elected trough ethnic minority 
parties. As the first row of figure 2 illustrates, descriptive representation has indeed a much 
stronger effect on the level of economic discrimination when the share of MPs elected 
through minority parties is high. While the interaction effect is not significant with regard to 
the level of language rights, the direction of the effect is in line with the expectations – i.e. 
minority MPs seem to have more influence if they were mostly elected through ethnic minori-
ty parties. Hence, although the present analysis cannot yet conclusively solve the puzzle of 
whether descriptive representation in ethnic minority parties is really more effective for the 
substantive representation of minorities, the available evidence speaks rather in support of the 
hypothesis. 
The small effect of descriptive representation on policy responsiveness should come as 
no surprise, because minority MPs might easily be outvoted or marginalized in parliament. 
This paper, therefore, discusses three additional mechanisms which are expected to increase 
the leverage of minority MPs. First, descriptive representatives are expected to be more likely 
to influence policy outcomes if they are in a special position of power which makes their sup-
port pivotal. The present analysis tests this hypothesis by interacting descriptive representa-
tion in the parliament with government inclusion of minorities (H2). The findings are present-
ed in model 3 and 8 of table 1 and in the second row of figure 2, which shows the effect of 
descriptive representation for groups that are included in the government (1) and groups that 
are not included in the government (0).16 The hypothesis is only supported for the level of 
language rights. The graphical presentation of the interaction effect illustrates that the effect 
of descriptive representation in parliament is more than doubled if minority groups are in-
cluded in the government. By contrast, the effect of descriptive representation on economic 
discrimination is negatively affected by government inclusion: against the expectations de-
____________________________________ 




scriptive representation has a stronger effect on the level of economic discrimination, if a 
group is not included into the government. Hence, government inclusion seems only to 
strengthen the effect of descriptive representation on the introduction of cultural policies.  
The importance of government inclusion for improvements of cultural rights is well illus-
trated by the example of Romania. In Romania, minority language rights were hotly debated 
during the first years after communism, but there was no political will to implement more 
language rights among the majority. Even though the Hungarian minority demanded more 
language rights for years it was only when they entered the government in 1996 and moderat-
ed their demands (Jenne 2007) that things started to change. Victor Ciorbea’s new govern-
ment, which the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) joined, promised to 
change the education law in return for DAHR support. The law which was finally passed in 
1999 was a compromise. While it did not revise the rule of teaching history and geography in 
Romanian (even in minority schools), it included other elements demanded by the Hungarian 
minority such as improved provisions for education for Hungarians in universities. Further 
improvements regarding minority education were achieved under the subsequent (minority) 
government in 2001 which was supported (without government participation) by DAHR. 
Similarly, it is mainly thanks to DAHR, who repeatedly threatened to leave the government 
coalition that a law was passed in 1999 which allowed minorities to use their own language in 
interactions with Romanian authorities in districts where they comprise more than 20% of the 
population (Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013; Chiribuca and Magyari 2003; Kelley 2004). These 
examples show that being in a position of political power - through government participation 
or support of a minority government - can contribute considerably to the introduction of mi-
nority-friendly policies. DAHR achieved much more through their participation in a weak 
government than in the six years in opposition, even though it was highly criticized by inter-
nal challengers for its accommodative behaviour and confronted with newly funded minority 
parties who pursued a more radical agenda (Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013). By contrast, gov-
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ernment inclusion and exclusion of DAHR had no (additional) effect on the economic dis-
crimination in Romania, which has always been low.  
 
Figure 2: Marginal effect of descriptive representation in parliament on substantive represen-
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and 7-10. The Y-axis refers to the size of the marginal effect of descriptive representation in par-





Apart from government inclusion two additional factors which might increase the lever-
age of minority MPs were discussed. The third hypothesis postulates that descriptive repre-
sentation has a stronger effect if the legislature is powerful and if the legislative prerogatives 
of the government are low. The findings are again presented in table 1 (models 4 and 9) and 
figure 2 (third row). The graphical illustration of the interaction effect shows the effect of 
descriptive representation in the parliament at different levels of legislative effectiveness and 
illustrates that the power of the legislature only increases the effect of descriptive representa-
tion on economic discrimination. Put differently, minority MPs have a higher influence on 
policies affecting economic discrimination in countries where the legislature is more power-
ful. There is no significant interaction effect with regard to the level of language rights, but 
the direction of the effect is again consistent with the expectations. 
Finally, by definition, the same share of descriptive representatives results in more par-
liamentary influence if a group is larger in comparison to the majority group. The fourth hy-
pothesis postulates that descriptive representation has a stronger effect for larger groups – 
either because larger groups have a higher threat potential, or because the same level of de-
scriptive representation results in more MPs for larger groups.  Models 5 and 10 in table 1 
below show that descriptive representation in parliament has a much stronger effect for large 
minorities than for small minorities, supporting the view that minority representatives can 
only influence policy outcomes if they have enough leverage in public and in parliament. The 
graphical representation of the interaction effect (see row 4 in figure 2 above) further illus-
trates the importance of group size. Descriptive representatives are clearly more successful in 
increasing the level of minority language rights and reducing the level of economic discrimi-
nation if their group makes up a significant share of a country's population. However, is it the 
size of an ethnic group or simply the number of MPs it has in parliament that matters? In oth-
er words, can the influence of small minorities be increased by raising their number of MPs 
and over-representing them in parliament? In order to answer these questions size was substi-
tuted with the share of minority MPs in parliament in the interaction effect (see figure A1 and 
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table A3 in the supplementary material, Part B). The results are less significant and less clear, 
however. While the effect is similar regarding the level of language rights, it is partly insignif-
icant for economic discrimination and goes in the opposite direction – however, this effect is 
entirely driven by the outlier of Guyana in 1991 and disappears (becomes insignificant) if the 
outlier is excluded. This implies that the size of an ethnic group has an effect on its own and 
not only due to the number of minority MPs in parliament. If this is true, small groups do not 
gain additional leverage by over-representation, because governments seem to consider the 
real size of the group (for example their threat potential) when taking decisions. 
To summarize, as expected descriptive representation increases the substantive represen-
tation of ethnic minorities in terms of policy outcomes (H1a), and there is some support for 
the argument that the effect is stronger if MPs are elected through ethnic minority parties 
(H1b). Unsurprisingly, however, the direct effect of descriptive representation is rather small. 
Therefore, we tested if the effect of descriptive representation was moderated by government 
inclusion (H2), legislative effectiveness (H3) and group size (H4). While group size has a 
strong and consistent effect on both dependent variables, the findings regarding the other two 
mediating factors reveal an interesting pattern which requires further elaboration. Why does 
government inclusion increase the effect of descriptive representation in parliament on lan-
guage rights, but not on economic discrimination? Conversely, why does the power of the 
legislature increase the effect of descriptive representation on economic discrimination, but 
not on language rights? To better understand this puzzle we need to take a closer look at the 
actual predicted effect of economic discrimination and language rights at different levels of 
descriptive representation (see figure 3).  
Figure 3 suggests a different causal explanation for language rights and economic dis-
crimination. According to figure 3, an improvement of language rights requires both, gov-
ernment inclusion and descriptive representation – i.e. both factors are necessary conditions 
for an improvement of language rights. By contrast, government inclusion seems to be suffi-
cient on its own, but not necessary, for the reduction of economic discrimination. As figure 3 
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clearly indicates, even groups that are not well represented in parliament benefit from rela-
tively low levels of economic discrimination, as long as they are represented in government. 
This difference persists when descriptive representation rises, but groups which are excluded 
from government seem to be able to reduce the gap if they are well represented in parliament 
– in particular if the legislature is powerful (see figure A2 in the supplementary material). 
This suggests that minority MPs are able work together with non-minority MPs – i.e. to build 
parliamentary alliances – in order to change economic policies. However, this does not seem 
to work for language policies. How can we explain this difference?  
I argue that economic policies are better suited for alliance building than cultural policies. 
In particular, policies to tackle economic discrimination tend to be part of larger policy pack-
ages, such as the general economic policy or budgetary decisions. When parliaments decide 
on policy bundles – such as economic policies – opportunities for negotiations between dif-
ferent factions in parliament arise. Minority MPs might promise to support certain aspects of 
a policy bundle in exchange for measures against economic discrimination. Likewise, minori-
ty parties might only ensure their support for the budget, as long as it includes aspects to im-
prove the economic situation of their group. Such alliances are more likely to form in multi-
dimensional policy fields (e.g. economic policy) than for single issues (e.g. language poli-
cies). While language rights are among the rights which are most often claimed by language 
minorities (Deets and Stroschein 2005), they are less important for the majority and rarely 
included in broader policy bundles. Accordingly, it is more difficult to negotiate a policy deal 
in the area of language policies. Only government inclusion seems to give minority MPs the 
power to get the necessary support for changes in language policies. This also explains why a 
powerful legislature is less important for the introduction of language rights: when govern-
ment inclusion is the key to the introduction of cultural policies, a powerful legislature is less 
important. This explanation is supported by the example of Romania discussed above. In Ro-
mania the nationalistic discourse prevailed, and the majority was not willing to make conces-
sions, until DAHR entered the government and put the question of language rights to the fore-
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front of the coalition negotiations. Only government inclusion – and the threat to leave the 
coalition – gave the minority the power to successfully demand more language rights. From a 
more general point of view, the question of whether some policies are more likely to be sup-
ported by alliances across parties than others might require further research. To my 
knowledge this question has not received systematic attention so far. 
 
Figure 3: Predicted Level of Substantive representation depending on descriptive representa-
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Table 1: Explaining Policy Responsiveness towards Minority Issues 
 Economic Discrimination Language Rights 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Descriptive Rep. in Parl. -0.68*** -0.60*** -0.77*** 0.63* -0.40*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.27 0.29** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.27) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.26) (0.09) 
Share of MPs in ethnic party -0.55*** -0.27+ -0.58*** -0.57*** -0.51*** 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.11 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Government inclusion -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.75*** -0.43*** -0.45*** 0.35*** 0.35*** -0.13 0.34*** 0.33*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
Legislative Effectiveness -0.08 -0.08 -0.10+ 0.19* -0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Size 2.93*** 2.61** 3.10*** 2.84*** 4.41*** 0.52 0.63 0.99 0.51 -0.33 
 (0.83) (0.84) (0.83) (0.82) (0.88) (0.93) (0.95) (0.93) (0.93) (0.96) 
Concentration -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.27*** 0.27** 0.27** 0.29*** 0.27** 0.24** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Territorial Autonomy -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.27*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.39*** 1.40*** 1.38*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Central and Eastern Europe -0.46 -0.47 -0.46 -0.51+ -0.49 1.23** 1.23** 1.25** 1.24** 1.25** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) 
Descr. Rep. * Share parties  -0.53**     0.12    
  (0.20)     (0.20)    
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.   0.43**     0.70***   
   (0.14)     (0.14)   
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.    -0.52***     0.08  
    (0.10)     (0.10)  
Descr. Rep. * Size     -4.00***     2.77** 
     (0.82)     (0.87) 
Constant 3.21*** 3.25*** 3.29*** 2.55*** 3.07*** 1.21** 1.19** 1.21** 1.31** 1.31*** 




Table 1 (continued) 
Level 3: Variance 0.40+ 0.42+ 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.22 0.38 0.39 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.66) (0.66) (0.65) (0.66) (0.62) 
Level 2: Variance 0.91** 0.90** 0.93** 0.92** 0.92** 2.01** 2.00** 2.10** 2.00** 1.91** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.66) (0.66) (0.69) (0.66) (0.62) 
Level 1: Variance 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 1737 1737 1737 1737 1737 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 
N (countries, ethnic groups) 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 
Log Likelihood -1802.08 -1798.50 -1797.09 -1789.24 -1790.35 -1941.54 -1941.36 -1928.67 -1941.23 -1936.54 
BIC 3693.69 3693.98 3691.16 3675.46 3677.67 3973.22 3980.36 3954.97 3980.10 3970.73 
 






To ensure the validity of the results, the models were confronted with several robustness 
tests and are robust to all alternative model specifications, which were tested. First, one might 
question the direction of the relationship as policy responsiveness might also affect political 
empowerment and, thereby, the political representation of ethnic minorities. In order to con-
trol for this caveat, I have calculated the same models with lagged independent variables. As 
Table A4 in the supplementary material reveals, the effects are almost identical to those pre-
sented above. The fact that the past level of descriptive representation explains the present 
level of substantive representation makes it is less likely that the direction of causation is re-
versed and supports the robustness of the results. 
Second, the time-series are rather short for most countries due to missing information on 
the descriptive representation of minority groups in parliament before the 1990s (in particular 
in Latin American countries). To test the robustness of the findings for longer time-series, the 
oldest available values of descriptive representation were therefore used as a proxy for de-
scriptive representation in earlier years. This approach mainly affects Latin American coun-
tries, where descriptive representation has only increased during recent years. Copying back-
wards values of a period with no or very few descriptive representatives to a previous period, 
where minority groups were also severely underrepresented (c.f. Van Cott 2005; Maybury-
Lewis 2002) is, therefore, unlikely to bias the results. As Table A5 in the supplementary ma-
terial shows, the results are also stable after the missing data on descriptive representation is 
replaced by the closest available value as the coefficients are essentially identical to those 
presented in Table 1 above.  
Third, along the same lines, I controlled for the robustness of the results to the inclusion 
of those groups which had to be excluded from the main analysis, because information on 
their descriptive representation in parliament was completely missing. I approximated de-
scriptive representation in parliament for these groups by replacing missing values with de-
scriptive representation through ethnic minority parties (if existing) or zero for all other cas-
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es.17 The results are robust to the inclusion of these groups as shown in Table A6 in the sup-
plementary material.18 
Fourth, as hierarchical models are still rarely used for time-series the robustness of the 
models was tested against the more common cross-sectional time-series panel design 
(PCSTS) with country-group fixed effects (see table A8 in the supplementary material). As it 
includes country-group fixed effects the PCSTS model only considers changes within ethnic 
groups over time – i.e. it can also be understood as an additional test for the causality of the 
effect. Again, the findings are virtually identical to those of the multi-level model presented 
above. This does not only support the general robustness of the results, but also underlines the 
usefulness of hierarchical models for time-series data. While the results seem to be similar 
between both approaches, the higher flexibility of hierarchical models (e.g. to the inclusion of 
time invariant explanatory variables) suggests that they should be considered more often. 
Finally, the robustness of the effects was checked with an ordered logit specification. As 
economic discrimination is an ordinal variable with only few categories an ordered logit mod-
el would be more appropriate than a linear regression. As Table A9 in the supplementary ma-
terial indicates the results are robust to an ordered logit specification. The direction of the 
coefficients and the interaction effects are identical to the results presented above. Therefore, 
linear models were presented for the main models instead of ordered logit models for the ben-
efit of the more straightforward interpretation.  
 
Conclusion 
Many members from ethnic minority groups are convinced that only MPs from their own 
ethnic group can represent them properly. While the presence of minority MPs is certainly 
important for symbolic and normative reasons, it remains purely symbolic unless it affects 
____________________________________ 
17 Based on the assumption that groups without representation through ethnic parties in parliament, and without 
any information about their representation in parliament are entirely excluded from parliament. This applies to 
four groups: Byelorussians in Estonia, Roma in France, Macedonians in Greece, and Friulians in Italy. 
18 A combination of the tests in table A5 and A6 proofed also robust – i.e. results for the complete sample (50 
countries, 97 groups) was approximated by replacing missing groups with their representation through ethnic 
minority parties, and by prolonging the time-series through the replacement of missing values with the closest 
available value. Results are presented in table A7, and are virtually identical to the other results presented here. 
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policy outcomes. This paper attempted to shed light on the link between descriptive and sub-
stantive representation from a comparative perspective by investigating under which condi-
tions minority MPs are most successful in influencing policy outcomes. Going beyond most 
studies of substantive representation, I built on a small number of recent studies from the 
United States and argued that substantive representation should be studied by analysing policy 
outcomes rather than the political behaviour and attitudes of ethnic minorities. Analysing data 
from all 50 multi-ethnic democracies (except for Africa and Asia) and 97 minority groups, it 
was shown that higher levels of descriptive representation are indeed associated with higher 
levels of policy responsiveness towards minority issues, thus supporting hypothesis 1a. While 
the direct effect of descriptive representation in the parliament on ethnic minorities' substan-
tive representation is rather weak, it is considerably strengthened by four factors. First, as 
suggested in hypothesis 1b, descriptive representation seems to have a stronger effect when it 
is achieved through the presence of ethnic minority parties - at least with regard to the level of 
economic discrimination. This suggests that minority parties are in a slightly better position to 
lobby for economic redistribution than individuals from mainstream parties who might have 
different priorities or may be bound by the official party line. The importance of parties and 
parliaments for economic policies is also mirrored in findings regarding the other hypotheses. 
The second hypothesis postulated that descriptive representatives are more influential if 
their ethnic group is represented in government. The results suggest that this is particularly 
true with regard to cultural policies (language rights). The level of language rights appears 
much higher when groups are represented in government and parliament. By contrast, eco-
nomic policies in favour of minority groups are not only implemented when they are included 
into the government, but also when they are well represented in parliament – parliamentary 
representation seems to work as a remedy against a lack of government representation. This is 
especially true in countries where the legislature is powerful (H3). This suggests that the 
mechanisms affecting economic and cultural policies might be different: Improvements of 
cultural policies seem to depend on presence in parliament and government, whereas econom-
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ic policies seem to be affected by inclusion into the government, or high descriptive represen-
tation – in particular when parliaments are strong and most MPs are elected through minority 
parties. However, future research is needed to clarify this relationship, and to study how it is 
related to non-minority related policies. Finally, hypothesis 4 tested the argument that repre-
sentatives from larger minority groups are more successful in influencing policy outcomes 
than representatives from smaller minority groups. The findings suggest that descriptive rep-
resentation is particularly effective if a group is relatively large in comparison to the majority 
population – apart from the number of MPs, a group’s ‘threat potential’ seems to affect their 
substantive representation. 
By extending the analysis of ethnic minorities' substantive representation beyond single 
case studies, this study contributed to the understanding of the influence of descriptive repre-
sentatives on policy outcomes. Previous research has robustly shown that descriptive repre-
sentatives often act for their constituency by, for instance, disproportionally supporting mi-
nority-friendly legislation or engaging in policy areas which are important to minorities. It has 
further been demonstrated that minority MPs indeed feel a certain responsibility to represent 
their group. Previous research was less clear, however, about the actual impact of minority 
MPs on policy outcomes. This paper contributes to this discussion by introducing two 
measures of policy responsiveness which can be used in a comparative perspective across 
time and space. The fact that we could observe an impact of descriptive representation on 
actual policy outcomes renders minority inclusion even more important. In this regard, the 
findings strengthen claims for adequate representation of ethnic groups not only for symbolic 
or normative reasons, but also due to its policy consequences. Furthermore, in contrast to 
most previous comparative studies of minority representation, this paper goes beyond descrip-
tive representation in minority parties. Minority parties do not exist in every country where 
ethnicity is salient, or they might only be supported by a minority of the respective ethnic 
group. Hence, extending the concept of descriptive representation beyond representation in 
ethnic minority parties contributes to our understanding of the role of descriptive representa-
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tion and allows the effect to be studied for societies where MPs are not (primarily) elected 
through ethnic minority parties. 
Future research might further develop the focus on policy outcomes rather than parlia-
mentary behaviour when studying the substantive representation of ethnic minorities, as this 
is the only way to understand the actual policy consequences of descriptive representation. In 
this regard, it is necessary to focus on additional aspects of minority issues and to develop 
new measures to analyse if the proposed relationship holds beyond the two proxies used in the 
present study. Furthermore, due to data restrictions a possibly important explanation of ethnic 
minorities' substantive representation could not be tested in the present paper: the attitudes of 
the majority population. It is likely that parliaments and mainstream parties are more open to 
minority issues if the majority population shows some tolerance toward ethnic minorities and 
their political demands. Tolerant or neutral attitudes of the majority population might, there-




19 Table A10 in the supplementary material presents a very rough approximation of this claim. For a small sub-
sample where data was available I included the attitudes of the majority (measured through World Values Sur-
vey data) as a control variable. I used the question whom individuals would not like as their neighbours (people 
of a different race, ethnic group, Roma) to approximate the attitudes of the majority towards minorities. The 
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Part A: Description of variables and data 
 
Table A1: Ethnic minority groups 
Country Minority Group Size Included sincea
Albania Greeks 0.03 2011
Argentina Indigenous peoples 0.02 1983
Australia Aborigines 0.03 1945
Austria Slovenes 0.01 1955
Belgium Flemings 0.59 1945
Bolivia Quechua Aymara 0.25 1982
Bolivia Guarani 0.03 1982
Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats 0.14 2002
Bosnia-Herzegovina Roma 0.01 2002
Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs 0.37 2002
Brazil Afro-Brazilians 0.45 1985
Bulgaria Roma 0.05 1990
Bulgaria Turks 0.10 1990
Canada French Canadians 0.04 1945
Canada Indigenous People 0.03 1945
Canada Québecois 0.20 1945
Chile Indigenous People 0.04 1989
Colombia Afro-columbians 0.23 1957
Colombia Indigenous People 0.03 1957
Costa Rica Afro-Costa Ricans 0.03 1945
Costa Rica Indigenous People 0.01 1945
Croatia Serbs 0.05 2000
Czech Republic Roma 0.01 1993
Ecuador Highland Indigenous People 0.29 1979
Ecuador Lowland indigenous 0.01 1979
El Salvador Indigenous People 0.10 1984
Estonia Byelorussians 0.01 1991
Estonia Russians 0.26 1991
Estonia Ukrainians 0.02 1991
Finland Swedes 0.06 1945
France Basques 0.01 1969
Georgia Abkhazians 0.04 1996
Georgia Adzhars 0.06 1996
Georgia Armenians 0.06 1996
Georgia South Ossetians 0.02 1996
Greece Macedonians 0.01 1974
Greece Muslims 0.01 1974
Greece Roma 0.01 1974
Guatemala Indigenous People 0.43 1996
Guyana Afro-Guyanese 0.30 1991






Table A1: (continued) 
Country Minority Group Size Included sincea
Honduras Garifuna 0.02 1980
Honduras Indigenous People 0.07 1980
Hungary Roma 0.05 1989
Israel Arabs 0.11 1948
Italy Friulians 0.01 1948
Italy Sardinians 0.02 1948
Latvia Byelorussians 0.29 1991
Latvia Russians 0.03 1991
Latvia Ukrainians 0.04 1991
Lithuania Poles 0.07 1991
Lithuania Russians 0.06 1991
Macedonia Albanians 0.25 1992
Macedonia Roma 0.03 1992
Macedonia Serbs 0.02 1992
Macedonia Turks 0.04 1992
Mexico Indigenous People 0.14 1997
Moldova Gagauz 0.04 1994
Moldova Slavs 0.21 1994
Montenegro Albanians 0.05 2006
Montenegro Bosniak 0.12 2006
Montenegro Croats 0.01 2006
New Zealand Maori 0.13 1945
Nicaragua Indigenous People 0.05 1995
Panama Afro-Panamians 0.14 1990
Panama Indigenous People 0.60 1990
Paraguay Indigenous People 0.02 1992
Peru Afro-Peruvians 0.05 2000
Peru Aymara 0.02 2000
Peru Indigenous lowland people 0.01 2000
Peru Quechua 0.34 2000
Romania Magyars 0.07 1992
Romania Roma 0.03 1992
Serbia Hungarians 0.04 2006
Serbia Roma 0.01 2006
Serbia Sandzak Muslims 0.02 2006
Slovakia Hungarians 0.11 1993
Serbia-Montenegro Croats 0.01 2000
Serbia-Montenegro Hungarian 0.03 2000
Serbia-Montenegro Albanian 0.17 2000
Serbia-Montenegro Roma 0.01 2000
Serbia-Montenegro Sandzak Muslims 0.03 2000
Slovakia Roma 0.04 1993
Spain Basques 0.06 1977
Spain Catalans 0.02 1977





Table A1: (continued) 
Country Minority Group Size Included sincea 
United Kingdom Welsh 0.02 1945
Spain Roma 0.17 1977
Switzerland Swiss French 0.16 1945
Switzerland Swiss Italian 0.08 1945
Turkey Kurds 0.18 2002
Ukraine Russians 0.22 1991
United Kingdom Catholics in N.I. 0.01 1945
United Kingdom Scots 0.10 1945
United States African-Americans 0.13 1945
United States Latinos 0.15 1945
Uruguay Afro-Uruguayans 0.06 1985
Notes: italics: groups with missing values for minority members of parliament. They are, therefore, excluded 
from the analysis, although they fulfil the case selection criteria. They are considered for the robustness checks 
presented in table A6. 
a: first year of inclusion refers to year a country became democratic, the year of independence or 1945. 
  
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Language Rights 2453 2.83 2.23 0 6 
Economic Discrimination 2488 1.80 1.50 0 4 
Descriptive Representation in Parliament 2121 0.62 0.67 0 3.26 
Share of MPs in ethnic minority parties 2121 0.20 0.35 0 1 
Government Inclusion 2909 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Legislative Effectiveness 2926 2.68 0.56 0 3 
Group Size 2926 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.59 
Group Concentration 2926 2.16 1.15 0 3 
Territorial Autonomy 2926 0.26 0.44 0 1 




Part B: Specifications and Robustness Checks 
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Notes: Models based on an interaction effect between descriptive representation and the share of 








Descriptive Representation -0.45*** 0.04 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Share minority MPs -7.34*** -2.51+ 
 (1.15) (1.35) 
Descr. Rep*Share minority MPs 2.31*** 6.12*** 
 (0.56) (1.20) 
Share MPs in minority parties -0.52*** 0.08 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
Government Inclusion -0.42*** 0.35*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Legislative Effectiveness -0.09 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Size 5.10*** 0.52 
 (0.90) (0.97) 
Concentration -0.24** 0.29*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Autonomy -0.25** 1.43*** 
 (0.08) (0.07) 
Central and Eastern Europe -0.45 1.36*** 
 (0.31) (0.40) 
Constant 3.05*** 1.25** 
 (0.33) (0.39) 
Level 3: Variance 0.38 1.00 
 (0.26) (0.59) 
Level 2: Variance 0.91 1.49** 
 (0.25) (0.45) 
Level 1: Variance 0.40*** 0.42*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Observations 1737 1828 
N (country, ethnic groups) 44,77 41, 70 
Log-Likelihood -1781.91 -1923.63 
BIC 3668.26 3952.42 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  





Figure A2: Prediction of economic discrimination for groups that are not part of the gov-


















0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Descriptive Representation in Parliament
No legislature Ineffective legislature
Partially effective legislature Effective legislature
 
Notes: Linear predictions of level of substantive representation (language rights and economic dis-
crimination), based on models 3 & 8 in table 1. 
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Table A4: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, incl. lagged IVs 
 DV: Language Rights DV: Economic Discrimination
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Descriptive Rep. in Parl. 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.38*** 0.31 0.30** -0.71*** -0.65*** -0.82*** 0.40 -0.44*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.26) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.28) (0.11) 
Share of MPs in ethnic parties 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.09 -0.58*** -0.39* -0.62*** -0.60*** -0.55*** 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Government inclusion 0.32*** 0.31*** -0.18 0.31*** 0.30*** -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.87*** -0.46*** -0.47*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
Legislative Effectiveness 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11+ 0.15+ -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Size 0.82 1.02 1.29 0.81 -0.10 3.01*** 2.80*** 3.22*** 2.92*** 4.34*** 
 (0.92) (0.94) (0.92) (0.92) (0.94) (0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (0.83) (0.90) 
Concentration 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.30*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.27*** -0.27*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Territorial Autonomy 1.36*** 1.36*** 1.34*** 1.36*** 1.34*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.30*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
CEE  1.31** 1.31** 1.32*** 1.31** 1.32** -0.60+ -0.60+ -0.60+ -0.64* -0.62+ 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.32) 
Descr. Rep. * Share parties  0.21     -0.36+    
  (0.20)     (0.21)    
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.   0.71***     0.59***   
   (0.14)     (0.14)   
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.    0.07     -0.43***  
    (0.10)     (0.11)  
Descr. Rep. * Size     3.02***     -3.64*** 
     (0.87)     (0.86) 
Constant 1.03* 1.00* 1.05** 1.12** 1.15** 3.20*** 3.22*** 3.33*** 2.64*** 3.08*** 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42) (0.40) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.33) 
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Table A4: (continued) 
Level 3: Variance 1.01 0.95 1.01 1.04 1.04 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.37 
 (0.62) (0.61) (0.62) (0.58) (0.58) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) 
Level 2: Variance 1.49** 1.49** 1.49** 1.38** 1.38** 0.89** 0.89** 0.95** 0.91** 0.93** 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.42) (0.42) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) 
Level 1: Variance 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 1759 1759 1759 1759 1759 1663 1663 1663 1663 1663 
N (country, ethnicgroups) 41, 69 41, 69 41, 69 41, 69 41, 69 42, 72 42, 72 42, 72 42, 72 42, 72 
Log Likelihood -1837.98 -1837.45 -1824.95 -1837.71 -1832.03 -1729.84 -1728.36 -1721.37 -1721.51 -1720.98 
BIC 3765.62 3772.04 3747.04 3772.56 3761.21 3548.67 3553.13 3539.16 3539.43 3538.38 
 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtmixed command. 

























Table A5: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, missing values of descriptive representation replaced with closest available value 
 DV: Language Rights DV: Economic Discrimination
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Descriptive Rep. in Parl. 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.30*** 0.38 0.19+ -0.65*** -0.55*** -0.71*** 0.41 -0.38*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.28) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.25) (0.10) 
Share of MPs in ethnic parties 0.32** 0.28* 0.32** 0.32** 0.30** -0.36*** -0.08 -0.36*** -0.38*** -0.32** 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Government inclusion 0.35*** 0.34*** -0.07 0.35*** 0.33*** -0.46*** -0.45*** -0.66*** -0.42*** -0.43*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
Legislative Effectiveness 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.18** 0.19** 0.19*** -0.07 -0.08+ -0.08+ 0.11+ -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Size 1.31 1.39 1.69+ 1.31 0.36 2.55** 2.24** 2.65*** 2.49** 0.00 
 (0.98) (1.00) (0.98) (0.98) (1.02) (0.80) (0.81) (0.80) (0.79) (.) 
Concentration 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.41*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.34*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Territorial Autonomy 1.66*** 1.66*** 1.66*** 1.66*** 1.64*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.28*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CEE  1.44*** 1.44*** 1.45*** 1.44*** 1.46*** -0.51+ -0.50+ -0.52+ -0.55* -0.54+ 
 (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.39) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) 
Descr. Rep. * Share parties  0.09     -0.63**    
  (0.22)     (0.19)    
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.   0.61***     0.33*   
   (0.15)     (0.14)   
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.    0.00     -0.41***  
    (0.11)     (0.09)  
Descr. Rep. * Size     3.05**     -3.91*** 
     (0.97)     (0.83) 
Constant 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.32 3.34*** 3.40*** 3.38*** 2.89*** 3.22*** 







Table A5: (continued) 
Level 3: Variance 1.04 1.04 0.99 1.03 1.02 0.32 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.27 
 (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.59) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Level 2: Variance 1.51** 1.51** 1.55** 1.53** 1.43** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.82*** 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.43) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Level 1: Variance 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 2090 2090 2090 2090 2090 2078 2078 2078 2078 2078 
N (country, ethnic groups) 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 45, 81 45, 81 45, 81 45, 81 45, 81 
Log-Likelihood -2457.55 -2457.47 -2449.66 -2457.55 -2452.66 -2193.17 -2187.97 -2190.37 -2183.58 -2182.23 
BIC 5006.85 5014.33 4998.70 5014.49 5004.70 4478.01 4475.25 4480.06 4466.47 4463.76 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Missing values for descriptive representation were replaced by the closest value available to test for the robustness of the results to longer time-series. This mainly affects 





Table A6: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, approximated values for missing groups 
 DV: Language Rights DV: Economic Discrimination
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Descriptive Rep. in Parl. 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.36*** 0.23 0.31*** -0.65*** -0.55*** -0.72*** 0.50* -0.35*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.25) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.25) (0.09) 
Share of MPs in ethnic parties 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.05 -0.17* 0.04 -0.18* -0.18* -0.16* 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Government inclusion 0.35*** 0.35*** -0.15 0.34*** 0.34*** -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.72*** -0.46*** -0.47*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
Legislative Effectiveness 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10+ 0.13+ -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Size 1.21 1.38 1.68+ 1.20 0.48 2.84*** 2.52** 2.97*** 2.77*** 4.50*** 
 (0.88) (0.90) (0.89) (0.88) (0.91) (0.77) (0.78) (0.77) (0.76) (0.83) 
Concentration 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.39*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.26*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Territorial Autonomy 1.34*** 1.33*** 1.32*** 1.34*** 1.32*** -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.33*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CEE  1.58*** 1.57*** 1.59*** 1.57*** 1.59*** -0.52+ -0.48+ -0.53+ -0.52+ -0.53* 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) 
Descr. Rep. * Share parties  0.18     -0.61***    
  (0.18)     (0.17)    
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.   0.73***     0.35**   
   (0.13)     (0.13)   
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.    0.10     -0.45***  
    (0.10)     (0.09)  
Descr. Rep. * Size     2.46**     -4.34*** 
     (0.84)     (0.78) 
Constant 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.68+ 0.65+ 3.09*** 3.11*** 3.15*** 2.53*** 2.94*** 






Table A6: (continued) 
Level 3: Variance 0.44 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.45 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.22 0.19 
 (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.65) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Level 2: Variance 1.92** 1.92** 2.05** 1.91** 1.85** 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.97*** 
 (0.65) (0.64) (0.70) (0.63) (0.61) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
Level 1: Variance 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 2155 2155 2155 2155 2155 2128 2128 2128 2128 2128 
N (country, ethnic groups) 46, 80 46, 80 46, 80 46, 80 46, 80 49, 92 49, 92 49, 92 49, 92 49, 92 
Log-Likelihood -2229.80 -2229.30 -2214.69 -2229.27 -2225.58 -2112.81 -2106.34 -2109.13 -2101.06 -2097.48 
BIC 4551.71 4558.39 4529.16 4558.32 4550.95 4317.57 4312.31 4317.89 4301.73 4294.58 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Missing values for descriptive representation in parliament were replaced by descriptive representation in parliament through ethnic minority parties (if available) or zero 





Table A7: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, complete sample, combination of approaches from Table A5 and A6 
 DV: Language Rights DV: Economic Discrimination
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Descriptive Rep. in Parl. 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.29 0.23* -0.60*** -0.49*** -0.64*** 0.31 -0.30** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.27) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.24) (0.09) 
Share of MPs in ethnic parties 0.24** 0.18 0.24** 0.24** 0.22* -0.13+ 0.07 -0.14+ -0.15* -0.12+ 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Government inclusion 0.35*** 0.35*** -0.08 0.35*** 0.34*** -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.63*** -0.44*** -0.43*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
Legislative Effectiveness 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17** 0.16* 0.18*** -0.10* -0.11* -0.11* 0.05 -0.09* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Size 1.67+ 1.81+ 2.06* 1.67+ 0.86 2.43** 2.16** 2.51*** 2.38** 4.07*** 
 (0.93) (0.95) (0.94) (0.93) (0.97) (0.74) (0.76) (0.75) (0.74) (0.81) 
Concentration 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.50*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.31*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Territorial Autonomy 1.62*** 1.61*** 1.61*** 1.62*** 1.60*** -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.35*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CEE  1.75*** 1.74*** 1.76*** 1.75*** 1.77*** -0.52+ -0.47+ -0.52+ -0.52* -0.53* 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Descr. Rep. * Share parties  0.16     -0.63***    
  (0.20)     (0.17)    
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.   0.64***     0.26*   
   (0.15)     (0.13)   
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.    0.05     -0.35***  
    (0.10)     (0.09)  
Descr. Rep. * Size     2.74**     -4.22*** 
     (0.93)     (0.79) 
Constant -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.14 -0.10 3.28*** 3.30*** 3.31*** 2.90*** 3.14*** 






Table A7: (continued) 
Level 3: Variance 0.91 0.88 0.78 0.90 0.88 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.24 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.63) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
Level 2: Variance 1.70** 1.72** 1.78** 1.70** 1.65** 0.80*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.77*** 0.89*** 
 (0.51) (0.52) (0.55) (0.51) (0.49) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) 
Level 1: Variance 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations 2438 2438 2438 2438 2438 2485 2485 2485 2485 2485 
N (country, ethnic groups) 46, 81 46, 81 46, 81 46, 81 46, 81 50, 97 50, 97 50, 97 50, 97 50, 97 
Log-Likelihood -2782.84 -2782.51 -2773.62 -2782.74 -2778.56 -2521.46 -2514.57 -2519.49 -2513.45 -2507.40 
BIC 5659.28 5666.41 5648.63 5666.86 5658.50 5136.74 5130.78 5140.61 5128.53 5116.43 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Missing values for descriptive representation in parliament were replaced by descriptive representation in parliament through ethnic minority parties (if available) or zero 
(under the assumption that no information is available, because the parliament did not include any MP of this particular group. Values were copied back to earlier years in 
order to prolong time-series to the entire democratic period (see table A5) 
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Table A8: Explaining Policy Responsiveness towards Minority Issues, PCSTS-Models with fixed effects 
 Language Rights Economic Discrimination 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Descriptive Rep. in Parl. 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.37*** 0.32 0.32** -0.68*** -0.61*** -0.77*** 0.58* -0.38*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.26) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.27) (0.11) 
Share of MPs in ethnic party 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 -0.66*** -0.40* -0.68*** -0.67*** -0.63*** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Government inclusion 0.34*** 0.34*** -0.12 0.34*** 0.33*** -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.79*** -0.45*** -0.47*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
Legislative Effectiveness 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.20* -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Size -0.72 -0.67 0.04 -0.74 -1.28 6.17*** 5.14*** 6.53*** 6.11*** 7.16*** 
 (1.24) (1.28) (1.24) (1.24) (1.25) (1.48) (1.54) (1.48) (1.47) (1.48) 
Concentration 0.21* 0.21* 0.25* 0.21* 0.19+ -0.27* -0.29** -0.28** -0.26* -0.25* 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Territorial Autonomy 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.39*** 1.40*** 1.39*** -0.25** -0.24** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.24** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Descr. Rep. * Share parties  0.03     -0.52*    
  (0.21)     (0.21)    
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.   0.68***     0.46***   
   (0.14)     (0.14)   
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.    0.06     -0.50***  
    (0.10)     (0.10)  
Descr. Rep. * Size     2.45**     -4.20*** 
     (0.91)     (0.89) 
Constant 1.84*** 1.83*** 1.74*** 1.92*** 1.89*** 2.46*** 2.63*** 2.54*** 1.83*** 2.39*** 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.38) 
Observations 1828 1828 1828 1828 1828 1737 1737 1737 1737 1737 
N (countries, ethnic groups) 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 41, 70 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 
Log Likelihood -1740.54 -1740.52 -1728.17 -1740.34 -1736.73 -1608.74 -1605.66 -1602.93 -1596.58 -1597.14 
BIC 3541.16 3548.64 3523.93 3548.28 3541.06 3277.15 3278.46 3273.00 3260.30 3261.42 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0. The multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12.
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Table  A9: Explaining the Level of Economic Discrimination, ordered logit model 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Descriptive Rep. in Parl. -2.53*** -1.94*** -2.68*** 5.25*** -1.83***
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.41) (1.20) (0.44) 
Share of MPs in ethnic party -1.14* 0.30 -1.15* -1.20** -1.03* 
 (0.46) (0.58) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) 
Government inclusion -2.26*** -2.26*** -2.51*** -1.77*** -2.20*** 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.41) (0.28) (0.27) 
Legislative Effectiveness -0.29 -0.33 -0.31 1.18*** -0.30 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.35) (0.22) 
Size 10.79*** 9.10** 10.80*** 10.45*** 13.04*** 
 (3.12) (3.19) (3.12) (3.09) (3.26) 
Concentration -0.86** -0.91*** -0.87*** -0.83** -0.84** 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) 
Territorial Autonomy -1.85*** -2.03*** -1.82*** -1.84*** -1.81*** 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) 
Central and Eastern Europe -1.48 -1.47 -1.50 -1.81 -1.56 
 (1.21) (1.27) (1.21) (1.13) (1.19) 
Descr. Rep. * Share parties  -3.56***    
  (0.88)    
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.   0.45   
   (0.54)   
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.    -3.20***  
    (0.49)  
Descr. Rep. * Size     -7.66* 
     (3.24) 
Cut 1 -6.13*** -6.55*** -6.24*** -2.72* -5.96***
 (1.22) (1.26) (1.23) (1.36) (1.21) 
Cut 2 -3.92** -4.24*** -4.03*** -0.46 -3.72** 
 (1.22) (1.25) (1.22) (1.36) (1.21) 
Cut 3 -2.52* -2.84* -2.63* 0.97 -2.32+ 
 (1.21) (1.25) (1.22) (1.36) (1.21) 
Cut 4 0.98 0.66 0.87 4.57*** 1.18 
 (1.21) (1.24) (1.21) (1.37) (1.20) 
Level 3: Variance 6.04 6.70 5.75 4.51 5.66
 (4.02) (4.09) (4.10) (3.91) (3.78) 
Level 2: Variance 11.95* 12.61** 12.09* 12.20* 11.81** 
 (4.67) (4.74) (4.82) (4.93) (4.41) 
N 1737 1737 1737 1737 1737
N (country, ethnic groups) 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 44, 77 
Log-Likelihood -1291.20 -1282.72 -1290.86 -1267.15 -1288.22 
BIC 2686.84 2677.34 2693.62 2646.19 2688.34 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 




Table A10: Explaining Policy Responsiveness, incl. attitudes of towards minorities 
 DV: Economic Discrimination DV: Language Rights
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Descriptive Rep. in Parl. -1.54*** -1.50*** -1.93*** -0.42 -1.17*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.21 -0.11 0.19 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.59) (0.22) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.50) (0.19) 
Share of MPs in ethnic parties -1.19*** -1.02*** -1.37*** -1.17*** -1.23*** 0.16 0.15 -0.02 0.14 0.19 
 (0.20) (0.30) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.24) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
Government inclusion -0.60*** -0.60*** -1.16*** -0.58*** -0.55*** 0.33*** 0.33*** -0.50*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) 
Legislative Effectiveness -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.05 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) 
Size 3.55** 3.32** 3.94** 3.59** 4.53*** 2.55* 2.57* 3.56** 2.50* 1.06 
 (1.18) (1.20) (1.21) (1.17) (1.26) (1.17) (1.22) (1.14) (1.17) (1.21) 
Concentration -0.29** -0.29** -0.35*** -0.29** -0.27* 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.76*** 0.70*** 0.61*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Territorial Autonomy -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.38** -0.47*** -0.50*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 1.00*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
CEE  -0.87* -0.87* -0.76+ -0.94* -0.88* 0.68 0.68 0.78 0.72 0.69 
 (0.44) (0.43) (0.46) (0.43) (0.43) (0.52) (0.52) (0.49) (0.52) (0.53) 
Attitudes towards minorities 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Descr. Rep. * Share parties  -0.26     0.01    
  (0.34)     (0.28)    
Descr. Rep. * Gov. Incl.   1.02***     1.30***   
   (0.20)     (0.19)   
Descr. Rep. * Legis. Eff.    -0.40+     0.29+  
    (0.21)     (0.18)  
Descr. Rep. * Size     -4.79*     5.77*** 
     (2.11)     (1.56) 
Constant 3.45*** 3.48*** 3.72*** 3.13*** 3.29*** 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.51 0.63 




Table A10: (continued) 
Level 3: Variance 0.31+ 0.31* 0.31+ 0.30+ 0.32* 1.06e-22 1.44e-17 7.74e-18 2.16e-22 9.20e-14 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (1.26e-21) (2.43e-16) (.) (.) (.) 
Level 2: Variance 0.02 2.05e-23 0.03 0.02 4.31e-14 1.77** 1.66** 1.77** 1.78** 1.71** 
 (0.14) (3.74e-22) (0.15) (0.14) (3.74e-13) (0.64) (0.80) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) 
Level 1: Variance 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.21** 0.21** 0.20** 0.20** 0.21** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Observations 996 996 996 996 996 994.00 994.00 994.00 994.00 994.00 
N (country, ethnic groups) 22, 37 22, 37 22, 37 22, 37 22, 37 22, 34 22, 34 22, 34 22, 34 22, 34 
Log-Likelihood -1120.80 -1120.52 -1108.41 -1118.89 -1118.25 -1028.86 -1028.86 -1005.90 -1027.51 -1022.17 
BIC 2331.35 2337.69 2313.48 2334.44 2333.16 2147.44 2154.34 2101.52 2151.64 2140.96 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Attitudes of the majority population are measured with the World Values Survey question on whom individuals would not like as their neighbours: people of a different race, 











Inclusion and responsiveness: 





Political representation is a central pillar of democracy. Political representation contributes to 
political stability through symbolic inclusion (descriptive representation) and policy conse-
quences. Empirically, most papers do not distinguish between different types of representation. 
This paper disentangles the effect of representation by studying descriptive and substantive 
representation separately. With a cross-sectional time-series design, analysing over 90 ethnic 
minority groups in more than 40 electoral democracies worldwide, it is shown that symbolic 
and instrumental aspects of representation matter, but that the effect of government inclusion is 
overestimated when policy responsiveness is not considered. The findings further suggest that 
different types of policies affect protest differently. 
 




Political representation is a crucial aspect of democracies (Dahl 1971). While political rep-
resentation of the majority is generally well achieved in new and old democracies (e.g. Roberts 
2010; Powell 2004), representation of ethnic minorities is more contested. Many democracies 
have recognized the challenges associated with underrepresentation of ethnic minorities and 
increasingly provide special rules for minority representation (Bird 2014; Krook and O’Brien 
2010). Nevertheless minorities remain numerically and substantively underrepresented in many 
democracies (e.g. Ruedin 2013; Reynolds 2011). This is problematic as the absence of minority 
representation and of responsiveness towards minority groups is likely to lead to anger and 
resentment (grievances) which might – under certain circumstances - translate into violent and 
non-violent protests against the state (Theuerkauf 2010).  
Previous research has shown that political representation – in particular descriptive repre-
sentation in the government – reduces the risk of ethnic confrontations (Birnir 2007; Cederman, 
Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Nevertheless, we know only 
little about the mechanism that links representation to protest. On the one hand, political repre-
sentation might be important due to its symbolic role of fostering feelings of inclusion and 
belonging among the minority population (Mansbridge 1999). On the other hand, political rep-
resentation is expected to have instrumental benefits, such as increased policy responsiveness 
(e.g. Phillips 1995; Preuhs 2007), a better access to resources and policy benefits, or an in-
creased perception of security among minority groups (Theuerkauf 2010). In this regard, I argue 
that the main benefit of representation is instrumental, but symbolic aspects might also play a 
role. 
Hence, representation is expected to influence policy responsiveness towards minority de-
mands – i.e. the responsiveness of the government to the preferences of ethnic minorities (e.g. 
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Mansbridge, 1999; Preuhs, 2007; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005) which should reduce griev-
ances and, therefore, the likelihood of ethnic confrontations (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, 
and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). While most previous studies see the im-
portance of representation in its instrumental effect, they approximate the effect of policy re-
sponsiveness with government inclusion. Thereby, previous research equalises descriptive rep-
resentation in the government with policy influence or at least assumes a direct link between 
the two forms of representation (e.g. Birnir 2007; Cederman et al. 2010). However, although 
responsiveness might be more likely when a group is numerically present, it is all but guaran-
teed. Minority representatives might easily be marginalised or outvoted (Bieber 2008) or they 
might represent other interests than those of their ethnic group (Zuber 2015). This happened for 
instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Croat member of the state presidency (2006-2014), 
Željko Komšić, was considered an illegitimate representative of Croat interests by Bosnian 
Croats, as he was allegedly mainly elected thanks to Bosniak voters (Bochsler 2012, 70). 
Accordingly, this paper argues that the effect of political representation can only be under-
stood by theoretically and empirically disentangling the symbolic and instrumental effects of 
representation. It, therefore, distinguishes between descriptive representation and its assumed 
effect – i.e. policy responsiveness – and thereby contributes to the on-going discussion about 
policy responsiveness and its role for democratic stability and ethnic confrontations. 
The forms of ethnic confrontations in democracies vary greatly and range from low-scale 
non-violent protests to violent protests (i.e. rebellions). In democracies, non-violent forms of 
protest prevail, but violent confrontations also occur (Gurr 2000, 29–30) – for instance in the 
United States (1960s and 70s), in Spain (1970s-2000s),  or in Bolivia (early 2000s). In most 
cases violent protests are preceded or accompanied by non-violent protests (Regan and Norton 
2005, 325; Gurr 2000, 50) and caused by similar factors (Saideman et al. 2002; Wimmer 1997). 
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This paper, therefore, focuses on the effect of representation for the entire range of ethnic pro-
tests in democracies – from non-violent to violent protest.1 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After briefly discussing the literature 
on grievances and ethnic conflict and protest the theoretical part explains why political inclu-
sion matters and how policy responsiveness influences the likelihood of ethnic confrontations. 
The empirical analysis relies on the new dataset “Ethnic Minorities in Democracies” that com-
bines EPR and MAR measures with newly developed indicators on policy responsiveness and 
descriptive representation. It also includes a case study of Bolivia to illustrate the effects found 
in the quantitative part. The final section discusses the findings and concludes by highlighting 
steps for future research. 
 
Representation, Policy Responsiveness and Grievance  
The argument that a lack of representation increases the risk of democratic instability and 
ethnic confrontations is linked to grievance-based explanations of conflict, which attribute pro-
test to discontent about unfulfilled expectations and the resulting grievances thereof 
(Theuerkauf 2010). In short, grievances develop when people perceive a discrepancy between 
the rights and resources to which they feel entitled and those that they (perceive to) be granted 
(Gurr 1970). Grievance-based explanations of ethnic confrontations see ethnic confrontations 
as attempts to eliminate grievances (Sambanis 2002, 223) and have a long history in political 
science (e.g. Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007; Birnir 2007; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 
2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gubler and Selway 2012; 
Gurr and Moore 1997; Gurr 1970, 1993; Regan and Norton 2005; Theuerkauf 2010). 
To explain the effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic confrontations theories about the 
role of ethnic minorities’ political grievances are of particular importance. Political grievances 
                                                            
1 Henceforth, I refer to violent and non-violent protests, as protests or ethnic confrontations. 
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develop when ethnic groups are excluded from political power, and feel that they have no in-
fluence in a countries’ political life. Excluded groups are more likely to search for ways outside 
the established political arena to make their demands heard (Theuerkauf 2010). Even though 
recent studies have clearly established a link between (descriptive) representation (especially 
in the government) and the likelihood of ethnic confrontations, we know still little about the 
mechanism that links representation to protest. On the one hand, representation may be im-
portant, because it fosters feelings of belonging to the political community and participating in 
the decision-making process among the minority group (Gay 2002; Mansbridge 1999, 641). In 
this sense representation can be understood as being intrinsically valuable, as almost all minor-
ity groups find representation important (Theuerkauf 2010). Most research on the effect of rep-
resentation on conflict claims, however, that representation of minorities matters because it 
makes politics more responsive and less discriminative towards the demands of minority groups 
(Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007; Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Theuerkauf 
2010). In this regard, the role of political representation of minorities lies in its instrumental 
effect: being present in the political institutions is expected to increase the likelihood that policy 
outcomes are in line with minority preferences (Theuerkauf 2010, 126–128), which should re-
duce grievances and consequently the likelihood of conflict. Although most scholars of ethnic 
conflict agree that representation is important due to its effect on policy outcomes, most re-
search only looks at descriptive representation (in the government), and is, therefore, unable to 
disentangle the symbolic and instrumental effect of representation. 
Contributing on this literature I argue that the effect of descriptive representation and policy 
responsiveness on anti-government protest should be distinguished. While policy responsive-
ness is a clear sign of actual policy impact descriptive representation is not necessarily related 
to political power. Minority MPs or ministers may be purely symbolic figureheads without ac-
tual policy influence. They can easily be marginalised or outvoted (Bieber 2008, 114), and 
might be unable to increase the policy responsiveness towards minorities. While the influence 
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of government ministers might be bigger than that of parliamentary representatives, even they 
might be side-lined. Consequently, I argue in this paper that what actually matters for the ac-
commodation of minorities is policy impact and not symbolic representation. For the accom-
modation of ethnic groups it is not only important who achieves representation, but also which 
policies are introduced. Therefore, this paper proposes to explicitly study the effect of policy 
responsiveness rather than relying on descriptive representation in government as a proxy and 
to disentangle the symbolic effect of inclusion from its substantial effect on policy outcomes. 
The focus on actual policies in addition to political inclusion contributes to understanding how 
political representation is linked to ethnic confrontations and to determine when symbolic in-
clusion is sufficient and when it matters only due to its effect on policy responsiveness. 
While it is intuitively apparent that groups which are satisfied with the policy outcome are 
unlikely to engage in protest against the state, it is less clear under which conditions groups 
which are dissatisfied protest against the government (Jenne 2007). The literature on the oppor-
tunity structure of protest (Eisinger 1973; Opp 2009) suggests, for instance, that protest is un-
likely when chances for success are small. This suggests that the effect of policy responsiveness 
on protest might be non-linear. Namely, one might expect groups that are neither entirely mar-
ginalized, nor entirely satisfied with the way politics works in their country to be most likely to 
protest against the state. The potential lack of protest among marginalised groups (groups with 
low levels of policy responsiveness) may be caused by at least two contrasting explanations, 
which are discussed in more detail below: low feelings of efficacy and a lack of economic 
means.  
 On the one hand, protests require sufficient motivation to mobilise against the state. Mo-
tivation for protest is influenced by grievances (caused by a lack of policy responsiveness) and 
feelings of efficacy. While a lack of policy responsiveness is generally expected to increase 
grievances and, therefore, the likelihood of protests, a lack of efficacy might moderate the ef-
fect. Ethnic groups and individuals who have never experienced any responsiveness towards 
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their demands might feel unable to influence policy outcomes (i.e. have low efficacy) and, 
therefore, abstain from any engagement in politics (Eisinger 1973; Opp 2009).   
On the other hand, protest requires a certain amount of resources to mobilize and organize 
group members in order to orient their grievances against the political actors (Edwards and 
McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Zald 1977). A complete lack of policy responsiveness may 
reduce a group’s access to resources and, therefore, protest. 
 
Figure 1: The effect of policy responsiveness on the likelihood of eth-
nic protest against the state 
 
Notes: simulation of inverted u-shape relationship between policy responsiveness and the level of 
ethnic confrontation (non-violent and violent forms of protest). 
 
In sum, groups that are completely denied responsiveness to their demands might feel that 
they have no influence (low efficacy) or lack the necessary resources (means) to engage in 
protest against the state and refrain from any interaction (even confrontational) with the state. 
If the non-linear effect is due to a lack of efficacy it should equally apply to responsiveness in 
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it is more likely to be visible when governments are particularly unresponsive in the economic 
area. When neither of the two explanations is correct, the effect of policy responsiveness should 
be linear – i.e. increasing levels of policy responsiveness linearly reduce the level of protest 
against the state. This is illustrated in figure 1 above. Based on these theoretical considerations 
the following hypotheses are postulated, whereas hypothesis 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The higher the level of descriptive representation the lower the level of 
ethnic protest against the state.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The higher the level of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities, 
the lower the level of protest against the state. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic protest has the form of 
an inverted u-shape, in particular with regard to economic issues. 
 
Case selection and Operationalisation 
Case selection 
The analysis is based on a worldwide sample of ethnically heterogeneous democracies 
(Freedom House (2011) value ≤ 4, and Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2011) value≥6) 2, but 17 
Asian and African democracies were excluded for the following reasons: 1) the basis for the 
identification of ethnicity is much more diffuse in African and Asian countries; there are more 
cross-cutting identity cleavages than in other regions and the saliency of these cleavages is more 
volatile (e.g. Posner 2007). 2) In many African countries ethnic parties are banned and repre-
sentation based on ethnicity is prohibited. Information on minority representation is, therefore, 
often scarce. This makes a study which focuses on different aspects of representation problem-
atic (e.g. Bogaards, Basedau, and Hartmann 2010 and further contributions in Democratization 
                                                            
2 In cases where the two ratings differed, the country was only included if the difference to the threshold was not 
more than one scale-point. If countries were democratic for different periods with authoritarian interruptions, only 
the most recent democratic period was considered. If a country's democracy broke down recently (e.g. Venezuela) 
it was excluded. 
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17(4)). Accordingly, the paper covers all electoral democracies in Western and Eastern Europe, 
the Americas and Oceania. Apart from being democratic countries have to fulfil the following 
criteria. They need to contain at least 500’000 inhabitants3 and be pluri-ethnic - i.e. a country 
must feature at least two politically relevant ethnic groups4 of at least one per cent of the coun-
try’s population.  
Based on these criteria the new dataset “Ethnic minorities in democracies” was developed 
that covers all pluri-ethnic democracies in Western and Eastern Europe, North and South Amer-
ica, and Oceania since 1950. Datasets on ethnic groups notoriously suffer from selection bias, 
as researchers always need to determine which of the at least 5000 ethnic groups to include into 
the analyses (Birnir et al. 2014; Hug 2013; Kymlicka 1995). In order to reduce the problem of 
selection bias the two most commonly used datasets on ethnic groups were combined. Groups 
were selected on the basis of the EPR dataset on ethnic power relations (Cederman, Wimmer, 
and Min 2010) and the Minority at Risk Project (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).5 In total, 93 
groups from 48 countries fulfil the selection criteria outlined above (see table A1 in the supple-
mentary material). 20 of these groups are not coded by MAR. To avoid the selection effect 
associated with MAR data (Hug 2013), information for these groups has been added to the 
dataset based on extensive reviews of the group-specific literature. For one of the dependent 
variables, manual coding was only possible for a subset of cases. Therefore, these results will 
be subject to robustness checks (see below).6 
 
                                                            
3 In order to exclude micro-states, for which information is scarce. 
4 Ethnic minorities are defined as autochthonous or ethno-nationalist minorities based on perceived common 
origin, shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 197; Horowitz 
1985, 17–18). 
5 EPR-ETH defines a group as politically relevant if "at least one political organization claims to represent it in 
national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination" (Hunziker 2013). A group is 
defined as relevant (or politically significant) by MAR if "the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, system-
atic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; and [if] the group is the basis for political mobi-
lization and collective action in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests" (Minorities at Risk Project 
2009). 
6 A more detailed description of the dataset is provided in the data appendix at the end of this dissertation. 
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Dependent Variable7 
The dependent variable measures ethnic minorities' confrontation with the state by analys-
ing violent and non-violent protest. Violent ethnic protest has become very rare in electoral 
democracies during the last few decades, while non-violent protest has continued. As non-vio-
lent protest is often understood as preceding and paralleling violent protest (Gurr 2000; Regan 
and Norton 2005; Saideman et al. 2002; Wimmer 1997), the entire range of ethnic confronta-
tions is considered by analysing violent and non-violent forms of protest. Violent protest is 
measured using the MAR dataset’s rebellion variable (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Since 
only very few groups in the sample used violent protest as a means to advance their demands 
the variable is recoded into a dummy variable, where (1) refers to the presence of violent protest 
against the state. Because the MAR dataset does not cover all ethnic minority groups in the 
sample, the variables were completed with additional information based on an extensive review 
of the group-specific literature. As no indication was found that any of the 18 groups missing 
in MAR has been engaged in violent protest since 1950,8 missing values were coded as (0). 
Non-violent protest is measured with an ordinal variable from the minorities at risk dataset 
(MAR) with ranges from (0) (no protest) to 4 (medium and large demonstrations9) (Minorities 
at Risk Project 2009). Because the group-specific literature is less explicit about non-violent 
protests, recoding of excluded groups was only possible for a small subsample (four groups). 
Therefore, the results regarding non-violent protest will be subjected to two types of robustness 
checks. First, the analysis will be conducted with a higher threshold for inclusion (1.5%)10, 
because the sample is more complete when only groups above 1.5% of the population are taken 
into account. Second, the models will be run with the full sample, where missing values on the 
                                                            
7 Descriptive Statistics for all variables are available from Table A2 in the supplementary material 
8 This is in line with Birnir et al. (2011; 2012) who analysed violent rebellion for all the groups MAR misses and 
found that only 8 of over 900 excluded groups had engaged in violent rebellion since 1945. 
9 Categories 4 and 5 of the MAR dataset are merged into one category. 
10 MAR selects groups that make up at least 1% of a country’s population. 
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protest variable will be coded as zero, because it is more likely that MAR excludes groups that 
do not engage in protest (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). 
 
Independent Variables 
The main independent variable is policy responsiveness towards minority preferences. 
Measuring policy responsiveness towards ethnic groups rests on the assumption that group pref-
erences exist, and that they are distinguishable from the preferences of the majority. Indeed, 
survey research on preferences of ethnic minorities and majorities shows that ethnic minorities 
often have different policy preferences than the majority, in particular with regard to ‘minority 
issues’, but also on more general policy issues (Hänni 2015; Lieberman and McClendon 2012). 
Even if not all members of a minority group support group rights to the same extent, ethnic 
minorities are significantly more likely to do so than members of the majority (Evans and Need 
2002; Rovny 2014). Hence, while the potential heterogeneity of minority preferences is 
acknowledged, measuring policy responsiveness of minorities on the group level appears justi-
fied. 
Previous attempts to measure policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities have mainly 
concentrated on the United States. Scholars have measured policy responsiveness by consider-
ing the extent of social welfare benefits (Preuhs 2006, 2007), by looking at the voting behaviour 
of minority MPs (Hero and Tolbert 1995), or by measuring the liberal attitudes of members of 
congress (Lublin 1999). While these solutions are useful for measuring responsiveness to La-
tino or Afro-American interests in the United States, they are not applicable in a cross-country 
comparison. Instead, a cross-national study of policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities 
might focus on at least two aspects: 1) policies which directly target ethnic minorities; 2) issues 
that are most important to voters belonging to ethnic minority groups. Similar to studies on 
policy responsiveness towards women (e.g. Caiazza, 2004; Cowell-Meyers & Langbein, 2009; 
12 
Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005), the present study focuses on policies which directly target 
minorities. 
In order to distinguish between the efficacy and means argument for the potential u-shaped 
effect of policy responsiveness (see H3), the existence of policies which directly target ethnic 
minorities is measured with two separate variables, one considering a cultural, the other an 
economic policy area. First, policy responsiveness is approached with an index of minority 
language rights. Language is often seen as an important group characteristic which bonds group 
members together (Liu 2011, 125), and is the most important marker for many ethnic groups 
(Brown and Ganguly 2003, 3). Accordingly, recognition and support for minority language and 
education are the rights most often claimed by ethnic minorities (Deets and Stroschein 2005). 
The index of minority language rights consists of an additive index of three variables and ranges 
from 0 to 6, where each element can be guaranteed (2), partly guaranteed (1), or not guaranteed 
(0). The three variables are i) the possibility to use the minority language with authorities and 
the courts; ii) the possibility of education of the minority language; iii) the possibility of edu-
cation in the minority language. Data is collected on the group-level based on Leclerc's (2015) 
databases on language policies around the world11. For the part of the analysis which includes 
this variable, the sample is restricted to language minorities (around 80% of all minorities in 
the sample). As a second factor for policy responsiveness towards minority groups economic 
discrimination is analysed. Economic discrimination is one of the most obvious obstacles which 
ethnic minority groups face, and is accordingly an issue of substantive importance for most 
members of an ethnic community. Economic discrimination is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 
with MAR data, where (0) refers to no discrimination and (4) refers to the presence of exclu-
sionary and repressive policies which severely restrict the economic opportunities of an ethnic 
group (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).12 This measure of economic discrimination combines 
                                                            
11 Completed with Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Liu (2011) 
12 (1) refers to significant economic discrimination due to historical marginalisation, but where the state attempts 
to improve the situation of the group through public policies, (2) refers to significant economic discrimination due 
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information about the extent of discrimination and the policies which are introduced in order 
to tackle discrimination. It is, therefore, a good indicator to measure the actual implementation 
of minority-friendly policies. Missing values (due to MAR’s selection criteria) were recoded 
with secondary sources, based on reports by the Minority Rights Group International (2014), 
Pan and Pfeil (2006), and Wheatley (2004). 
Descriptive representation is measured as incorporation into the government, because mi-
nority representation is most effective if minorities have a say in government (Hänni 2014). 
Government inclusion is measured with a binary variable, where (1) refers to governments 
where at least one minister belongs to the respective ethnic minority group. It is coded with 
information from electoral databases,13 the country reports from the U.S. Department of State, 
Birnir (2007) and Birnir and Satana (2013). 
The independent variables are lagged by one year in order to take the potential endogeneity 
of representation and protest into account. One might argue that responsiveness and descriptive 
representation improve, when minorities protest, because governments attempt to accommodate 
them to prevent further escalation. By regressing protest on the lagged explanatory variable the 
risk that protest causes an improvement of representation is lower. 
 
Control Variables 
We control for other factors which are known to explain the level of ethnic protest. 1) 
Factors influencing the mobilization capacity of an ethnic group such as group size and territo-
rial concentration are controlled for. Information on territorial concentration is based on 
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) and MAR data (Minorities 
                                                            
to historical marginalisation, while no or very few policies are implemented to improve the situation of the group, 
and (3) refers to significant economic discrimination due to present marginalisation with no, or insufficient 
measures to improve the group's status. 
13 The database of political institutions (Beck et al. 2001), the Parties and Election Database (Nordsiek 2012), the 
European Election Database (2012), and information provided by the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2012) 
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at Risk Project 2009).14 The size of an ethnic minority group is measured with data on the ethnic 
group's share of the population according to MAR and EPR-ETH (Cederman, Wimmer, and 
Min 2010; Minorities at Risk Project 2009).15 
2) It is controlled for institutional factors such as territorial autonomy and the electoral 
system. Coding of territorial autonomy is based on EPR-ETH-data (Bormann et al. 2015; 
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), and information provided in Pan and Pfeil (2006), laws 
on autonomy, and constitutions. The electoral system is measured as a set of dummy variables 
(proportional system, mixed system, plurality/majority systems) (Bormann and Golder 2013), 
where plurality and majority systems are used as the reference category.  
3) The level of a country’s economic development is considered, because richer countries 
are expected to be better equipped to accommodate ethnic groups through redistribution 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Saideman et al. 2002).16 Economic development is meas-
ured with data on the GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 US $). The data is based on the Penn 
World Tables (Center for International Comparision of Production Income and Prices 2006).17 
Finally, it is controlled for factors related to the opportunity structure of protest. First, it is 
expected that ethnic minority groups are more likely to engage in protest against the govern-
ment if protest is seen as a legitimate means to advance a group's policy demands in a country. 
Therefore, it is controlled for a country’s general culture of protest, measured through addi-
tively combining information on peaceful anti-government demonstrations18 and strikes19 
                                                            
14 The variable consists of four categories, where (0) refers to widely dispersed groups, (1) covers groups which 
are primarily urban or form the minority in one region, (2) indicates that a part of the group is a majority in one 
region, while other group members are dispersed, and (3) refers to groups which are concentrated in one region. 
15 If the information regarding the ethnic composition of the population differed between MAR and EPR-ETH, the 
data was validated with information from the CIA World Factbooks. 
16 Others argue that economic development increases protest, because modernization leads to more discrimination 
and thus to more grievances (Fearon 2003; Gellner 1983). 
17 Due to missing data in the Penn World Tables, data for Serbia-Montenegro (2000-2005) is based on World Bank 
data (2012). 
18 Number of peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing 
their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature 
(Banks and Wilson 2013). 
19 Number of strikes of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involve more than one employer and that 
are aimed at national government policies or authority (Banks and Wilson 2013). 
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(Banks and Wilson 2013). Second, the opportunity for protest is lower if governments are 
known to suppress unconventional political actions easily. A country’s level of repression is 
measured through the political terror scale data (Gibney et al. 2015).20 The scale ranges from 
1-5 with higher values indicating more repression. Missing years on this variable were replaced 
by the closest available value. 
 
Data Analysis and Findings 
This part examines the effect of representation on ethnic confrontations with the state by 
disentangling the effect of symbolic inclusion in the government (descriptive representation) 
and policy responsiveness (as a potential consequence of government inclusion). I apply mul-
tilevel analysis in order to deal with cross-sectional time-series data instead of the more com-
mon panel (PTSCS) data analysis. The multilevel design provides accurate estimates of time-
series effects while simultaneously controlling for dependencies in the data (i.e. dependencies 
between ethnic groups over time and between ethnic groups in the same country) (e.g. Shor et 
al. 2007). This allows us to analyse if the proposed relationship holds within ethnic groups and 
not just between them – e.g. if increases in policy responsiveness towards one particular group 
over time reduce the risk (level) of ethnic confrontations for this particular group. The main 
independent variables are lagged by one year in order to account for the potential endogeneity 
of representation and protest. The analysis first examines the consequences of policy respon-
siveness for non-violent protest (table 1) before turning to the discussion of policy responsive-
ness and violent protest (table 2). 
Table 1 below estimates the effect of representation on non-violent protest with linear mul-
tilevel models, with random intercepts and slopes. The empty model not reported here supports 
the choice of a hierarchical model: most of the variance in protest behaviour occurs at the group-
                                                            
20 The political terror scale assesses government repression based on Amnesty International and U.S Department 
of State reports. When the two ratings differed, the higher value is chosen. 
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year-level (60%), 38% of the variance is explained by group-level factors and only 1% by coun-
try-level characteristics. This implies that country characteristics are least important in explain-
ing non-violent protest. We first analyse the effect of government inclusion on the level of 
ethnic minorities’ non-violent protest (H1). As postulated, inclusion into the government re-
duces the level of minority protest – i.e. groups which are represented by one of their own in 
government protest less than groups who lack descriptive representatives in the government. 
We then turn to the second and third hypotheses which refer to the effect of policy responsive-
ness towards ethnic minorities on non-violent protest. We distinguished between cultural and 
economic aspects of policy responsiveness. The analysis reveals varying effects between the 
two variables. As hypothesis 2 anticipates, higher levels of minority language rights are linearly 
associated with decreases in the level of non-violent protest against the state. By contrast, eco-
nomic discrimination has a non-linear effect on the level of non-violent protest. Groups with a 
midrange level of economic discrimination protest most, whereas groups that are not discrimi-
nated and groups that are highly discriminated protest less. For a more intuitive interpretation 
of the non-linear effect it is referred to the predicted values in figure 2 below, which depicts the 
inverted U-shape relationship between economic discrimination and non-violent protest.21 To 
facilitate the interpretation and comparison with other measures of representation, the scale for 
economic discrimination was reversed and all variables scaled from 0 to 1. Figure 2 further 
underlines that the guarantee of all forms of representation (responsiveness and government 
inclusion) has a very similar effect on the level of non-violent protest: for all measures of rep-
resentation the level of non-violent protest is comparable, when representation is high. Hence, 
at least regarding non-violent protest, the symbolic and instrumental aspects of representation 
seem to be equally important. 
 
                                                            
21 The U-Shaped effect is presented with confidence intervals in figure A1 in the appendix. As figure A1 reveals 
the U-shaped effect is significant across the entire level of economic discrimination. 
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Table 1: Explaining non-violent Protest Behaviour of Ethnic Minorities 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Language Rights (lag) -0.12* -0.12   
 (0.05) (0.11)   
Language Rights^2 (lag)  0.00   
  (0.02)   
Economic Discrimination (lag)   0.05 0.51*** 
   (0.05) (0.13) 
Economic Discrimination^2 (lag)    -0.11*** 
    (0.03) 
Government Inclusion (lag) -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.52*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Territorial Autonomy 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.18 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) 
Concentration 0.11+ 0.11+ 0.06 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Group Size 3.14*** 3.14*** 4.41*** 4.15*** 
 (0.75) (0.75) (0.91) (0.88) 
GDP p.c in 1000 US$ 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Proportional System a 0.13 0.13 -0.24 -0.29+ 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) 
Mixed System a 0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) 
Anti-government Actions -0.00 -0.00 0.01+ 0.01+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
State Repression -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.81** 0.59* 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
Country level variance 0.41** 0.41** 2.01e-13 3.18e-17
 (0.18) (0.18) (1.24e-12) (7.90e-14) 
Slope Variance (country level) 0.09* 0.09* 0.06* 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Group level variance 0.13+ 0.13+ 0.59*** 0.54*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) 
Year level variance 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 1391 1391 1751 1751 
N(country, groups) 38, 63 38, 63 44,79 44,79 
Log Likelihood -2022.97 -2022.97 -2541.88 -2534.41 
BIC 4154.51 4161.75 5195.79 5188.31 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Multilevel models were 
calculated with the Stata 12 xtmixed command. a Reference category is a majoritarian electoral system. 
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Notes: predicted margins of policy responsiveness (economic discrimination and language rights) 
and government representation on the level of violent protest. Other variables are held constant at 
their mean. The scale of economic discrimination was inverted – i.e. high values refer to high policy 
responsiveness or low economic discrimination, respectively. 
 
Regarding the control variables, the mobilization capacity of minority groups seems to be 
important: bigger groups (and to some extent more concentrated groups) are more intensely 
engaged in non-violent confrontations with the state than smaller groups. Against the expecta-
tions, higher economic development seems to foster non-violent protest. This might support the 
argument that increased development increases discrimination and, therefore, grievances 
among ethnic minority groups (Fearon 2003; Gellner 1983). By contrast, institutional factors 
seem to be less important for non-violent protest: the effect of the electoral system and territorial 
autonomy are mostly insignificant. Regarding the opportunity structure of protest only the ex-
istence of other anti-government actions in a state has (partly) an influence on protest, while 
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As discussed above, the measure of non-violent protest might potentially suffer from se-
lection bias, as MAR does not cover all minority groups that fulfil the selection criteria of the 
present study. Therefore, two types of robustness checks regarding the validity of the protest 
variable were conducted (see Table A3 in the supplementary material). First, the threshold re-
garding the size of minority groups was slightly increased to 1.5% of the total population. This 
led to the exclusion of two countries and 8 very small minority groups, but allows the hypoth-
eses to be tested with an almost complete sample, thus reducing the MAR related potential 
selection bias. As the findings presented in Models 1-4 in table A3 in the supplementary mate-
rial indicate, we find virtually identical effects in the smaller sample. Second, the number of 
groups included into the analysis was extended to the full sample by assigning missing groups 
the value of (0) on the protest variable, because groups excluded by MAR are likely to show 
low levels of protest.22 The results are presented in Table A3 in models 5-8. Confirming the 
findings presented above, the results are robust to this alternative operationalization of protest. 
We still find the u-shaped effect of economic discrimination, a linear effect of language rights, 
and a negative effect of government inclusion which is comparable to that presented in table 1 
above. 
Do these findings translate into more violent forms of protest or have violent and non-
violent protests different causes? Table 2 below presents the effect of policy responsiveness 
and descriptive representation in the government on violent protest. The empty models not pre-
sented here indicate that 19% of the variance in violent protest is explained by the lowest level 
(group-year-level), 67% by group-level characteristics and 14% by country level factors. We 
start our analysis again by evaluating the effect of descriptive representation in the government 
(H1). In line with the findings on non-violent protest and earlier research (e.g. Birnir 2007; 
Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), descriptive representation in the government reduces the 
                                                            
22 One of MAR’s selection criteria requires that groups are mobilised and are “the basis for collective action in 
defence or promotion of its self-defined interests” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). As this is certainly the case 
as soon as groups engage in protests, it is likely that excluded groups do not protest.  
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likelihood of violent protest – i.e. the symbolic aspect of representation seems also to play a 
role for violent protest. 
Turning to the effect of policy responsiveness, the analysis in table 2 reveals again con-
trasting effects for cultural and economic policies. While language rights seem to be linearly 
associated with the likelihood of violent protest, economic discrimination seems again to have 
a small non-linear effect. In terms of substantial effects, a one-point increase in the level of 
language rights reduces the likelihood of violent protest by about 40%. The effect does not 
change, however, for high levels of language rights, thereby aligning with hypothesis 2, which 
postulates a linear effect of policy responsiveness. By contrast, the effect of economic discrim-
ination seems to be non-linear - thus supporting H3. While lower levels of economic discrimi-
nation reduce the risk of violent protest, very discriminated groups appear to have a slightly 
lower risk of violently engaging against the state than groups with a mid-range level of eco-
nomic discrimination (see figure 3). However, the uncertainty associated with this effect is con-
siderable.23 The non-linear effect should, therefore, be interpreted cautiously and only be un-
derstood as a possible indication for the presence of a non-linear effect.  Apart from illustrating 
the small (and potentially insignificant) non-linear effect of economic discrimination, figure 3 
compares the effect of policy responsiveness and government inclusion. To ease the interpreta-
tion of figure 3, the scale of economic discrimination has again been reversed and all variables 
have been scaled from 0 to 1. The fact that descriptive representation in the government remains 
significant after controlling for policy responsiveness suggests that symbolic and instrumental 
aspects of representation are important for the likelihood of violent ethnic protest. 
   
                                                            
23 Figure A2 in the supplementary material provides the confidence intervals for the U-shaped effect. The uncer-
tainty associated with the u-shaped effect is considerable. The effect can, therefore, not be interpreted with great 
confidence. However, I still take it as a sign for the presence of a small non-linear effect as the large uncertainty 
is probably at least partly caused by the general very low probability of violent protest in democracies. 
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Table 2: Explaining violent protest of ethnic minorities 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Multilevel models were 
calculated with the Stata 12 xtmelogit command. In logistic models the variance of the lowest level is fixed at 
3.29. a Reference category is a majoritarian electoral system. 
   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Language Rights -0.40* -0.55   
 (0.18) (0.48)   
Language Rights^2  0.03   
  (0.09)   
Economic Discrimination   0.71*** 3.70*** 
   (0.15) (0.67) 
Economic Discrimination^2    -0.63*** 
    (0.13) 
Government Inclusion -1.17* -1.18* -1.51*** -1.44** 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.45) (0.46) 
Concentration 0.88* 0.87+ 0.84** 1.11** 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.31) (0.36) 
Group Size 1.81 1.60 1.97 1.06 
 (4.72) (4.75) (3.51) (4.42) 
GDP p.c in 1000 US$ -0.05* -0.05* 0.03 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Proportional System -0.73 -0.77 -0.93 -0.75 
 (0.84) (0.84) (0.75) (0.85) 
Mixed System 0.76 0.75 -0.82 -0.41 
 (0.97) (0.97) (0.80) (0.90) 
Anti-government Actions -0.08* -0.08* -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Territorial autonomy 2.11*** 2.13*** 1.09** 1.28** 
 (0.61) (0.61) (0.39) (0.42) 
State Repression 0.30 0.31 0.41** 0.23 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.16) (0.18) 
Constant -5.82*** -5.72*** -8.27*** -11.29*** 
 (1.52) (1.55) (1.33) (1.79) 
Country level variance 6.45 6.69 1.97 5.20 
 (5.03) (5.13) (2.56) (4.19) 
Slope Variance (country) 0.39 0.39 - - 
 (0.23) (0.22) - - 
Group level variance 9.74* 9.53* 8.51** 11.59** 
 (4.52) (4.50) (2.88) (4.28) 
Observations 1935 1935 2299 2299 
N(country, group) 44, 76 44, 76 48, 93 48, 93 
Log Likelihood -412.92 -412.86 -491.72 -474.94 
BIC 931.79 939.24 1084.07 1058.25 
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of violent protest over varying levels of policy re-
sponsiveness and government representation 
 
Notes: predicted margins of policy responsiveness (economic discrimination and language rights) 
and government representation on the level of violent protest. Other variables are held constant at 
their mean. The scale of economic discrimination was inverted – i.e. high values refer to high policy 
responsiveness or low economic discrimination, respectively. 
 
Regarding the control variables, all else equal, concentrated groups and groups which enjoy 
territorial autonomy are more likely to use violent protest as a means to advance their demands. 
These findings are in line with the research on federalism and territorial autonomy stating that 
subnational autonomy arrangements which closely follow ethnic group lines foster rather than 
accommodate tensions between ethnic groups (Christin and Hug 2012; Roeder and Rothchild 
2005; Roeder 2009), and that concentrated groups have a better opportunity structure to mobi-
lize (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). While economic development was positively asso-
ciated with non-violent protest it seems to reduce violent protest against the state. This confirms 
the mixed findings and arguments for economic development presented in the literature. 
The results are robust to different model specifications. On the one hand, instead of a hier-
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conducted (see table A4). The findings are comparable, thus, underlying the robustness of the 
results.24 On the other hand, the models for non-violent protest were estimated with an ordered 
logit model to take the non-continuous nature of protest into account.25 The significance and 
direction of the estimates presented in table A5 are similar to those presented above, thus con-
firming the robustness of the findings. 
Taken together, these findings help disentangling the effect of policy responsiveness and 
descriptive representation. Comparing the effect of policy responsiveness and descriptive rep-
resentation in the government it appears that both forms of representation are important. The 
fact that symbolic inclusion (descriptive representation) stays significant after including 
measures for policy responsiveness implies that government inclusion is an insufficient proxy 
for substantive representation and has a value of its own. Furthermore, by disentangling sym-
bolic and instrumental forms of representation it could be shown that different issues affect 
protest differently. Economic discrimination seems to be non-linearly associated with protest 
(H3) – in particular with non-violent protest, while language rights seem to have a linear effect 
(H2). The different effect of language rights and economic discrimination invites further clari-
fication. As discussed above cultural and economic rights might be differently linked to the 
likelihood of ethnic confrontations. Whereas economic rights are directly related to a group’s 
economic wellbeing, the deprivation of cultural rights does not necessarily translate into eco-
nomic marginalisation, but might affect its prospect for group survival. Hence, while groups 
which are economically marginalized might lack the necessary resources to successfully mobi-
lize, groups who feel culturally threatened might have the necessary economic means and en-
gage in confrontation against the state to address their cultural grievances. Accordingly, the 
findings yield more support to the means than efficacy argument for the u-shaped relationship. 
                                                            
24 The effect of language rights is no longer significant, but the direction and size of the effect remains comparable. 
Generally, the results regarding language rights appear slightly less stable, probably also due to little variance over 
time. 
25 Strictly speaking protest is measured on an ordinal scale and requires the use of ordinal multi-level models. 
Since the results are very similar, the results of the linear models are presented in the paper. 
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If the decreasing effect of policy responsiveness at high level of discrimination was related to 
efficacy, it would equally apply to language rights. The fact that language rights are linearly 
related to protest, however, suggests that it is a lack of resources (means) rather than efficacy 
which makes protest less likely at low levels of responsiveness. The previous concentration of 
the literature on descriptive representation in the government overlooks that such differences 
between policy areas exist.  
 
The case of Bolivia: non-violent and violent protest of the indigenous population 
This section provides illustrative case evidence for the quantitative models presented 
above. For this purpose, we need a case that is well explained by the models and for which the 
dependent variable varies over time (Lieberman 2005; Seawright and Gerring 2008). Bolivia 
fulfils these criteria, as it has small residuals, and has experienced various violent and non-
violent protests in the period under observation (since 1982).  
At the time of democratisation the situation of Bolivia’s indigenous population had already 
slightly improved. To understand whether the u-shaped effect of the quantitative models can 
also be observed qualitatively one needs, accordingly, to look at the pre-democratic period. The 
indigenous population was always economically worse off than the rest of the population. On 
the one hand, the overlap of economic development and identity was seen as partly accidental 
and associated with cultural autonomy in specific indigenous areas that excluded indigenous 
from ‘modernization’. On the other hand, the state also actively discriminated and exploited the 
indigenous and marginalised them politically. Nevertheless, the indigenous rarely actively pro-
tested against their situation (Evia, Laserna, and Skaperdas 2008; Gurr and Burke 2000, 179; 
Rice 2012, 76). This changed after the Nationalist Revolution of the 1950s when the agrarian 
and educational reforms transformed the economic structure dramatically and most indigenous 
received the right to vote. As parts of the indigenous population became wealthier and more 
aware of politics they realized that their discrimination was not only based on economic, but 
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also on cultural grounds (Evia, Laserna, and Skaperdas 2008), and started to mobilise politically 
against it. Whereas the indigenous organised initially mainly as miners and peasants they began 
to integrate explicit indigenous demands into the agenda of the peasant and labour protests in 
the late 1960s. In particular, the ongoing failure of the revolutionary government to integrate 
the indigenous despite changes in the economic and educational structure led to a shift of the 
protest discourse and a ‘reindigenousisation’ of the population (Flesken 2013, 337–339).26 The 
increase in protest at a time when the system became slightly more open towards indigenous 
demands is in line with the u-shaped effect of economic discrimination discussed above: as long 
as minority groups were entirely socially and politically marginalised they protested less, be-
cause they lacked the economic means (and in the case of Bolivia the necessary efficacy) to 
protest against government policies. 
In order to further illustrate the causal link between policy responsiveness and protest in 
Bolivia I know turn to the discussion of specific indigenous protests during the democratic 
period. I focus on selected, large-scale protests (see table A6 in the supplementary material) 
rather than on explaining the overall protest pattern since the early 1980s. This has the ad-
vantage that more fine-grained data can be used to illustrate the mechanism that was found in 
the quantitative analysis. 
One of the first major protests after transition to democracy started in the late 1980s when 
the indigenous lowland people protested against the state (Rice 2012, chap. 5; Van Cott 2005, 
chap. 3).27 At this time policy responsiveness towards indigenous people in Bolivia was still 
                                                            
26 While the discourse of the protests transformed during the 1970s and raised indigenous demands more explicitly 
they were not a new phenomenon of the democratization period and cannot be attributed to increased identification 
with indigenous identity. To the contrary, the protests led to a sharpening of collective indigenous identity and 
increased the willingness of people to identify as indigenous rather than mestizo – i.e. people with mixed heritage 
(Flesken 2013b; Flesken 2013a). However, the Quechua and Aymara speaking population was already active and 
relevant before democratization (according to EPR-ETH), 
27 Protests of the Aymara and Quechua population were mostly oriented against attempts of the government to 
eradicate coca production. While coca production is partly seen as an indigenous tradition it is also related to 
international drug trafficking (Rice 2012, 5). I will, therefore, leave this aspect of the protests out and concentrate 
on those that have clearly an economic or cultural agenda. 
26 
rather low, but they were no longer as marginalised as at the beginning of the century. Never-
theless, the indigenous population was still lacking sufficient land rights, cultural discrimina-
tion was high and economic discrimination considerable (Van Cott 2000, 2005, chap. 3). As a 
consequence, indigenous groups mobilised and showed their dissatisfaction with the state by 
protesting. From 1991 onwards a number of laws were passed to protect the cultural and eco-
nomic rights of the indigenous population – for instance access to land in the highlands. The 
turning point for protests and indigenous rights was the constitutional reform of 1994 (Gurr and 
Burke 2000). In 1994, language rights were increased by granting the lowland indigenous com-
munities more rights to minority language education, and the possibility to use indigenous lan-
guages in contact with the authorities. Simultaneously, policies were introduced to lessen eco-
nomic discrimination against the indigenous population. For instance, in the mid-1990s, for the 
first time, a large extent of the government’s development budget went to rural indigenous 
communities, and local authorities were granted the authority to implement these projects, 
thereby contributing to the empowerment and economic development of the indigenous popu-
lation (Gurr and Burke 2000). As a consequence violent protests ceased entirely and the non-
violent protests organised in support of these issues also stopped.28 
Half a decade later, another wave of indigenous protests erupted. Due to dissatisfaction 
with government policies, particularly with progress in the INRA29 land reform, social invest-
ment in health and bilingual education, or the question of indigenous control over subsoil re-
sources, the organization of the lowland indigenous people in Bolivia (CIDOB) organized a 
protest against the government in July 2000. The protests ceased after an agreement was 
reached that guaranteed an improvement of the INRA law and certain minority rights, as well 
as the appointment of a Guarani minister into government (Gustafson 2002, 281, 290). 
                                                            
28 This does not mean that all non-violent protests stopped. Major protests in the second half of the 1990s oc-
curred for instance, when Cocoa growers protested against attempts of the government to eradicate coca produc-
tion.  
29 The INRA law was a set of rules for land reforms that was passed in 1996. INRA stands for Instituto Nacional 
de Reforma Agraria (National institute for agrarian reform) (Gustafson 2002, 281). 
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A second indigenous protest in the same year that started in April and continued until Sep-
tember demonstrates how protests are not always harmless and can easily escalate into violence. 
Initially, the Aymara-dominated Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesionos 
de Bolivia (CSUTCB) expressed their dissatisfaction with government policies with road 
blocks that paralyzed the country for 20 days. Similar to CIDOB, they were protesting against 
the implementation of the INRA land-reform law, but being more radical, demanded the imple-
mentation of a revised proposal that regulated indigenous control over land reform, the distri-
bution of titles and territories, as well as control over soil, subsoil and water rights for the An-
dean indigenous communities. In contrast to the CIDOB-protests, these actions turned violent 
and resulted in the death of 15 people and more than one hundred injured protestors (Gustafson 
2002, 284–289). After reaching an agreement with the state which promised large investments 
into infrastructure projects and an adaptation of the contested INRA law the protests of the 
highland indigenous stopped. However, both agreements (with CIDOB and CSUTCB) were 
not sufficiently implemented by the state, leading to renewed protests in the following months 
(Gustafson 2002, 290–291). 
In sum, the case of Bolivia supports the effect found in the quantitative analysis. According 
to the examples discussed here, minority groups start to protest against the government if they 
are dissatisfied with government policies and feel discriminated. When the lack of policy re-
sponsiveness coincides with a lack of government inclusion (as in Bolivia until 2005) minority 
groups have no other means to bring their demands to the attention of the elites than by protest-
ing (Madrid 2008, 174). Indeed, after Evo Morales became Bolivia’s first indigenous president 
in 2006 the protest by the indigenous population ceased. While Morales’ first government 
(2006-2010) also faced various social protests they were mostly caused by those who had ben-
efitted from previous government policies and now felt excluded from the new government 
(Rice 2012, 74). The fact that the protagonists of the protests changed after Evo Morales’ elec-
tion lends further support to the argument that people protest when they are dissatisfied with 
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government policies. While non-violent protest is not necessarily dangerous for a democratic 
regime, and can be understood as the healthy mobilization of dissatisfied citizens, it can easily 
transform into more violent confrontations with the state as the example of the CSUTCB pro-
tests demonstrates. Consideration of and responsiveness to minority demands should, therefore, 
be a central concern of every democratic government.  
 
Conclusion 
Political representation in general and policy responsiveness in particular are crucial as-
pects of every democracy. They require the continued responsiveness of governments to the 
policy preferences of their citizens (Dahl 1971). Questions of representation are most heatedly 
debated in (ethnically) heterogeneous societies, where groups of people might feel excluded 
from access to power and unrepresented by policy outcomes. This is highly problematic, as 
feelings of exclusion may contribute to political instability and societal confrontations.  Previ-
ous studies showed that representation in government reduces ethnic confrontations. We know 
little, however, about the political mechanism that links descriptive representation to the ab-
sence of ethnic confrontations. Government inclusion may be effective due to its symbolic ef-
fect on minorities’ perceptions of inclusion. Usually it is argued, however, that descriptive rep-
resentation in the government increases policy responsiveness towards ethnic minorities, which 
in turn reduces grievances, and consequently, ethnic conflict. Empirical evidence for the role 
of policy responsiveness in reducing ethnic confrontations has not been presented so far. Rather, 
it has been approximated with data on descriptive representation in the government. This study 
attempted to extend the research on minority representation by disentangling the effect of de-
scriptive representation and policy responsiveness. Building on the new dataset “Ethnic minor-
ities in democracies” it analysed if and how policy responsiveness affects non-violent and vio-
lent forms of ethnic confrontation with the state. 
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In sum, the findings suggest that higher levels of policy responsiveness reduce ethnic mi-
norities’ confrontation with the state. Interestingly, the effect seems to differ for economic and 
cultural policies. While economic discrimination appears to follow an inverted u-shaped effect, 
cultural rights have a linear effect on ethnic confrontations. This supports the assumption that 
groups which are entirely marginalized do not protest, because they lack the necessary resources 
to sustain a political movement. By contrast, groups which are culturally, but not economically, 
marginalized may have the necessary economic means to sustain a confrontation with the state 
and might, therefore, be more likely to express their grievances through protesting. These dif-
ferences call for further theoretical and empirical study in order to fully understand what dis-
tinguishes the effect of cultural from economic policies. 
Apart from policy responsiveness descriptive representation in the government also mat-
ters. This might suggest that not only instrumental, but also symbolic aspects of inclusion con-
tribute to the reduction of inter-ethnic tensions. In contrast to previous studies, which used de-
scriptive representation (partly) as a proxy for policy responsiveness this paper set out to di-
rectly test this mechanism with new data which allowed us to look beyond descriptive repre-
sentation in government. Thereby, it contributes to the discussion about minority representation 
and its effect on ethnic confrontations. While not all forms of representation affect protest in 
the same way, this study suggests that both, symbolic and instrumental aspects of representation 
explain the level of ethnic protest. This is significant as it contributes to the understanding of 
the role inclusion and representation play in ethnic confrontations. Only by disentangling de-
scriptive and substantive representation and analysing specific policies one can understand, 
how representation affects ethnic protest. While government inclusion may work as a proxy for 
policy responsiveness to some extent, it also appears to matter on its own (after policy respon-
siveness is considered). Some may interpret this as a sign that symbolic aspects of representa-
tion accommodate minorities. Others, however, might argue that the effect of descriptive rep-
resentation would disappear if more aspects of policy responsiveness were considered. Future 
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studies might, therefore, extend the findings of this paper in order to analyse whether the sym-
bolic aspect of representation continues to play a role once additional aspects of policy respon-
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Table A1: Ethnic Minority Groups 
Country Minority Group Size Years covered 
Albania Greeks 0.03 2001-2006 
Argentina Indigenous peoples 0.02 1983-2006 
Australia Aborigines 0.03 1950-2006 
Austria Slovenes 0.01 1955-2006 
Belgium Flemings 0.59 1950-2006 
Bolivia Aymara 0.25 1982-2006 
Bolivia Guarani 0.03 1982-2006 
Bolivia Quechua 0.31 1982-2006 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats 0.14 2002-2006 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Roma 0.01 2002-2006 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs 0.37 2002-2006 
Brazil Afro-Brazilians 0.45 1985-2006 
Bulgaria Roma 0.05 1990-2006 
Bulgaria Turks 0.10 1990-2006 
Canada French Canadians 0.04 1990-2006 
Canada Indigenous People 0.03 1990-2006 
Canada Québecois 0.20 1990-2006 
Chile Indigenous People 0.04 1989-2006 
Colombia Afro-columbians 0.23 1957-2006 
Colombia Indigenous People 0.03 1957-2006 
Costa Rica Afro-Costa Ricans 0.03 1950-2006 
Costa Rica Indigenous People 0.01 1950-2006 
Croatia Serbs 0.05 2000-2006 
Czech Republic Roma 0.01 1993-2006 
Ecuador Highland Indigenous People 0.29 1979-2006 
Ecuador Lowland indigenous 0.01 1979-2006 
El Salvador Indigenous People 0.10 1979-2006 
Estonia Byelorussians 0.01 1991-2006 
Estonia Russians 0.26 1991-2006 
Estonia Ukrainians 0.02 1991-2006 
Finland Swedes 0.06 1950-2006 
France Basques 0.01 1969-2006 
Georgia Abkhazians 0.04 1996-2006 
Georgia Adzhars 0.06 1996-2006 
Georgia Armenians 0.06 1996-2006 
Georgia South Ossetians 0.02 1996-2006 
Greece Macedonians 0.01 1974-2006 
Greece Muslims 0.01 1974-2006 
Greece Roma 0.01 1974-2006 
Guatemala Indigenous People 0.43 1996-2006 
Guyana Afro-Guyanese 0.30 1991-2006 
Guyana Indigenous People 0.09 1991-2006 
Honduras Garifuna 0.02 1980-2006 
Honduras Indigenous People 0.07 1980-2006 
Hungary Roma 0.05 1989-2006 
Israel Arabs 0.11 1950-2006 





Italy Sardinians 0.02 1950-2006 
Latvia Byelorussians 0.29 1991-2006 
Latvia Russians 0.03 1991-2006 
Latvia Ukrainians 0.04 1991-2006 
Lithuania Poles 0.07 1991-2006 
Lithuania Russians 0.06 1991-2006 
Macedonia Albanians 0.25 1992-2006 
Macedonia Roma 0.03 1992-2006 
Macedonia Serbs 0.02 1992-2006 
Macedonia Turks 0.04 1992-2006 
Mexico Mayans 0.01 1997-2006 
Mexico Other Indigenous People 0.13 1997-2006 
Moldova Gagauz 0.04 1994-2006 
Moldova Slavs 0.21 1994-2006 
New Zealand Maori 0.13 1950-2006 
Nicaragua Indigenous People 0.05 1990-2006 
Panama Afro-Panamians 0.14 1990-2006 
Panama Indigenous People 0.60 1990-2006 
Paraguay Indigenous People 0.02 1992-2006 
Peru Afro-Peruvians 0.05 2000-2006 
Peru Aymara 0.02 2000-2006 
Peru Indigenous lowland people 0.01 2000-2006 
Peru Quechua 0.34 2000-2006 
Romania Magyars 0.07 1992-2006 
Romania Roma 0.03 1992-2006 
Serbia-Montenegro Croats 0.01 2000-2005 
Serbia-Montenegro Hungarian 0.03 2000-2005 
Serbia-Montenegro Albanian 0.17 2000-2005 
Serbia-Montenegro Roma 0.01 2000-2005 
Serbia-Montenegro Sandzak Muslims 0.03 2000-2005 
Slovakia Hungarians 0.11 1993-2006 
Slovakia Roma 0.04 1993-2006 
Spain Basques 0.06 1976-2006 
Spain Catalans 0.02 1976-2006 
Spain Galicians 0.05 1976-2006 
Spain Roma 0.17 1976-2006 
Switzerland Swiss French 0.16 1950-2006 
Switzerland Swiss Italian 0.08 1950-2006 
Turkey Kurds 0.18 2002-2006 
Ukraine Russians 0.22 1991-2006 
United Kingdom Catholics in N.I. 0.01 1950-2006 
United Kingdom Scots 0.10 1950-2006 
United Kingdom Welsh 0.02 1950-2006 
United States African-Americans 0.13 1950-2006 
Uruguay Afro-Uruguayans 0.06 1985-2006 
Notes: Serbia 2006 and Montenegro 2006 fulfil the selection criteria, but are dropped from the analysis due to the 
lagging of the variables (as data for Serbia and Montenegro as separate countries is only available as of 2006 – i.e. 
the last year under observation). 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Non-violent protest 1832 1.68 1.32 0 4 
Violent rebellion 2402 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Economic discrimination 2405 1.81 1.48 0 4 
Language rights 2023 2.75 2.24 0 6 
Government inclusion 2405 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Autonomy 2405 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Concentration 2405 2.17 1.15 0 3 
Size 2405 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.59 
GDP p. C in 1000 US$ 2403 14.17 9.49 1.47 43.22 
Plurality System 2405 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Proportional System 2405 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Mixed System 2405 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Antigovernment Actions 2388 1.23 3.14 0 60 




Table A3: Explaining non-violent Protest behavior of Ethnic Minorities, robustness check 
 Only minorities > 1.5% Imputed Protest Variable 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Language Rights (lagged) -0.14** -0.13   -0.08* -0.07   
 (0.05) (0.11)   (0.04) (0.08)   
Language Rights^2 (lagged)  -0.00    -0.00   
  (0.02)    (0.02)   
Economic Discrimination (lagged)   0.05 0.39**   0.03 0.60*** 
   (0.06) (0.13)   (0.06) (0.12) 
Economic Discrimination^2 (lagged)    -0.08**    -0.13*** 
    (0.03)    (0.03) 
Government Inclusion -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.55*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.37*** -0.35*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Concentration 0.11+ 0.11+ 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Group Size 3.21*** 3.22*** 4.36*** 4.17*** 3.89*** 3.90*** 3.85*** 3.59*** 
 (0.78) (0.78) (0.90) (0.89) (0.93) (0.93) (0.94) (0.88) 
GDP p.c in 1000 US$ 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Proportional System 0.14 0.14 -0.15 -0.20 0.07 0.07 -0.33* -0.37* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) 
Mixed System 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.12 -0.14 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Anti-government Actions -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01+ 0.01+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Autonomy 0.20 0.20 0.22+ 0.25+ 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.06 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
State Repression -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.96*** 0.95*** 0.78** 0.62* 1.22*** 1.22*** 1.09*** 0.75** 




Table A3 (continued) 
Country level variance 0.48* 0.48* 3.54e-14 2.29e-10 0.29 0.29 2.01e-08 2.15e-10 
 (0.20) (0.20) (2.88e-13) (1.14e-07) (0.17) (0.17) (1.51e-07) (1.28e-09) 
Slope Variance 0.10** 0.10** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.10* 0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Group level variance 0.12+ 0.12+ 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.49** 0.49** 1.07*** 0.89*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.16) 
Year level variance 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observation 1265 1265 1564 1564 1935 1935 2299 2299 
N(country, group) 36,57 36,57 42, 71 42, 71 44, 76 44, 76 48, 93 48, 93 
Log Likelihood -1844.37 -1844.37 -2249.45 -2245.76 -2542.55 -2542.54 -3045.45 -3033.09 
BIC 3795.89 3803.03 4609.24 4609.20 5198.62 5206.17 6207.00 6190.02 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robustness checks for protest variable. Models 1-4 replicate the models in Table 1 with groups > 1.5% of the population. This allows testing the models with an almost complete 
sample. In Models 5-8, the protest variable was imputed for missing groups with the value of 0, thus assuming that groups not reported in the MAR sample were not experiencing 
high levels of protest (as they would be 'at risk' otherwise and included into the sample). Multilevel models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtmixed command.  




Table A4: Explaining violent and non-violent Protest Behavior of Ethnic Minorities, PTSCS Model 
 Non-violent Protest Violent Protest 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Language Rights (lagged) -0.07 -0.01   -0.37** -0.14   
 (0.07) (0.14)   (0.14) (0.36)   
Language Rights^2 (lagged)  -0.01    -0.05   
  (0.03)    (0.07)   
Economic Discrimination (lagged)   0.01 0.59*   0.68*** 3.49*** 
   (0.11) (0.27)   (0.15) (0.61) 
Economic Discrimination^2 (lagged)    -0.13*    -0.60*** 
    (0.06)    (0.12) 
Government Inclusion -0.67* -0.67* -0.68* -0.67* -1.07* -1.03* -1.52*** -1.44** 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45) 
Concentration -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.89* 0.94* 0.84** 1.11*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.37) (0.38) (0.30) (0.32) 
Group Size 7.47** 7.55** 7.68** 6.29* 2.11 2.29 1.83 0.28 
 (2.73) (2.74) (2.80) (2.65) (3.64) (3.70) (3.20) (3.90) 
GDP p.c in 1000 US$ 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.04* -0.05* -0.05* 0.03 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Proportional System -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.20 -0.78 -0.71 -1.08 -1.05 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.28) (0.26) (0.71) (0.73) (0.67) (0.75) 
Mixed System 0.27 0.25 0.17 0.11 -0.50 -0.43 -0.96 -0.74 
 (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) (0.26) (0.79) (0.81) (0.73) (0.81) 
Anti-government Actions 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.08* -0.08* -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Autonomy 0.24 0.21 0.06 0.07 1.20** 1.16* 1.08** 1.25** 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.46) (0.46) (0.38) (0.41) 
State Repression -0.08 -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 0.54** 0.52** 0.42** 0.24 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) 
Constant 0.87+ 0.84+ 0.48 0.28 -5.36*** -5.57*** -7.99*** -10.62*** 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.51) (0.53) (1.21) (1.25) (1.20) (1.48) 
(continued) 
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Table A4 (continued) 
Observations 1391 1391 1751 1751 1935 1935 2299 2299 
N (country, group) 38, 63 38, 63 44,79 44,79 44, 76 44, 76 48, 93 48, 93 
Log Likelihood -1944.78 -1944.47 -2417.55 -2407.89 -428.98 -428.72 -491.79 -475.53 
BIC 3961.93 3968.55 4909.78 4897.93 948.78 955.83 1076.46 1051.69 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
PTSCS models were calculated with the Stata 12 xtreg and xtlogit command. The models on non-violent conflict are calculated with clustered standard errors on the country-
level to control for country variance (Option is not available for logistic models). 
a Reference category is a majoritarian electoral system. 
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Table A5: The effect of policy responsiveness on ethnic minorities’ non-violent Protest, ordered 
logit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Language Rights (lag) -0.33** -0.34   
 (0.12) (0.23)   
Language Rights^2 (lag)  0.00   
  (0.04)   
Economic Discrimination (lag)   0.09 1.02*** 
   (0.11) (0.26) 
Economic Discrimination^2 (lag)    -0.22*** 
    (0.06) 
Government Inclusion (lag) -0.94*** -0.94*** -0.93*** -0.86*** 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23) 
Territorial Autonomy 0.40 0.41 0.20 0.26 
 (0.31) (0.33) (0.25) (0.25) 
Territorial Concentration 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.24+ 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Group Size 6.67*** 6.65*** 8.75*** 8.31*** 
 (1.92) (1.93) (1.93) (1.89) 
GDP p.c in 1000 US$ 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Proportional System 0.08 0.08 -0.62+ -0.73* 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.34) (0.34) 
Mixed System 0.20 0.20 0.01 -0.07 
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.35) (0.35) 
Anti-government Actions 0.00 0.00 0.04* 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
State Repression -0.09 -0.09 0.06 0.04 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) 
Cut 1 -0.39 -0.40 0.27 0.73 
 (0.59) (0.60) (0.53) (0.54) 
Cut 2 1.02+ 1.01+ 1.57** 2.04*** 
 (0.59) (0.60) (0.54) (0.55) 
Cut 3 2.68*** 2.67*** 3.08*** 3.56*** 
 (0.59) (0.60) (0.54) (0.55) 
Cut 4 4.77*** 4.76*** 5.17*** 5.65*** 
 (0.60) (0.61) (0.55) (0.56) 
Level 3 Variance (slope) 0.59* 0.58* 0.27 0.24 
 (0.23) (0.22) (.) (.) 
Level 3 Variance (intercept) 2.24** 2.24** 3.11e-28 1.63e-28 
 (0.99) (0.99) (78.53) (81.91) 
Level 2 Variance (intercept) 0.75** 0.74** 2.57*** 2.46*** 
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.60) (0.58) 
Observations 1391 1391 1751 1751 
N (country, ethnic groups) 38, 63 38, 63 44,79 44,79 
Log-Likelihood -1883.95 -1883.95 -2279.80 -2272.42 
BIC 3890.95 3898.18 4679.10 4671.80 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Hierarchical ordered logit models were calculated with the meologit command in Stata 14. 
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Figure A6: Overview of selected indigenous protests in Bolivia 
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Description of the Dataset „Ethnic minorities in democracies“ 
 
The dataset on “Ethnic minorities in democracies” covers countries since 1945 from 
Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America and Oceania, where ethnic minority 
groups are politically relevant and exceed one per cent of the population. Ethnic minorities are 
defined as autochthonous or ethno-nationalist minorities based on perceived common origin, 
shared language, culture or religion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 13; Fearon 2003, 
197; Horowitz 1985, 17–18). Hence, it includes pluri-ethnic democracies (Freedom House 
(2011) ≤ 4 and Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2011) ≥ 6) with at least two ethnic groups and 
more than 500’000 inhabitants. In cases where the two ratings (Freedom House and Polity IV) 
differed, the country was only included if it is rated at most one scale-point below the 
democracy threshold (on the measure where it was not rated as democratic). For countries 
with interrupted democratic periods only the latest democratic period was counted (e.g. 
Turkey). Countries with a recent breakdown of democracy (e.g. Venezuela) were excluded 
from the dataset.  
Datasets on ethnic minorities often suffer from selection bias, because one needs to 
decide which of the at least 5000 existing ethnic groups to include (Birnir et al. 2014; Hug 
2013; Kymlicka 1995). In order to reduce problems of selection bias I chose politically 
relevant (salient) ethnic groups on the basis of the EPR dataset on ethnic power relations 
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and the Minority at Risk dataset (Minorities at Risk 
Project 2009). The combination of both datasets reduces the selection bias associated with 
datasets on ethnicity (especially with MAR) (Hug 2013). 




Extension of MAR data 
 
Three indicators are based on MAR data (violent and non-violent protest, economic 
discrimination). In order to increase the coverage of these indicators and gather data for all 




- Minority Rights Group International : http://www.minorityrights.org (main source, 
used for: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Costa Rica, Finland, Guyana, Macedonia, Spain, 
UK, Uruguay) 
- Pan, C. and Pfeil, B.S., 2006. Minderheitenrechte in Europa. Handbuch der 
europäischen Volksgruppen, Band 2. Wien: Springer Verlag. (Latvia & Estonia) 
- Wheatley, J., 2004. Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Javakheti 




According to Birnir (2011) only very few of the group that MAR does not cover have 
engaged in violent protest against the state. Therefore, I did a google search for all groups and 
countries where data on rebellion was missing and concluded that no violent rebellion had 





In contrast to violent protest, non-violent protest occurs more often, also for groups that are 
not covered by MAR (e.g. parts of the French speaking population of Switzerland, Flemish 
population of Belgium). It was not possible to reliably code those protests for all missing 
countries with additional information. In particular, it was only possible to code the level of 
non-violent protest for Ukrainians and Byelorussians in Estonia and Latvia (replaced with 
values for the Russian minority, since many argue that these groups highly overlap and since 
they rarely mobilize independently). 
 
 
Newly compiled indicators 
 
Descriptive Representation in Parliament:  
 
The dataset provides a measure of the overall descriptive representation in parliament (i.e. in 
minority parties and mainstream parties). For this purpose, the share of minority MPs was 
compared to the share of the minority in the population. Perfectly proportional descriptive 
representation is given, when the share of minority MPs corresponds to the minority’s share in 
the population. Sources typically contain information on the number of MPs in parliament 
which was then related to the total number of seats in the lower house in order to calculate the 




- Human rights reports (main source): http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
- Years before 1999: http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=crhrp 
- For 2006: Ruedin, D., 2009. Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National 




- Albania: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/16856 
- Brazil: Johnson, O.A.I., 1998. Racial Representation and Brazilian Politics: Black 
Members of the National Congress, 1983–1999. Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs, 40(4), pp.97–118. 
- Bulgaria: Protsyk, O. and Sachariew, K., 2012. Recruitment and Representation of 
Ethnic Minorities under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Bulgaria. East 










- Latin American Countries: Van Cott, D.L., 2000. The friendly liquidation of the past. 
The Politis of Diversity in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
- Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova: Crowther, W.E. and Matonyte, I., 2007. Parliamentary 
elites as a democratic thermometer: Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova compared. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40(3), pp.281–299. 
- Macedonia:  http://www.sobranie.mk/home-en.nspx 




o Protsyk, O. and Osoian, I., 2010. Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties?: Party 
competition and legislative recruitment in Moldova. ECMI Working Paper. 
- New Zealand: 
o McLeay, E.M., 1980. Political argument about representation: the case of the 
Maori seats. Political Studies, XXVlll(1), pp.43–62. 
o Fleras, A., 2009. From Social Control towards Political Self-Determination? 
Maori Seats and the Politics of Separate Maori Representation in New 
Zealand. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 18(03), p.551. 
- Romania:  
o Chatre, B., Protsyk, O. and Matichescu, M., 2009. Representational 
consequences of special mechanisms for ethnic minority inclusion : evidence 
from Romania. 
- Switzerland: 
o Staatskalender Schweiz: http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch 
- United States: 
o Lublin, D., 1999. The Paradox of Representation. Princeton, New Jersey: 






For some countries where ethnic minority groups live very concentrated, the number of MPs 
who are elected from a certain district was used as a proxy, when no other information was 
available. This concerns Wales in the UK, and the Basque region in France. 
 
 
Representation in Ethnic Minority Parties 
 
In addition to descriptive representation in parliament the share of minority MPs which is 
elected through ethnic minority parties is accounted for in the dataset. For this purpose a party 
is defined as ethnic when its representatives are primarily elected by members of one ethnic 
group and their main political appeal is based on ethnicity. 
 
Sources for the identification of minority parties 
 
- Bochsler, D., 2010. Electoral Rules and the Representation of Ethnic Minorties in 
Post-Communist Democracies. European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 2007/8(7), 
pp.153–180. 
- Ishiyama, J., 2009. Do Ethnic Parties Promote Minority Ethnic Conflict? Nationalism 
and Ethnic Politics, 15(1), pp.56–83. 
- Reed, R., 2002. New Rules for the Game: Paraguayan Indigenous Groups and the 
Transition to Democracy. In: D. Mabury-Lewis, ed., The Politics of Ethnicity: 
Indigenous Peoples in Latin American States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, pp.309–328. 
- Van Cott, D.L., 2005. From Movements to Parties in Latin America. The Evolution of 
Ethnic Politics. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
- Pan, C. and Pfeil, B.S., 2006. Minderheitenrechte in Europa. Handbuch der 
europäischen Volksgruppen, Band 2. Wien: Springer Verlag. 
 
Additional sources for election results 
 
- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P., 2001. New Tools in 
Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. The World 
Bank Economic Review, 15(1), pp.165–176. 
- Nordsiek, W., 2012. Parties and Elections. The database about parliamentary 
elections and political parties in Europe. [online] Available at: http://www.parties-
and-elections.eu/. 
- European Election Database, 2012. Data on various elections. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/>. 
- Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2012. PARLINE Database on national parliaments. 
[online] Available at: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp. 
 
 




- Human rights reports (main source): http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 




- Birnir, J.K. and Satana, N.S., 2013. Religion and Coalition Politics. Comparative 
Political Studies, 46(1), pp.3–30. 
- Birnir, J.K., 2007. Ethnicity and Electoral Politics. Cambridge, New York, 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
- Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P., 2001. New Tools in 
Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. The World 
Bank Economic Review, 15(1), pp.165–176. 
- Nordsiek, W., 2012. Parties and Elections. The database about parliamentary 
elections and political parties in Europe. [online] Available at: http://www.parties-
and-elections.eu/. 
- European Election Database, 2012. Data on various elections. [online] Available at: 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/. 
- Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU), 2012. PARLINE Database on national parliaments. 
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This dissertation studies the causes and consequences of policy responsiveness towards 
ethnic minorities in democracies worldwide. It analyses under which conditions descriptive 
representation in parliament influences policy responsiveness towards minorities. It then 
focuses on the consequences of these two types of representation for ethnic conflict and 
political support among ethnic minorities. 
It draws on data from more than 40 countries and 90 minority groups in electoral 
democracies in Europe, North and South America, and Oceania and presents new data to test 
the hypotheses. 
In sum, the dissertation shows that policy responsiveness differs significantly between 
minority and majority groups and that governments are often less responsive to members of 
minority than majority groups. Descriptive representation indeed incraeses policy 
responsiveness, especially when minority MPs have sufficient leverage. The fact that 
governments are less responsive towards minorities in many democracies is normatively 
problematic because one of the main pillars of democracy is only partially fulfilled. But it 
also has important empirical consequences: a lack of policy responsiveness negatively affects 
political support, and increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict.  
 
